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Voorwoord 
 
Met het betrekken van marktpartijen in de planning van weginfrastructuur slaat 
Rijkswaterstaat een weg in de richting vannieuwe vormen van publiek-private 
samenwerking. Met wegen als gezamenlijk richtpunt en asfalt als het smeermiddel 
gaan publieke en private partijen een samenwerking aan. Een dergelijke 
samenwerking vereist het loslaten van traditionele werkwijzen. En hoewel politieke 
besluitvorming en randvoorwaarden vanuit de maatschappij een rol spelen, blijft veel 
afhangen van onderlinge communicatie en vertrouwen. Mijn promotieonderzoek heeft 
zich gericht op deze samenwerking en de wegen waarop je succesvol een proces kunt 
doorlopen, een project kunt realiseren en gezamenlijk een weg kunt voltooien. 
 
Het mooie van wegen is dat ze altijd ergens toe leiden, maar niet altijd op de manier 
waarop je vooraf had gedacht. Op basis van een routekaart kun je vooraf een beeld 
vormen van een reis, maar de eigenlijke reis en het bereiken van de bestemming 
kunnen anders zijn dan verwacht. Deels ligt dit aan de keuzes die je op de weg maakt, 
de opties die je links laat liggen en de afslagen die je neemt. Deels ligt het aan de 
ervaring die je opdoet en de ontwikkeling die je onderweg doormaakt. Met dit 
proefschrift is een reis voor mij tot een einde gekomen, en ik ben velen dankbaar voor 
hun hulp bij het nadenken over mogelijke bestemmingen, het bepalen van de route, het 
vermaak onderweg, het bereiken van de bestemming en het succesvol voltooien van dit 
‘reisverslag’.  
 
Allereerst mijn promotores, Jos Arts en Taede Tillema; ik kan jullie niet genoeg 
bedanken. Jos, je enthousiaste betrokkenheid vormde een grenzeloze bron van 
inspiratie, waarbij je tomeloze energie, vooral in de vroege ochtend, aanstekelijk 
werkte. Taede, jouw rust en ervaring brachten focus waar dat nodig was: je was immer 
direct betrokken en wees me altijd in de goede richting.  
 
Hoewel promoveren een individuele bezigheid is, kon ik altijd terugvallen op het team 
Duurzame Wegen. Niels Heeres, Tim Busscher en Marije Hamersma: binnen de 
samenwerking met Rijkswaterstaat was het fijn om belevenissen en ervaringen met jullie 
te kunnen delen. Ook voormalige teamleden Catherine Maloir en Rik Struiksma wil ik 
hierbij niet vergeten. Jullie waren allen altijd beschikbaar voor een praatje: soms meer 
inhoudelijk, over asfaltboeren en suikerooms, en soms minder, over profielvrije ruimtes. 
Wim Leendertse, Frits Verhees en Arjan Hijdra: jullie betrokkenheid als externe 
promovendi zorgde voor verfrissende inzichten op theorie en praktijk, waarvan ik jullie 
zeer erkentelijk ben. 
 
Daarnaast wil ik Rijkswaterstaat bedanken voor de mogelijkheid om dit onderzoek te 
kunnen doen en de ondersteuning die ze daarbij bood. In het bijzonder Arthur, 
Diederik, Hans, Marcelle, Marijke, Mieke, Obbe en Roel: dankzij jullie vond ik mijn weg 
binnen deze fascinerende organisatie en denk ik inmiddels aardig op de hoogte te zijn 
van de talloze drie-letter-afkortingen. Daarnaast wil ik graag alle betrokken 
organisaties bedanken, zowel publiek als privaat, die me gedurende mijn onderzoek 
hartelijk hebben ontvangen om me een kijkje te geven in de keuken van de 
wegenplanning, van aanbesteding tot beheer en onderhoud.  
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De ex-collega’s van planologie in Groningen wil ik ook graag bedanken: Ferry, Chris, 
Ivo, Ward, en Stefan. Ook de andere ex-collega’s bij de Faculteit Ruimtelijke 
Wetenschappen hebben mijn tijd in Groningen erg plezierig gemaakt, in het bijzonder 
denk ik daarbij aan Sierdjan, Viktor, Heike, Mirjam, Rixt, Petra, Marianna, Elen-Maarja 
en Billie. Verder wil ik alle vrienden van (zaal)voetbal, studie of anderszins, uit 
Groningen, Twente, Nijmegen of waar dan ook, bedanken voor zowel de getoonde 
interesse en betrokkenheid bij het proefschrift, als de (soms) noodzakelijke desinteresse 
door mij afleiding te bieden. 
 
Het laatste jaar bood Erwin van der Krabben me de mogelijkheid om, naast het 
opstarten van mijn onderzoekswerkzaamheden in Nijmegen, tijd te kunnen steken in het 
afronden van mijn proefschrift, bedankt hiervoor. Nieuwe collega’s in Nijmegen, jullie 
worden van harte bedankt voor het warme welkom in jullie midden.  
 
Alles wat afgerond wordt heeft ook een begin: Pa en ma, ik ben jullie erg dankbaar 
voor alles wat jullie voor mij door de jaren hebben betekend. Anke, Krijn en Merle: 
jullie hebben er mede voor gezorgd ik nooit alleen was en met alle plezier terugdenk 
aan mijn jeugd en tegelijkertijd vooruitkijk naar de toekomst.  
 
Tenslotte, Korrie, jij hebt me doen beseffen dat ik me met jou overal thuis kan voelen. 
Je steunt me onvoorwaardelijk, vult me aan en daagt me uit waar nodig. Ik ben blij en 
dankbaar dat je bij me bent, laiverd. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The complexity of current society makes planning increasingly difficult (Booher & Innes 
2002; Castells, 1995), which is, for example, noticeable in the planning of Dutch road 
infrastructure (Arts, 2007). One reason is that the increasing scarcity of available space 
for land-use planning puts pressure on the available land. It makes it harder to put 
initiatives into practice, as different stakes and values have to be balanced in order to 
prevent conflicts, for example between development and nature preservation (De Roo, 
1999). Also, new actors are introduced to the institutional landscape and existing ones 
take up different roles. Over the past years, national governments have distributed 
tasks to both the European Union and to regional governments (Healey, 2004; Cooke 
et al., 2000). Furthermore, increased public participation plays an important role in 
planning. Over the years, civil society has become more actively involved in exploring, 
developing and negotiating plans and projects. A final development, which is at the 
heart of this study, is the increased privatization of public services since the 1980s. This 
development is changing the roles of and relations between government and private 
market parties. 
 
The effects of complexity are clearly visible in planning in general and in road 
infrastructure planning in particular. Uncertainties and risks have been introduced (Van 
der Heijden, 1996) that cause problems and issues throughout the stages of the 
planning lifecycle: from strategic issues in policymaking to operational problems in 
subsequent stages of project development, construction and maintenance. The strategic 
issues have been discussed extensively in international planning literature, for example 
in the works on strategic planning by Healey (2009) and Albrechts (2004). These 
include the formulation of long-term strategies and policies to deal with complexity at a 
strategic level. The operational problems in project plan development and construction 
have also been discussed frequently in planning literature, and include exceeded 
timeframes and cost overruns, as investigated by Haynes and Krmenec (1989), 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002; 2003) and Flyvbjerg (2005). Operational problems in the 
subsequent operation and maintenance of road infrastructure seem to receive less 
attention in international planning literature. 
 
In Dutch road infrastructure planning, the primary focus of this study, the effects of 
complexity have become clear as well. In the Netherlands, a densely populated country 
with a strong planning tradition (see Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000), a balance of values 
and interests has to be created on a limited amount of available land (Arts, 2007; 
Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1998). The increasing complexity of infrastructure 
planning in the Netherlands results in budget overruns during the construction stage 
(Cantarelli, 2012; TCI, 2005). In addition, planning of various infrastructure projects 
has been slowed down or halted during the project development stage due to societal 
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and legal discussions (De Jong & Geerlings, 2004). The problems experienced in road 
infrastructure planning can be attributed to the hierarchical and top-down nature of its 
approach (Van der Heijden, 1996; Vickerman, 2005; Arts, 2007). Such a hierarchical 
and directive approach seems to be less capable of dealing with the challenges that 
result from increasing complexity (see Giddens, 1994), which, as mentioned before, 
results in budget overruns and project standstills. 
 
In 2008, the Elverding committee investigated how to prevent standstills in the Dutch 
road infrastructure planning process and how to deliver projects within time and budget 
(Elverding Committee, 2008). In its advice to the Minister of Transport, Public Works 
and Water Management,1 strong attention was paid to the staged and fragmented 
approach to infrastructure planning with scattered involvement of the public and 
private parties (Lenferink et al., 2008). Over the last decade, major institutional 
changes have been implemented in order to cope with the challenges and problems in 
Dutch road infrastructure projects. The executive agency of the current Dutch Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment (the Directorate-General for Public works and 
Water management, in Dutch: “Rijkswaterstaat”) which, amongst other things, is 
responsible for the Dutch national highway network, aims to transform from a 
hierarchical and closed organization to a public-oriented open organization (Van den 
Brink, 2009, Rijkswaterstaat, 2008a; 2011). In addition, it increasingly involves market 
parties throughout the planning process of road infrastructure by distributing 
responsibilities in design, construction, maintenance and operation to these private 
market parties (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008a; 2011).  
 
This chapter starts by elaborating on the challenges in infrastructure. Five challenges 
are discussed and connected to relevant theoretical discussions in planning literature. 
Subsequently, a lifecycle approach to infrastructure planning is developed. This includes 
a description of the Dutch infrastructure planning process, a discussion of forward and 
backward lifecycle integration and the involvement of market parties in the planning 
process. Subsequently a system’s perspective on lifecycle integration is developed that 
is composed of the operationalization of concepts of project complexity, governance 
strategies and institutional conditions. Next, the scope of the study is given: the problem 
definition, the research goal and the research questions. The last sections of this chapter 
provide the research approach, including a discussion on the research methodology, 
and, finally, the outline of this study. 
 
                                              
 
1 In 2010 the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (in Dutch: Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, V&W) partly merged with the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (in Dutch: 
Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, VROM) to form the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
the Environment (in Dutch: Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, I&M). Some smaller other parts of VROM and 
V&W merged into other ministries. 
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1.2 Setting the stage: Challenges in road infrastructure planning 
The increasing complexity makes that traditional road infrastructure planning 
approaches are confronted with several relevant challenges that are related to the 
character of the planning process of road infrastructure. These challenges include 
dealing with the implementation gap, the top-down focus of the planning process, the 
limits to government dominance in planning, the need to incorporate learning in the 
planning process, and setting a long-term overarching sustainability goal in the 
planning process.2 These challenges play a role in road infrastructure planning, but can 
also be recognized in the planning of other types of infrastructure (waterways, 
railways, electricity, etcetera) and in planning in general.  
 
1.2.1 Bridging the implementation gap  
The first challenge is posed by the strong orientation of planning on drafting plans and 
on reaching a planning consent decision. This decision is reached through a staged 
process in which the government structurally makes choices. Often, the final product of 
this process is a plan: a desired spatial intervention accompanied by technical, legal, 
financial-economic and political-administrative considerations. As Voogd puts it, 
“Planning is the systematic preparation of actions that shape and implement policy, 
focused on deliberate interventions in the spatial structure and on the organization of these 
interventions, in order to preserve and, if possible, improve spatial quality” (2001, 
translation by author). This definition illustrates the primary concern of planning with 
preparation: it is aimed at arriving at a plan that meets the expectations of the actors 
involved and respects the values at stake. However, there is a difference between 
rhetoric and reality, between plans and practice, as Banister notes: “Good intentions 
never get really effectively implemented” (2002, p. 108). In carrying out the 
infrastructure planning procedures, there seems to be only a limited interest in the 
translation of plans into projects and, subsequently, the execution of these projects. The 
planning process seems primarily focused on carrying out preparatory planning 
procedures in such a way that a consent decision can be reached. Voogd and Woltjer 
(2010) describe this as part of a decision-oriented style of planning.3 
 
As a result of the orientation on plan development, a disconnection exists between the 
strategic plan development stages of policymaking and project plan development and 
the operational project implementation stages of construction and operation and 
maintenance (see Figure 1.1).4 Upon switching from the first to the second stage, new 
                                              
 
2 These challenges are not typical for Dutch infrastructure planning: they can be recognized in other countries, at 
other (local, regional and international) levels, and in other fields of planning as well. 
3 Voogd and Woltjer (2010) also describe the potential of including feedforward and feedback cycles in 
decision-oriented planning approaches (see also De Roo & Voogd, 2004 and Section 1.2.4). 
4 Although other subdivisions of the planning lifecycle can be made (see Ward & Chapman, 1995), in general 
these four stages are recognized in both planning literature and planning practice (see Highways Agency, 2008; 
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actors become involved, who have other responsibilities and different perspectives. The 
predominantly strategic planning stage and the more operational implementation stage 
result in different products being delivered: a project proposal laid down in a planning 
consent decision versus a constructed and maintained infrastructure project. As a 
consequence of the different focus, different actors and different products of the 
planning and implementation stages, the effective translation of plans into actions 
proves difficult. The resulting disconnection between plan development and 
implementation is also referred to as the implementation gap (Cloke, 1987; Dunsire, 
1978), which can be described as “a discrepancy between what plans are intended to 
deliver and what they actually deliver” (Baker & Hincks, 2009, pp. 175-176). 
Traditionally, the implementation gap is related to the follow-up and implementation of 
project plans in project construction, maintenance and operation, see Figure 1.1 (Cherp 
et al., 2011; Arts et al., 2011). The implementation gap has not had a strong focus in 
planning literature, which tends to focus more on the early stages of plan preparation 
and policymaking. However, over the years, the implementation gap has been the focus 
of attention in implementation studies, most notably in the works of Wildavsky (1973), 
Elmore (1979), Sabatier (1986) and Barret (2004).  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Implementation gap between strategic planning stages and operational project 
implementation stages. 
 
1.2.2. The top-down focus of the planning process  
Traditionally, the planning process for road infrastructure at the national level can be 
characterized as rather linear and top-down (Van der Heijden, 1996), performed step-
by-step in strictly delimited processes. The process is separated from outside influences 
as much as possible by what Collingridge (1984) describes as ‘hedging’. In the 
planning process, directive instruments steer towards project implementation, ensuring 
                                                                                                                                             
 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2011) . See Section 1.3.1 and Figure 6 for a detailed description 
of Dutch planning stages in the infrastructure planning process. 
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the proper implementation of plans in later stages (see Figure 1.2, and see Section 
1.3.1 for a description of the (Dutch) infrastructure planning process). Over the years, 
however, planners have abandoned the belief that a top-down, hierarchical design 
could solve all problems in society (Dryzek, 1993). Planning in the twentieth century 
displays a development from technical planning via comprehensive rational planning 
towards communicative, interaction-oriented planning in the 1990s (Woltjer, 2000). The 
essential tool for establishing the interaction and the associated negotiation and 
participation is communication, which inspired Healey to call this development the 
‘communicative turn’ (Healey, 1997). In recent years, as a result of the communicative 
turn, attention in planning has focused on social networks5 and other fluid types of 
collaborative governance (see Ansell & Gash, 2008; Edelenbos et al., 2009). The 
infrastructure planning process, however, can still be characterized as linear and top-
down, and as such, does not seem suited for application in current complex society. A 
directive and hierarchical way of steering leaves no possibilities for feedback and can 
increase the danger of a ‘lock-in’ (Bertolini, 2005; Elverding, 2008). The directive 
fashion in which national level infrastructure planning is conducted fuels opposition at 
the local level, where local actors are confronted with the imposed, ‘hedged’ results. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Top-down directive management focus in the infrastructure planning process. 
 
More interaction in an approach with a more flexible character – involving what 
Collingridge (1984) refers to as ‘flexing’ – could be part of the solution. Opposite to 
the aforementioned hedged processes, which seek to limit or minimize the risks by 
preventing the worst possible outcome, flexing aims to continuously “search for 
                                              
 
5 In this study the concept of network is used in two different ways. Networks can refer to social networks of actors 
that interact within a given institutional structure. The term network is also used to describe road infrastructure 
networks: the physical system of road infrastructure, consisting of highways, secondary roads, bridges, tunnels, 
etcetera.  
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overlooked options and supplement salient information” (Collingridge, 1983). The 
discovery of overlooked options and information is only useful when the selection of 
alternative options is a possibility. Therefore, approaches are required that can be 
adjusted if necessary, that enable for resilience through contingencies (Alexander, 
1994; Lawrence & Lörsch, 1967) and that introduce opportunities for adaptive 
planning (Gunderson & Holling, 2009; Holling, 1978). Issues in planning as a result of a 
complex society could then be dealt with in a pragmatic way (in line with the 
pragmatist school of thought, see Mead et al., 1972; Rorty, 1991). In order to come to 
such an approach to planning, it can be necessary to reconsider the directive forward 
focus of planning and be more open to feedback: it would require governments to be 
more reflective on their actions and position in the field (Schön, 1995).  
 
1.2.3 Limits to government  
A third challenge is the changing role of government in infrastructure planning. In 
traditional infrastructure planning, government had a dominant position compared to 
the other main groups of actors: the civil society and the market. The traditional 
dominant role of government fitted well with the directive planning approach and the 
aforementioned focus on plan development. Government as the central actor was 
responsible for, and took care of the activities in all the stages of the planning process. 
In recent years, the central role and dominant position of government is being 
questioned by societal actors in the Netherlands and in other countries. Government 
organizations still mainly approach planning hierarchically (Hill & Lynn, 2005), whereas 
societal actors press increasingly for other, more informal forms of governance (Peters 
& Pierre, 1998; Meuleman, 2008). In planning and public administration literature 
considerable attention is given to the relation of government with the social networks in 
civil society, for example in the communicative and collaborative planning debates 
(Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 1999) and in network governance (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2000).  
 
Besides the government-centred hierarchical model of organization and the network 
organizational model that relates to civil society, Thompson et al. (1991) recognize a 
third main organization model in planning and public administration: the market model. 
This organizational model approaches planning as a market system, and introduces the 
involvement of private business organizations in the planning arena. The active 
involvement of this group of actors received less attention in planning literature, but 
recently, a trend towards more market-oriented policies in politics and administration 
has become noticeable. New public management, described by Saint-Martin (2000) as 
the collection of core values and instruments which suppose that governmental agencies 
can be run more efficiently by applying privatization and business management 
techniques, has been introduced to public administration and planning worldwide 
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Lane, 2000). Combined with increasing neoliberal 
influences in Western societies in the last decades (Harvey, 2005; Roy et al., 2007), the 
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role and position of both government and market in infrastructure planning are being 
reassessed. Increased market involvement is applied to supplement and replace 
national government, which limits its activities to its core responsibilities. In practice, this 
means that government reduces its role in the realization and maintenance stages of the 
planning process in order to establish a smaller and more efficient government 
organization. More responsibilities in construction and maintenance are distributed to 
market parties which are also increasingly involved in design of road infrastructure. This 
means that they are involved earlier, in the project plan development stage (see Figure 
1.3 and Section 1.3.3). 
 
  
Figure 1.3: Increased market involved and retreating government. 
 
1.2.4 The need for learning in planning 
A fourth challenge is posed by the rather conservative, self-enforcing nature of 
institutions involved in planning. Planning traditionally tends to look for solutions 
acquired through traditional paths by the regular set of actors (see Berger & Luckman, 
1967). Organizational routines are performed in which learning is limited to enhancing 
processes and structures that already exist within the organization. Such learning is 
single looped (Argyris & Schön, 1978), as it is aimed at reinforcing and reinstating the 
position of an agency within the existing structure, i.e. the planning system (Giddens, 
1984). Routines, rules and procedures are optimized, and external influences are 
excluded through hedging (Collingridge, 1984), as previously discussed. In order to 
respond to challenges posed by the complex society, single loop learning is not 
sufficient as the limits of the current planning system apply and there is no incentive to 
look beyond traditional paths and approaches. Organizational learning requires 
discussing and possibly adapting the nature and limits of a system. In literature, the 
concept of learning is connected to adaptiveness in planning: in the form of adaptive 
systems (see Allen, 2001; Holland, 1995) and adaptive planning approaches (see 
Gunderson & Holling, 2009, and Section 1.2.2). Introducing adaptiveness requires 
‘double loop learning’ in which new capabilities and new contingencies are created 
based on generated insights in occurring system structures. Double loop learning is more 
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fundamental than single loop learning, since it determines the long-term effectiveness of 
a system (Argyris, 1992).6  
 
In the context of infrastructure planning, opportunities for both single and double loop 
learning can be found in horizontal and vertical planning coordination. Through 
horizontal coordination links with other fields of planning can be established. This can 
be helpful in coming to new integrated approaches on transportation and land-use 
(Stead, 2003) or infrastructure and land-use (Heeres et al., 2010). Vertical 
coordination considers the integration between actors at different levels of scale 
(Voogd & Woltjer, 2010). It could prove to be a promising strategy for planning, as 
illustrated by experiences with the similar concept of supply chain integration in the 
private sector (see Burgess et al., 2006; Halldorsson et al., 2007). Vertical coordination 
in the infrastructure planning process would not only connect governments at different 
levels of scale, but through learning loops could also provide a connection to the 
involvement of market parties from later implementation stages. By vertically 
integrating the planning process, market parties playing a role in later stages are 
involved earlier. These market parties especially have knowledge and experience in 
constructing and maintaining infrastructure (see also Section 1.2.3 and Figure 1.4). 
Vertically integrating the planning lifecycle could lead to institutional innovation that 
results in added value and cost savings (Laverman, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 1.4: Learning through vertical coordination loops in the planning process. 
 
1.2.5 Setting an overarching goal: in search of sustainable development  
Previously discussed challenges on the plan development orientation, the top-down 
focus, the government dominance and the role of learning in planning are inspired by 
the idea that the infrastructure planning process could be made more efficient and 
effective. Recently, another goal has become increasingly important: global climate 
changes, concerns about the environment and fossil fuel scarcity have inspired a call for 
                                              
 
6 In addition, triple loop learning, which focuses on the way learning itself can be optimized (Swieringa & 
Wierdsma, 1992), can also be recognized (Argyris & Schön, 1978). However, this concept is beyond the scope of 
this discussion on challenges in infrastructure planning. 
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sustainable development that is reflected in the call for new approaches to 
infrastructure planning (Arts, 2007).7 It has proven to be difficult to bring sustainability 
into practice effectively (O’Riordan & Voisey, 1998; De Roo & Porter, 2007; Tillema & 
Arts, 2011). The broad operational definitions of the sustainable development concept 
can, for example, include the promotion of principles such as inter- and intra-
generational equity and safeguarding long-term ecological quality (Gibson, 2005), 
meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
(WCED, 1987) or numerous other aspects (see Pearce et al., 1989 for an overview). 
These definitions are rather vague and may prove to be useless for policymaking 
(Holden, 2007).  
 
However, besides the definition issue, perhaps a more important explanation for the 
difficulties in bringing sustainability into practice is that it requires a transition (Kemp et 
al., 2007) or a system change (Gunder, 2004). Allen (2001) states that sustainability 
can either be the result of amplifying or suppressing unchanging individual activities in 
a system, or the result of “adaptive learning processes of transformation within the 
entities in a system” (p. 176). Although the sustainability concept has the ability to 
connect actors and although it has a high transformative power (Healey, 2007), the 
required system change is proving hard to achieve. A still relevant observation made 
by the Brundtland commission in the late 1980s states that governments do not seem to 
be aware of the need to change themselves in order to better respond to the speed 
and scale of global changes (WCED, 1987). 
 
In practice, the role of sustainable development in planning is limited because the 
strategic visions on sustainability can only partially be connected to fragmented 
operational norms and targets, such as resource management assessment and CO2 
reduction targets in procurement (Tillema & Arts, 2011). These concepts encompass only 
fragments of sustainability. It seems to be impossible to provide a comprehensive 
definition of sustainability, but it must be stressed that the cyclical and inclusive nature is 
essential to the concept and its practical application. From a planning process 
perspective, sustainability involves linking forward from policymaking to maintenance 
and also linking back to policy and decision-making, thereby increasing its inclusivity 
over time (Arts, 2007), and establishing cycles from cradle to grave over the complete 
lifecycle (Ny et al., 2006) (see Figure 1.5). In the separate stages of the planning 
process this would come down to creating opportunities for including more sustainability 
in policy-making and project plan development, and successfully bringing these into 
practice in the stages of construction and operation and maintenance.  
 
                                              
 
7 A reason for this quest for new approaches lies in the determining character and irreversible consequences of 
developing infrastructure, for example noticeable in scattered nature and dispelled cultural heritage, which 
makes the search for sustainable development approaches to infrastructure planning necessary. 
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Figure 1.5: Cyclical nature of sustainability in the planning process. 
 
1.3 A lifecycle approach for infrastructure planning 
The challenges described in the previous section, illustrate that government is in need of 
an approach that provides a connection to later project development stages, includes 
feedback from practice, actively involves market actors, enables learning and 
facilitates opportunities for improving sustainability. However, before it is possible to 
elaborate on potential components and elements in such an approach (Section 1.3.2 
onwards), the traditional planning procedure and the increased market involvement in 
Dutch infrastructure planning will be described (Section 1.3.1). Insight into these 
specifics of the Dutch infrastructure planning process is relevant to this research because 
the procedure strongly guides and structures the Dutch planning process for road 
infrastructure. In this process, the distinction between stages of policymaking, project 
plan development, construction and operation and maintenance (taken as the basis for 
the discussions in Section 1.2 and Figures 1.1 to 1.5) is also made. 
 
1.3.1 Traditional infrastructure planning process in the Netherlands 
As stated before (see Section 1.1), this study will primarily focus on Dutch road 
infrastructure planning. The Netherlands has a strong planning tradition supported by a 
robust legal framework, in which planning is strongly regulated by government (Hajer 
& Zonneveld, 2000). The introduction of new public management and market 
involvement, which are internationally recognized developments in planning (Lane, 
2000; Sager, 2009), has been strongly promoted by the Dutch national government 
during the last decades. Especially in road infrastructure planning, many initiatives have 
been developed for stronger involvement of market parties. These initiatives are partly 
based on the international developments in other countries: especially the highways 
agency in the United Kingdom and the federal highways administration in the USA 
have been sources of inspiration for recent innovations in Dutch road infrastructure 
planning.  
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In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment is responsible for 
the planning of infrastructure.8 An executive agency, Rijkswaterstaat, takes care of 
design, construction, management and maintenance of the main road network, main 
waterways network and main water systems.9 The plan- and decision-making for road 
infrastructure projects is realized through the so called MIRT process.10 Although 
planning can be not as straightforward in practice and can be described as an 
iterative process (Teisman, 2008), the staged planning process functions as the basis for 
planning infrastructure process and is the formal legal anchor point for infrastructure 
planning. It guides the infrastructure planning in the Netherlands. In other countries, 
similar planning programming and budgeting systems exist, which are also based on 
stages that are concluded with key decisions. In the United Kingdom, for example, the 
project planning process consists of an options phase, development phase and 
construction phase in which decisions are made on the commitment to investigate, the 
commitment to develop and the commitment to invest in infrastructure (Highways 
Agency, 2008). 
 
The Dutch planning process is staged and consists of three stages - explorative stage, 
project study stage and realization stage – in which four key decisions need to be 
made (see Figure 1.6). The process functions as a funnel: projects do not automatically 
move from one stage to another, as in each stage go/no-go decisions are made. As 
choices regarding design, construction, operation and maintenance issues are made 
ever further along in the project, the project’s level of detail increases, limiting the 
opportunities for creativity, i.e. opportunities for alternatives and variation (see Ministry 
of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2011).  
 
Before the MIRT process commences with an explorative stage, regional and local 
governments are consulted in an informal stage in which the connection between an 
initiative and policy is discussed. Local and regional governments are involved in yearly 
rounds of negotiations in order to set agendas at the regional level. If an initiative is 
thought to have potential, the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment may take a 
Starting Decision (Decision 1). This decision starts the first official stage of the MIRT 
process, the explorative stage. In this explorative stage an initiative is investigated for 
its ambition and potential. This may involve debating the usefulness and necessity of 
                                              
 
8 The Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment is responsible “creating an efficient network of roads, railways, 
waterways and airways in the Netherlands, as well as for an effective water management to protect against flooding, 
and improved air and water quality” (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2012a).  
9 The responsibility for other infrastructures is generally distributed by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment to specific executive organizations or authorities. For example ProRail is responsible for the Dutch 
railway infrastructure and specific authorities, such as the Port of Rotterdam Authority and the Schiphol Group, 
manage the main sea ports and airports. The Directorate-General for Public Works and Water management (in 
Dutch: Rijkswaterstaat) manages the Dutch national infrastructure networks related to highways, waterways and 
water management. 
10 MIRT stands for “Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport”, which translates into “Long Range 
Programme for Infrastructure, Spatial Development and Transport”. 
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potential solutions, performing of cost-benefit analyses and determining of the 
appropriate scope of the project. At the end of the explorative stage, this input helps 
the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment in deciding on the preferred 
alternative (Decision 2). This decision can be made jointly with other government 
parties, for example with other ministries at the national level or with regional and 
local level governments, such as provinces, municipalities and water boards. In the 
following project study stage, the preferred alternative is further worked out and 
specified. With the project decision (Decision 3), formal planning consent is given, the 
specified design is determined and the size of the investment and the distribution of the 
costs is decided upon. The decision can be laid down in a route decision under the 
infrastructure planning act or under the spatial planning act, in a local land-use plan 
and/or in an environmental permit. This final planning consent is the basis for the 
procurement and the resulting contracts with the market parties. In the stage of 
realization the final decision is the completion decision (Decision 4). This decision marks 
the completion of the project and the start of the operation and maintenance stage.  
 
 
Figure 1.6: Stages and key decisions in the Dutch infrastructure planning process. Based on Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment, 2011. 
 
1.3.2 Forward and backward integration in the planning lifecycle 
The traditional planning process can be characterized as linear, top-down and 
directive (see Section 1.2). A new approach may be found by connecting stages 
throughout the planning process, coming to a new way of managing the lifecycle (see 
also Labuschagne & Brent, 2005). By strengthening the relation between stages, the 
limitations of the plan development orientation and the forward management focus 
could be overcome. Connecting stages would also stimulate the involvement of different 
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actors from other stages, thereby filling the gap left by retreating government. Finally, 
connecting stages would create opportunities to facilitate learning and feedback loops, 
which are important prerequisites for sustainable development. Basically, a lifecycle 
approach to infrastructure planning could encompass two directions of integration of 
the planning lifecycle, i.e. forward and backward integration of the stages of 
policymaking, plan development, construction and operation and maintenance (see 
Figure 1.7). Usually, concepts of lifecycle integration, such as lifecycle costing 
(Frangopol & Furuta, 2001) or asset management (Herder & Wijnia, 2012), are limited 
to the integration of the project implementation stages of construction, operation and 
maintenance. This study attempts to include the early stages in the lifecycle as well by 
regarding the stages of policymaking and project plan development. 
  
 
Figure 1.7: Lifecycle integration in the road infrastructure planning process. 
 
The first direction of lifecycle integration entails involving plan-makers in a process of 
‘forward integration’ (see Morrison-Saunders & Arts, 2004). Forward integration is 
aimed at following up (decisions on) plans and projects into subsequent stages. It is in 
line with the traditional style of project management applied in the forward, directive 
planning process. As described before (see Section 1.2.2), the forward management 
focus is common in current infrastructure planning practice, where plans and projects 
are formulated by government with incorporated elements that ensure that the plan 
(makers) can influence a project, for example through coordination, monitoring and 
testing of the conformity to plans (see Figure 1.7). Therefore, forward integration has 
received much attention in the planning theory community: the (strategic) relation 
between policy and project development has been researched intensively (see Arts, 
1998; Teisman, 2000; Van Duinen, 2004; Zonneveld & Verwest, 2005). It is especially 
aimed at the development of plans up to the stage of strategic, open decision making: 
the development of detailed plans and programs from more general policies. Less 
attention is paid in planning theory and practice to the follow-up in subsequent 
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realization, construction and operation, as described in Section 1.2.1 (see also Arts, 
1998; Morrison-Saunders & Arts, 2004). A reason for this is brought forward by 
Elmore (1979),11 who states that the “implicit and unquestioned assumption [is] that 
policymakers control the organizational, political, and technological processes that affect 
implementation” (p. 603). 
 
Previous research has illustrated, however, that the planning process in practice does 
not only comprise a top-down hierarchically coordinated process in which ‘higher’ 
strategic levels set the stage for subsequent plan and project development. It also 
comprises a bottom-up movement in which concrete project implementation and 
operation influence more strategic planning levels (see Arts et al., 2011), which will be 
referred to as ‘backward integration’. This backward integration could potentially help 
to improve planning processes as it makes the earlier inclusion of later-stage actors and 
their experiences possible. By incorporating the backward integration experiences into 
the ‘forward’ management in the planning process, i.e. combining backward integration 
with forward lifecycle integration, the road infrastructure planning process and its 
outcomes can potentially be improved. In planning literature and practice, less attention 
is given to dealing with backward relations in the planning process in a structured 
manner. Bottom-up involvement of different actors in an integrated planning process, 
however, is not new to planning. Over the last decades, it has been at the core of the 
participatory and collaborative planning approaches (Healey, 1997), which, as 
mentioned before, are geared towards involvement of local communities and lower 
levels of government and less towards market involvement.  
 
Contrary to forward integration, the application of backward integration of market 
parties does not yet seem to be common practice in infrastructure planning. In practice, 
the first experiences are gained with linking the operation stage to the construction 
stage, for example by providing knowledge to build easily maintainable roads in 
performance-based road maintenance contracts (Piñero, 2003). This can be continued 
by linking the construction and operation to the project plan development stage, for 
example by enabling for more innovative building techniques or providing a reality 
check on data by using the expertise of market parties in the plan-making (Nijsten et 
al., 2008). Another backward integration link is between project plan development and 
policymaking, where knowledge from practice could be used to formulating effective 
policy. The receptivity of backward integration determines the adaptiveness of a 
system: the degree to which learning and feedback can be incorporated and 
subsequently can be used in approaches of forward integration, resulting in an 
approach with a cyclical nature (see also Section 1.2).  
 
                                              
 
11 Elmore (1979) introduces the term of ‘Forward mapping’ to describe the directive management approach that 
assumes control of policy-makers over the implementation of their policies. 
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1.3.3 Market involvement in the planning process 
The lifecycle approach could be relevant because it distinguishes itself from more 
‘traditional’ collaborative approaches by focusing on the added value of backward 
integration. Through backward integration all kinds of actors could be involved. For 
instance, governments, environmental agencies, and community organizations are 
involved through initiatives to integrate the planning lifecycle, such as participatory 
environmental impact assessment (Sheperd & Bowler, 1997), lifecycle assessment (Anex 
& Focht, 2002), and participatory design (Sanoff, 1990).  
 
This research focuses on lifecycle integration by involving another relevant group of 
actors: private market parties. Private market parties currently receive less attention in 
the scientific debate on planning in general and on collaborative planning approaches 
in particular, although public-private partnerships have received some attention in the 
last decade (see for example Koppenjan, 2005; Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004; Hodge & 
Greve, 2000; Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2006). Potentially, market parties could use their 
knowledge and experience to play an important role in thinking through the 
consequences of decisions for subsequent ‘forward’ stages. This could help to improve 
the forward management of the infrastructure planning process. Similar to national 
government actors, private market parties therefore have developmental, 
transformative power, and, as Teisman (2000) puts it, are purposeful actors. They can 
help realize a project by providing money, knowledge, expertise or simply manpower. 
Involving purposeful private market parties can help to realize a more businesslike 
approach to planning (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Nijsten et al., 2008) and prevent 
endless unstructured rounds of (re-) negotiation with all stakeholders involved, a 
potential pitfall of collaborative planning approaches (Gray, 1989; Mazmanian & 
Sabatier, 1983). This would help to come to an approach in which the involvement of 
parties in infrastructure plan and decision-making can prevent standstills in planning, in 
line with the advice of the Elverding Committee (2008; see Section 1.1). 
 
Traditionally, market parties are involved at different moments in each of the various 
stages: consultancy companies for engineering; design and impact assessment studies 
and construction companies, subcontractors and technical engineers for the construction 
and maintenance activities. Usually the role of market parties in the early stages of 
infrastructure planning is limited to consultancy during policymaking and project-plan 
preparation stages. After the conceptual design is finished and the final planning 
consent given, private contractors are engaged through a procurement procedure at 
the end of the plan development stage. This happens on the basis of a request for 
proposals, which is, in turn, founded on the project study and (draft) consent decision. 
After competition between contractors, a contract is traditionally awarded on lowest 
price only. The selected private party then usually makes the final design, constructs the 
infrastructure, and, separately, maintains the infrastructure.  
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From the early 2000s onwards, the Dutch government changed its position regarding 
private involvement. Currently, active participation of the private sector in infrastructure 
planning is pursued, as is reflected in the latest business plans of Rijkswaterstaat 
(Rijkswaterstaat, 2008a, 2011): the principle of ‘market, unless’ was introduced and 
implemented into the corporate procurement strategy of Rijkswaterstaat. In practice, 
this strategy means that government approaches private market parties earlier in the 
planning process, in order to be able to successfully conclude integrated public-private 
partnership contracts (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008b). These integrated contracts cover an 
increased time span to include more activities, such as design, maintenance and 
operation activities (Ministry of Finances, 2010).  
 
1.3.4 Bringing lifecycle integration into practice 
Including lifecycle integration into a planning approach for infrastructure could be 
relevant because it is aimed at learning and exchanging experiences, knowledge and 
expertise between stages of the planning lifecycle and the public and private parties 
involved. The assumption is that stages could be better linked to overcome the 
fragmented nature of current planning processes and the cost and time overruns in 
infrastructure planning practice (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). It could be relevant and 
important to assess the potential relevance of lifecycle integration in helping to relief 
these problems in the transport infrastructure planning process and assisting in creating 
a more business-like approach to infrastructure planning, in line with the previously 
discussed concept of new public management (England & Ward, 2007; Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992).  
 
Potentially, lifecycle integration could enhance project control over the stages of project 
preparation, construction and/or operation, and make it easier to connect to the needs 
of the end-users: society. However, such integration may potentially also lead to 
increased transaction costs because of the prolonged involvement of the private sector 
(NAO, 2007; Solino & Gago de Santos, 2010). In addition, integration of stages 
combined with market involvement could cause public and private roles and 
responsibilities in the planning process to become scattered and unclear, which could 
negatively affect the democratic legitimacy of planning processes (Bexell & Mörth, 
2010). A complete lifecycle approach, incorporating forward and backward 
integration, cannot be observed in current infrastructure planning practice. However, 
the first initiatives that specifically aim at backward lifecycle integration through 
market involvement between two stages of the planning process in infrastructure 
planning have been undertaken in countries such as the Netherlands (Lenferink et al., 
2008) and Great Britain (see Nichols Group, 2007).  
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Figure 1.8: Lifecycle backward integration initiatives. 
 
This study focuses on initiatives for backward integration of the planning lifecycle in 
general, and lifecycle integration initiatives for market involvement in particular. 
Recently, several initiatives for lifecycle integration through market involvement have 
been launched. These initiatives are diverse in both character and stage of application: 
planning instruments in development of policies and project plans, legal instruments and 
procedures in contracting and initiatives with a more technical character in construction 
and maintenance and operation. The backward lifecycle integration initiatives are 
allocated in this study to three links in the Dutch planning process, between the stages 
of policymaking, project plan development, construction, and operation and 
maintenance (see Figure 1.8).  
 
Link A in Figure 1.8 consists of initiatives to involve private market parties in the 
transition from policymaking to project plan-making. These initiatives include market 
reconnaissance, early design contests, market consultations, and unsolicited proposals 
(see Chapter 2), and together compose a relatively complete overview of models for 
early market involvement. Link B is the link between plan-making and the later stages 
of construction and maintenance and operation. Early contractor involvement through 
parallelization and interweaving (see Chapter 3) attempts to connect public planning 
and procurement procedures through increased market involvement. The competitive 
dialogue procurement procedure can be regarded as a lifecycle integration initiative 
that attempts to establish this link. Other procurement procedures, such as the open 
procedure and the negotiated procedure, also connect project plan development and 
construction, but do not include the same degree of market involvement as competitive 
dialogues. In the competitive dialogue, public parties can engage in pre-bid 
negotiations with private parties over wishes, ambitions and possible solutions (see 
Chapter 4). A lifecycle integration initiative in Dutch infrastructure planning practice 
that considers the relation between construction and maintenance and operation, Link C, 
is the application of integrated Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) contracts to 
Dutch road infrastructure planning. Again, other contracts exist that connect stages in 
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the planning lifecycle, such as Design & Construct (D&C) and Design-Build-Maintain 
(DBM) contracts. However, these contracts do not integrate the stages in the lifecycle 
and their respective parties to the extent that DBFM contracts do (see Chapter 5). 
DBFM contracts combine the building and maintenance activities from the 
implementation stages in a single contract, connecting the operation and maintenance 
stage to the construction stage (Link C in Figure 1.8). In addition, by including design 
activities in the DBFM contract, the connection to the project plan development stage is 
made as well (visualized by the dotted line in Figure 1.8).  
 
By comparing and combining these initiatives of backward integration, a more coherent 
approach to backward lifecycle integration could be achieved. Such an approach 
could help to adjust initiatives to each other in order to generate additional 
opportunities to improve the planning process and its outcomes in terms of time, money 
or quality of the delivered products. Backward integration could help improve the 
subsequent forward management of the planning process. Put together, forward and 
backward integration could result in a full lifecycle approach, which could improve the 
planning process and help in dealing with the challenges in infrastructure planning (see 
Section 1.2). 
 
1.4 Towards a systems perspective on lifecycle integration 
As discussed in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, infrastructure planning is being confronted with the 
increasing complexity of current society. This complexity cannot be addressed by a 
one-size-fits-all strategy: over the years several typologies have been recognized that 
help to identify different planning and management strategies. These can be for 
example based on means and ends (Christensen, 1985), on differentiation and 
interdependency (Baccarini, 1996), on an ordered and an un-ordered domain (Kurz & 
Snowden, 2003), on agreement and certainty (Stacey, 2002), and on detail and 
dynamic complexity (Senge, 2006; Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010). Here a systems 
perspective on lifecycle integration will be adopted, in which a system is defined in line 
with Steward and Ayres (2001) as consisting of inter-related parts and relations 
between these parts within a system boundary. This system has to deal with both 
internal and external complexity (in line with Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010; Kurz & 
Snowden, 2003). The relations and interaction between the inter-related parts can 
cause internal complexity, whereas the interaction with elements and developments 
outside the system boundary can cause external complexity. A system needs to provide 
an adaptive balance between hard institutional conditions and soft governance 
strategies in order to deal with these different types of complexity. This is in line with 
Edelenbos et al. (2009) who regard system stability and interaction intensity between 
system components as essential for providing the adaptiveness to deal with complexity. 
 
Institutional conditions originate from institutional structures and capabilities that 
together make up the institutional framework (March & Olsen, 2005) and to a large 
 Chapter 1 - Introduction  19 
 
 
extent determine the relations between the actors involved. In this research, institutional 
conditions are considered to structure the interactive processes in which preferences are 
articulated and decisions are made. This can be regarded as in line with sociological 
institutionalism (see Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Giddens, 1984). The institutional 
conditions constitute the technical-rational side of institutions, the ‘hard’ systems 
perspective, as they determine the structures within a system and the capabilities of the 
actors in it (March & Olsen, 2005). Several categories of institutional conditions can be 
identified, in planning literature (see Dijkstra, 1989 cited in Voogd, 2001; Voogd, 
1995; Niekerk, 2000), but also in fields of complexity management and public 
administration (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010). Based on these categorizations, four 
groups of institutional conditions are identified that reflect the rational, tangible aspects 
of the planning structure:  
- legal conditions;  
- financial-economic conditions;  
- technical-qualitative conditions;  
- organizational conditions.  
Legal conditions include the legal duties and responsibilities of government and market 
parties and the enforcement of these responsibilities, the relation between public 
planning acts and the private procurement law and the way legal positions of 
stakeholders and market parties relate to each other. Financial-economic conditions 
include the financial contribution to infrastructure projects, the financial triggers for 
market parties and governmental parties to participate, the way in which profits and 
deficits and risks are distributed, and the way in which projects are financially 
controlled. Technical-qualitative conditions include the operationalization of 
sustainability in infrastructure projects, the measurement of quality and effectiveness 
and the degree of innovativeness and creativity. Organizational conditions include the 
phasing and coordination of the decision-making process, the actors involved and the 
timing of their involvement in the planning process, and the project and program design 
and management.  
 
However, besides the institutional conditions that represent a hard, normative and 
rational side of systems, softer elements also play a role in planning. Such soft elements 
are at the core of soft systems theories (Stewart & Ayres, 2001; Checkland, 1981). 
Soft system elements are intangible concepts and perceptions that as such cannot be 
measured objectively in the real world (Neal, 1995), but are particularly relevant in 
complex adaptive settings (Checkland, 1981). Soft system elements can be considered 
as complementary to the hard institutional conditions. In planning, the role and 
relevance of soft elements is illustrated by governance strategies. These governance 
strategies determine how opportunities within the framework of rational institutional 
conditions are used, and influence how actors deal with and account for institutional 
conditions with regard to their own actions and their interaction with others. In current 
complex settings, it is regarded as essential to come to approaches that combine 
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governance strategies (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1995; Martens, 2007). Several 
classifications of these governance strategies have been developed in planning theory 
(Martens, 2007; Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). In line with 
Robinson et al. (2000), three governance strategies are distinguished here: 
coordination, competition and cooperation. 
 
Coordination is described by Martens (2007) as the division between government and 
the governed. As such, coordination can be defined as a matter of protecting 
government’s core responsibilities by providing rules to actively steer and regulate 
others and, additionally, as a matter of self-regulating government’s behaviour (in line 
with ‘central coordination’ or ‘hierarchy’ as distinguished by Dahl & Lindblom, 1992). By 
coordination, goals and actions can be unified through a hierarchical model of 
organization, for example through regulative power or financial power. Competition is 
the second strategy of governance. It can be related to the market organization model 
(Bevir, 2011) in which selection through a market mechanism is essential. This becomes 
clear from the definition of Thompson et al. (1991, p. 6): “[competition is] a process of 
selection, turmoil and change where disequilibrium conditions prevail”. Competition 
assumes a level playing field in which actors compete to realize their own interests. 
Cooperation is the final strategy that is strongly present in communicative and 
collaborative planning theories (Healey, 1997). It assumes ideal speech situations 
(Habermas & Cronin, 1993) in which all actors are equal and rely on each other to 
reach common goals. As debating and reasoning is the basis for collaboration and 
transforming individual interests into collective interests, the strategy of cooperation is 
also called "governance through argumentation" (Martens, 2007). As such, cooperation 
relies on a network model (Powell, 1990) or partnership model (Blomqvist, 2002) of 
organization.  
 
If stages in the planning process are linked in a lifecycle approach, public and private 
experiences with lifecycle integration are shaped by the way institutional factors and 
governance strategies are combined. The significance of institutional conditions and 
governance strategies can differ per planning stage. For example, legal conditions and 
the governance strategy of competition are likely to play a more important role in the 
procurement of works, situated between the plan development and construction stages 
in Link B of Figure 1.8, than in the policymaking stages. The integration initiatives 
discussed in Section 1.3.4 are new to infrastructure planning and the effects of these 
initiatives on the planning process - output in terms of time, costs and quality - are 
unclear. Also, a full lifecycle approach including forward and backward integration of 
all planning stages has not yet been applied in Dutch infrastructure planning. However, 
experience is being gained with linking specific stages in the planning lifecycle of Dutch 
road infrastructure planning. Collecting these public and private experiences with 
initiatives for backward lifecycle integration from practice can help to assess the 
relevance and applicability of a full lifecycle integration approach. In addition, making 
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an inventory of experiences with integration initiatives from planning practice could 
provide insight in the preconditions and lessons learned, which could help to structure 
and improve the infrastructure planning process. Therefore, in this research, the focus is 
on gaining insight in the experiences of involved actors with lifecycle integration 
initiatives in Dutch road infrastructure projects.  
 
1.5 Scope of the study 
1.5.1 Problem definition 
In the lifecycle of the Dutch infrastructure planning process several challenges play a 
role, as discussed in Section 1.2. Conceptually, integration of stages in the planning 
lifecycle of infrastructure by market involvement is interesting as it may provide 
solutions to the challenges. In principle, this market involvement throughout the planning 
lifecycle could help connect and integrate planning stages and lead to more 
sustainable infrastructure development. However, it could potentially also lead to issues 
such as increased transaction costs and unclear and unstructured planning processes, 
negatively affecting the democratic legitimacy of planning processes. In current Dutch 
infrastructure planning practice, the integration initiatives do not appear to reach 
further than partial lifecycle integration and an overarching approach to lifecycle 
integration seems to be missing.  
 
The question therefore remains how to bring market involvement throughout the 
lifecycle into practice effectively and coherently. A coherent and overarching approach 
to lifecycle integration is not yet being applied in Dutch road infrastructure planning. 
Actors are currently gaining experience with specific lifecycle integration initiatives: in 
particular backward integration, such as early market involvement and early contractor 
involvement through parallelization and interweaving, is still uncommon to infrastructure 
planning. Therefore, the added value of backward lifecycle integration to Dutch 
infrastructure planning and the potential contribution of a lifecycle approach to more 
adaptive and sustainable infrastructure development are unclear. In order to facilitate 
the transformation towards a lifecycle approach, insight is required in the experiences 
of different public and private actors with lifecycle integration: experiences with the 
institutional conditions and with governance strategies that shape the infrastructure 
planning practice.  
 
1.5.2 Research objective 
By exploring public and private experiences with market involvement initiatives that 
involve lifecycle integration in the planning process of infrastructure, this study aims to: 
 
provide insight into the relevance and applicability of lifecycle integration 
throughout the Dutch infrastructure planning process in order to provide 
directions for the design of an overarching full lifecycle approach in 
infrastructure planning.  
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In doing so, this study provides lessons for improving instruments and initiatives of 
lifecycle integration in practice. Although many studies have been conducted which 
aimed at optimizing certain stages (for example on plan development of infrastructure 
planning, see Woltjer, 2000), exploring experiences with certain types of market 
involvement (for example on the competitive dialogue procurement procedure, see 
Hoezen, 2012; Lenferink & Hoezen, 2011) or certain planning aspects (for example on 
public-private partnerships, see Koppenjan, 2005), such a broad and encompassing 
lifecycle perspective is uncommon to planning research. 
 
1.5.3 Research questions 
Several challenges were explored in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 that will be investigated 
further in this research in which the focus is on lifecycle integration between stages in 
the planning process. Special attention will be given to the experiences of public and 
private actors involved in market involvement initiatives that aim to integrate the 
lifecycle of the Dutch road infrastructure planning process (see Section 1.6 for the 
research approach). After having introduced and discussed a theoretical framework for 
institutional conditions and governance strategies in Section 1.4, five research questions 
are formulated to meet the objective. These consist of four empirical questions on 
lifecycle integration between different stages in the planning process and one design 
question on possible combinations of lifecycle integrations initiatives for settings that 
differ in project complexity.  
 
The four empirical questions address possible links between two stages in the planning 
process (see the links in Figure 1.8). However, the link between plan development and 
construction is given specific attention by formulating two research questions (Questions 
2 and 3). This is done because the essence of planning lies between these two stages: 
successfully bringing plans into practice. However, in practice, plan development and 
construction are often divided by an implementation gap when project plans are 
implemented (as described in Section 1.2.1 and displayed in Figure 1.1). As the 
significance of institutional conditions and governance strategies can differ per stage 
(see Section 1.4), in the investigation of each empirical research question, certain 
conditions and strategies receive more attention than others.  
 
The first question considers the link between policymaking and plan development:  
 
(1) What is the potential of market involvement in early strategic plan- and 
policymaking and how can this potential be unlocked in order to strengthen the 
connection between strategic policymaking and plan development?  
 
This question aims to explore the potential of market involvement in the early, 
preparatory stages of infrastructure planning. In order to do so, several instruments for 
early market involvement are examined for potential application in the Netherlands. 
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These are instruments instigated by government, i.e. market reconnaissance, market 
consultations and early design contests, or are private initiatives for involvement in 
infrastructure planning, i.e. unsolicited proposals. These instruments reflect differences in 
the role of the involved market parties and in the way the stages of policymaking and 
plan development are linked. Through interviews with public and private parties 
involved and document analysis, lessons learned in the application of the instruments in 
four Dutch cases have been collected. By investigating these lessons, the potential of 
market involvement in early strategic plan- and policymaking is assessed and incentives 
and opportunities for unlocking this potential are identified.  
 
The second and third research questions aim to investigate the relation between the 
stages of plan development and construction. Two procedures play a strong role in the 
connection between plan development and construction: the public planning procedures 
and the procurement procedures. These procedures differ in nature as they stem from, 
respectively, public law and private law. The second question specifically focuses on the 
relation between these two procedures and the role market involvement could play in 
connecting the two procedures in practice:  
 
(2) What are the lessons learned from applying early contractor involvement in road 
infrastructure planning and what are the added values and risks involved in 
connecting public planning and procurement through early contractor involvement?  
 
This question focuses on the impact of early contractor involvement on the planning 
process of road infrastructure. Two models of early contractor involvement are 
distinguished: paralleled public planning and procurement procedures (‘parallelization’) 
and interwoven public planning and private procurement procedures (‘interweaving’). 
Document analysis and interviews with the employees at public project organizations 
are applied to assess the application of these models in Dutch infrastructure planning 
practice. The goals and expectations of early contractor involvement, which include 
realizing time gains by speeding up project plan development and implementation, 
increasing project control over risks in the planning process (in terms of time, budget 
and quality), and improving project quality (e.g. by stimulating innovation), are 
confronted with the experiences and lessons learned in Dutch infrastructure projects. This 
enables the assessment of the added values and risks of connecting planning and 
procurement procedures through early contractor involvement.  
 
In the third question, the relation between plan development and construction is 
investigated from the perspective of interaction between public and private actors in 
the competitive dialogue procurement procedure: 
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(3) What are the public and private experiences with the competitive dialogue 
procurement procedure and how is public-private interaction in this procedure 
influenced by external factors?  
 
This question focuses on the public-private interaction in the competitive dialogue 
procurement procedure. This procedure explicitly aims to facilitate interaction in the 
procurement of complex projects. Semi-structured interviews were carried out, 
exploring the experiences of public authorities and private contractors with the 
procedure in particular and with the public-private interaction in general. Special 
attention is given to the role of the governance strategies (Robinson et al., 2000) of 
coordination, competition and cooperation in the public-private interaction in the 
competitive dialogue procurement procedure. This includes investigating how the mix of 
these three governance strategies is influenced by various organizational issues and 
financial, technical and legal complexity factors.  
 
The fourth question primarily considers the relation between the stages of construction, 
maintenance and operation. The focus in this question is on experiences with integrated 
Design-Build-Finance-Maintain contracts (DBFM) spanning these stages. However, as 
explained in Section 1.3.4, DBFM contracts also link the implementation stages to the 
project development stage. Therefore this link will also be taken into account:  
 
(4) What are the experiences and issues relating to integrating stages in DBFM contracts 
and how can these help to come to more sustainable infrastructure development?  
 
As the question indicates, the experiences and issues relating to integrating construction 
and maintenance and operation stages by integrated DBFM contracts are investigated. 
These contracts link different stages and distribute responsibilities from government to 
market parties, and are therefore an example of both lifecycle integration and 
increased market involvement. This study investigates whether linking stages can lead to 
more sustainable road infrastructure development and apply a process-based 
framework that includes actor, scope and time dimensions to see how these dimensions 
are integrated towards more inclusive, sustainable infrastructure projects. Sustainability 
is discussed more explicitly in this question compared to the previous questions. In 
preceding policymaking and plan development stages, sustainability is a matter of 
creating opportunities, whereas in the implementation stages, sustainability is brought 
into practice. Assessing the experiences with integrated DBFM contracts may provide 
insight in the translation of sustainability into practice. Based on the experiences of 
public and private parties involved in DBFM contracts, three avenues for strengthening 
sustainability in integrated contracts are identified. 
 
Besides the practical experiences with separate lifecycle links between stages in the 
planning process, as discussed above in the four empirical research questions, designing 
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a more encompassing approach plays an important role in this research. After all, the 
combination of governance strategies and institutional conditions will determine the 
added value of lifecycle integration. Therefore, a fifth design question is formulated: 
 
(5) How do lifecycle integration initiatives relate to each other and can the combination 
of such initiatives lead to added value for dealing with project complexity?  
 
This question is formulated to regard the full lifecycle of infrastructure planning and 
assess whether the lifecycle integration initiatives, as investigated in the first four 
research questions, could be combined into a full lifecycle approach. As a first step 
towards assessing the relevance of a full lifecycle approach, public and private 
experiences with separate combinations of these initiatives are analyzed in order to 
see whether combining lifecycle integration initiatives can lead to added value. 
Because this added value depends on the nature of a project, a distinction is made in 
the combination of lifecycle integration initiatives for projects that differ in their degree 
of internal and external complexity (see Section 1.4). The added value for complicated 
projects and projects referred to as complexicated is investigated.12 This provides 
insight into both the relevance and the added value of combining lifecycle integration 
initiatives in different settings.  
  
1.6 Research approach 
The study is aimed at investigating the planning of road infrastructure in general and 
the lifecycle of road infrastructure projects in particular. Projects are the most common 
organizational form in the planning of road infrastructure. Other forms, such as policies 
and programs, also have a lifecycle that includes exploration, development and 
implementation. Projects, however, are stronger and more directly connected to 
technical implementation activities, such as construction and maintenance of roads. As a 
consequence, projects include a more diverse set of actors, and especially involve 
private business organizations, whereas policies and programs tend to be limited to 
inclusion of public governmental actors only.  
 
The objects of study are mainly road infrastructure projects at the Dutch national level 
(see Appendix F). Such projects usually have a more complex character than local level 
projects. As a result of the numerous actors and stakeholders involved, there is a 
greater need to deal with dynamics and come to learning processes aimed at mutual 
understanding (Woltjer, 2000) than in the smaller regional and local projects. Because 
                                              
 
12 Based on the degree of internal and external complexity four categories of projects can be distinguished. 
Simple projects include a low internal and a low external complexity; Context-complex projects include a low 
degree of internal and a high degree of external complexity; Complicated projects include a high degree of 
internal and a low degree of external complexity; Complexicated project include both a high degree of internal 
and a high degree of external complexity. See Chapter 6 for a more elaborated discussion on internal and 
external project complexity.  
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of their complexity, national level projects are more in need of new planning 
approaches. These could include the adoption of a lifecycle perspective in public-
private arrangements with a changed role for market parties. 
 
Only a limited number of integration initiatives are currently applied in infrastructure 
projects at the national level. However, the number of initiatives has grown during the 
course of this research (see Table 1.1). Besides the qualitative nature of the research 
questions, the limited number of initiatives which also have a different character and 
different stage of the lifecycle, make this kind of study approach relevant as well. This 
relates to the recognized potential added value of an inventory of the applied 
lifecycle integration initiatives in practice and the relations between these initiatives in 
the infrastructure planning lifecycle (see Section 1.4). Through a qualitative study, a 
deeper understanding of the advantages and disadvantages, the problems that occur 
and the issues that play a role could be gained. In order to achieve this understanding, 
the public and private experiences with lifecycle integration are specifically explored, 
because connecting stages through lifecycle integration requires interaction between 
the actors involved. A qualitative study can provide insight in how this interaction takes 
place, what information is exchanged and which choices are made, and how this affects 
other stages of the planning lifecycle.  
 
Table 1.1: Amount of completed lifecycle integration initiatives in road infrastructure planning. 
Link Initiatives 2006 2012 
A Market consultations < 5 10 - 15 
Early design contests < 5 5 - 10 
Market reconnaissances 0 3 
Unsolicited proposals 0 < 5 
B Interweaving and parallelization projects 0 15 - 20 
Competitive dialogues < 5 15 - 20 
C DBFM contracts 0 5 - 10 
Sources: Kraak, 2010; Ministry of Finances, 2010; Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 
2012b; Nagelkerke et al., 2009; WB consulting, 2009. 
 
A qualitative study into the experiences in case studies is performed, using in-depth 
interviews, document analysis and focus group discussions. Case study research is 
applied to comprehend complex social situations, by allowing “investigators to retain 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events – such as […] organizational and 
managerial processes” (Yin, 2003, p. 2). The cases were selected by theoretical 
sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) in which cases with a high potential for rich 
information are sought for (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This is done in order to further 
develop theories (Eisenhardt, 1989): the theoretical concept of lifecycle integration.  
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In the cases, public and private experiences are primarily brought forward by 
conducting approximately seventy in-depth interviews (see Appendix A). In-depth 
interviews were chosen because, in order to come to cooperation in lifecycle 
integration, the in-depth experiences of the involved actors are relevant. As explained 
above, experience with lifecycle integration is limited, but growing. Therefore, 
interviews were conducted with experts on certain lifecycle integration initiatives and 
with other actors directly involved in implementing the initiatives. Interviewees come 
from different fields (legal, financial, technical, planning, etcetera), different 
organizations from the public (government, Rijkswaterstaat, Ministries, etcetera) and 
private sector (construction companies, engineering consultants, etcetera), and different 
stages (policy, plan development, construction, maintenance, operation) (see Appendix 
A). To gain insight in their lessons learned and experiences in what can be 
characterized as a developing practice (see Table 1.1), semi-structured in-depth 
interviews were conducted (see Appendix B for the interview guidelines). The semi-
structured nature of these interviews helps to structure the interview and the analysis of 
the findings, but also leaves room for bringing up other issues and insights (Liamputtong 
& Ezzy, 2005).  
 
The findings of the conducted interviews are supplemented by document analysis, as a 
sort of ‘casing’ of the interviews (Ragin, 1992; Ragin & Amoroso, 2010), which provides 
the necessary background for interpreting the interview findings (George & Bennett, 
2005). This review of secondary literature mainly consists of studying project 
evaluations, internal Ministry and Rijkswaterstaat studies and other relevant 
publications that could be categorized as ‘grey literature’. These documents have a 
financial, legal, planning, and / or technical nature. The grey literature can help to 
situate the experiences, obtained through the interviews, within the Dutch context and 
the specific context of national road infrastructure projects for which Rijkswaterstaat is 
responsible.  
 
Findings from case studies (from the interviews and the literature study) have been 
validated in focus group discussions (see Hennink et al., 2011) in order to deal 
effectively with possible bias in the case studies, for example leaping to conclusions 
based on limited data, being overly influenced by vivid settings, or by more elite 
respondents (Eisenhardt, 1989). These focus groups consisted of both public and private 
experts (see Appendix C). The interaction in the focus groups is essential for gaining 
insight in opportunities for combining lifecycle integration initiatives into a lifecycle 
approach. Because lifecycle integration is a developing practice, experts too have 
limited experience with lifecycle integration. By explicitly discussing the application of 
lifecycle integration in settings with different types and degrees of project complexity, 
the interaction helps the participating public and private experts to formulate their own 
opinions, which can subsequently be used to provide first directions for combining 
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lifecycle integration initiatives into a lifecycle approach (see Chapter 6 and see 
Appendix D for the focus group discussion guideline). 
 
As explained before, a lifecycle approach encompasses the institutional conditions and 
governance strategies (see Section 1.4). The design of a lifecycle approach should 
combine these hard and soft system elements in a way that makes the best use of the 
potential of lifecycle integration. This means that incentives and opportunities for early 
market involvement (research question 1) are related to added values and risks in 
early contractor involvement (research question 2), strategies and factors in public-
private interaction in the competitive dialogue (research question 3), and experiences, 
issues and avenues in integrated contracts (research question 4). In addition, the 
opportunities for combining lifecycle integration initiatives are assessed for different 
project complexities (research question 5). By combining these findings in the final 
conclusions and recommendations chapter, a lifecycle approach is provided that can 
help to address complexity and the help to deal with the challenges in planning. 
 
1.7 Outline of study 
The outline of the book is displayed in Figure 1.9. As becomes clear from the figure, 
Chapter 2 to 5 each discuss the link between two of the stages in the planning lifecycle. 
Chapter 6 elaborates on possible combinations of lifecycle integration initiatives and 
Chapter 7 provides the conclusions and recommendations. 
 
 
Figure 1.9: Outline of study.  
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The next chapter, Chapter 2, deals with the first research question and discusses the 
lifecycle integration of the stages of policymaking and plan development (Link A in 
Figure 1.9). For this purpose, several instruments for early market involvement are 
examined for their application in Dutch infrastructure planning practice: market 
reconnaissance, early design contests, market consultations and unsolicited proposals. 
Chapter 3 focuses on Link B in Figure 1.9, between plan development and construction. 
In the chapter, the experiences and lessons learned with early contractor involvement 
are described for two models: interweaving and parallelization of planning and 
procurement procedures. Chapter 4 also examines the link between plan development 
and construction (see Link B in Figure 1.9), but focuses specifically on the public-private 
interaction in the competitive dialogue procurement procedure. The influence of 
external complexity and organizational factors on the balance of governance 
strategies is investigated for four Dutch road infrastructure projects. In Chapter 5 the 
link between construction and the subsequent stages of maintenance and operation is 
analyzed (see Link C in Figure 1.9). The links in Dutch Design-Build-Finance-Maintain 
contracts are analyzed for their potential to stimulate more sustainable infrastructure 
planning. In addition, three avenues for further stimulating the sustainability of 
infrastructure planning are identified. 
 
In Chapter 6 special attention is paid to the combination of lifecycle integration 
initiatives, as specified in the fifth research question. By applying focus group 
discussions, the potential of combining lifecycle integration initiatives is assessed for 
highly complex settings. Chapter 7 provides the conclusions of this research by bringing 
together the findings from the preceding chapters. This includes a discussion of the 
institutional conditions and governance strategies and a reflection on the development 
of such a lifecycle approach. In addition, this last chapter provides recommendations 
for planning research and planning practice.  
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2 Public-private plan development:  
Can early private involvement strengthen infrastructure planning? 
 
Abstract  
Private parties, who are usually involved in later stages of design, construction 
and maintenance, can potentially strengthen the early plan-making stages of 
infrastructure planning. They can bring in knowledge, expertise and experience 
to help address complexity in planning. Such early private involvement can be 
accommodated through several models for which experiences in Dutch 
infrastructure planning practice differ. In this article, we assess the potential of 
early private involvement for strengthening infrastructure plan development by 
examining evaluative studies and conducting interviews with public and private 
actors involved in four early private involvement models in Dutch infrastructure 
planning: market consultation, early design contest, market reconnaissance and 
unsolicited proposal. We conclude that in order to unlock the potential of early 
private involvement government needs to incorporate incentives for creativity, 
reward private involvement and strike a balance in the setup of the 
investigated models between conceptual freedom for private solutions and 
transparent public guidance in preconditions and regulations. Early private 
involvement could, thus, provide opportunities for conceptual creativity and 
innovation and opportunities for public–private collaboration, which can 
strengthen plan development. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In today's society, the planning of infrastructure projects is a difficult task. Road 
infrastructure projects, railway and waterway projects all have to cope with time and 
budget overruns (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Haynes & Krmenec, 1989). These time and 
budget overruns also put pressure on the quality of the infrastructure. The root of these 
problems lies in the increasing complexity of society and the major interests involved in 
infrastructure projects (Arts, 2007; Banister, 2002). Increasing complexity resulted in 
the traditional technical-rational planning approach failing to control the risks involved 
in projects (De Roo, 2007). It inspired several developments in planning, including the 
communicative turn (Healey, 1996; Innes & Booher, 1999), the search for other modes 
of governance and partnerships (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Pierre, 1998; Teisman & 
Klijn, 2002) and the introduction of new public management and market-like 
arrangements, such as public–private partnerships (PPP) (Lindblom, 2001; Wettenhall, 
2003). 
 
In Dutch infrastructure planning, these developments are reflected in new approaches 
towards including private business organizations in the planning process. Such 
organizations are usually responsible for the design, engineering, financing, 
construction, maintenance and exploitation of infrastructure. Through early private 
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involvement,13 business organizations are involved in the early stages of the planning 
process. As Nijsten et al. (2008) describe, early private involvement can increase the 
quality of planning proposals and address complexity issues, at a stage where 
strategic and operational options remain open. By involving private businesses earlier 
in the planning process, early private involvement could also compensate for the loss of 
government knowledge and expertise as a result of the transfer of executive 
responsibilities to private actors under neoliberal regimes and inspired by new public 
management theories (Lane, 2002; Sager, 2009). In addition, according to Pierre 
(1998), involving business organizations in planning can have advantages for 
government, for example, in the setting of strategic agendas and the performance of 
particular tasks. 
 
Experiences with early private involvement in plan development are limited, since it has 
only recently been applied in Dutch infrastructure planning practice. As a consequence, 
the potential of early private involvement initiatives to cope with complexity in planning 
and to strengthen public–private collaboration is unclear. In addition, the application of 
such initiatives is unclear: to what extent can private businesses help to improve the 
infrastructure planning process? When should these business organizations be involved? 
How can early private involvement effectively be incorporated in current planning 
processes? 
 
In this article, we aim to explore the potential of early private involvement to 
strengthen plan development and to address complexity, and to provide lessons for 
effectively unlocking this potential in practice. In this article, we investigate what role 
early private involvement could play within a broader search for new governance 
arrangements in infrastructure planning, and how it can connect collaborative thinking in 
the public planning processes and market thinking in project development (Brand & 
Graffikin, 2007; Wettenhall, 2003). In addition, we investigate how early private 
involvement could inspire and lay the basis for PPP. A range of experiences with early 
private involvement is investigated by assessing four models and their application in 
Dutch road, railway and water infrastructure projects. 
 
In the following section, early private involvement is framed within PPP literature and 
the possible added value and risks are discussed. Afterwards, an introduction to the 
Dutch planning process is given within which four models for early private involvement 
are located. Next, practical experience of and lessons learned with applying these 
models are presented in four case studies, which were investigated through document 
analysis and supported by interviews, workshops and personal experiences. 
                                              
 
13 In this article, we deliberately focus on early private involvement. Unlike other commonly used terms, such as 
early contractor involvement, early market involvement and early supplier involvement, early private involvement 
does not necessarily include a direct contractual relationship between government and the private sector. 
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Subsequently, in the analysis section, the case study findings are analyzed for their 
potential by assessing the case studies for added value and risks. The article concludes 
with the main findings on the potential of early private involvement to strengthen 
public–private plan development and to address complexity. 
 
2.2 Theoretical foundations of early private involvement  
Traditional private involvement in infrastructure planning can be defined as the 
involvement of private design, engineering, construction and maintenance companies 
from procurement onwards, usually in separate construction and maintenance contracts. 
The concept of early private involvement is the involvement of these private companies 
at an earlier stage of the planning process, before procurement is started. Early 
private involvement is not limited to infrastructure planning; similar developments take 
place in other sectors, for example, early supplier involvement, partnering and 
alliances in the field of supply chain management (Child et al., 2005; Essig & Batran, 
2005; Ragatz et al., 2002) and value creation through co-development and empathic 
design in customer-based production (Leonard & Rayport, 1997; Porter, 1998; 
Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). These developments all share the aim of facilitating 
interaction to stimulate a healthy and dynamic market (Porter, 1998). 
 
With regard to infrastructure planning, early private involvement is connected to the 
rise of PPP. PPP has been extensively discussed in literature from a wide range of 
perspectives, for example, the public administration perspective (Koppenjan, 2005; 
Osborne, 2000), the financial and accounting perspective (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; 
Hodge & Greve, 2004), the legal procurement and contractual perspective (Ahadzi & 
Bowles, 2004) and the organizational and contract management perspective (Bult-
Spiering & Dewulf, 2006). These perspectives reflect the multiple meanings (Sagalyn, 
2007), diverse character (Coulson, 2005) and inherent ambiguity (Peters, 1998) of 
PPP. In line with Miraftab (2004) and Siemiatycki (2010), we adopt a planning 
perspective on PPP practice. We extend the traditional discussion on PPP that focuses 
on the later stages of realization and project management by assessing private 
involvement in the early stages of the planning process, before negotiations and 
contracting for PPP has started. This focus is relevant because in the early stages, 
preconditions are shaped that can determine the success or failure of PPP 
arrangements. 
 
Two types of relationships between public and private actors can be distinguished. 
Vertical or hierarchical relationships mean that one party controls and supervises the 
others (Wettenhall, 2003). Vertical relationships fit the traditional approach to 
planning, aimed at providing certainty and control through a technical-rational 
approach, with the government as the dominant actor. The application of new public 
management also thrives on vertical relationships: competition is facilitated and agency 
contracts are concluded through vertical relationships (Lægreid, 2000). Horizontal 
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relationships depend on aligning the interests of the public and private actors involved 
in a more cooperative fashion (Grimsy & Lewis, 2004; Sagalyn, 2007), in order to 
arrive at relational contracts (Lægreid, 2000). Such relationships typically require a 
network type of governance (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000) in which there is “no single 
superior capable of invoking closure rules” (Wettenhall, 2003, p. 90). Horizontal 
relationships between government and business organizations resemble the involvement 
of broad social groups, as advocated in communicative and collaborative planning 
(Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 1999). However, private involvement differs in the fact 
that the horizontal relationships, which often result in lock-ins and impasses by involving 
civil groups in traditional collaborative planning (Brand & Graffikin, 2007), are 
targeted at specific private actors that have a direct interest in potential project 
implementation. As such, business organizations behave as what Teisman (2000) 
describes as “purposeful actors”. They have an interest in preventing lock-ins and 
impasses. 
 
Government is currently searching for the right mode of governance that combines and 
connects these horizontal and vertical relationships in order to bridge the gap between 
rhetoric and action (Fainstein, 2000). This is especially relevant for plan development, 
when policy initiatives are worked out into projects. Early private involvement 
potentially provides added value for the plan- and decision-making process, for a 
number of reasons. First, by applying early private involvement, detailed and 
committed information on the financial and technical feasibility of a project is made 
available early in the process. The private sector operates from a business case 
perspective that considers the balance between affordability and return on investments 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Siemiatycki, 2010). This focus can help set a realistic project 
scope for the later stages and make better-informed decisions (Lenferink et al., 2012). 
Second, practical experience of design, construction and maintenance can be used to 
improve the relationships in the planning process. By bringing forward knowledge and 
expertise from later stages in the planning process, relationships between the different 
stages can be strengthened. This “lifecycle perspective” can help reduce failures and 
the costs of such failures in later stages (Bult-Spiering & DeWulf, 2006; Morledge et 
al., 2006; Parker & Hartley, 2003; Siemiatycki, 2010). Third, another added value lies 
in the changed character of the planning process itself. Private companies can bring in 
a more professional, businesslike attitude in which agreements and deadlines are 
respected. The private sector can, thus, help discipline government (Sager, 2009) and 
professionalize plan- and decision-making, as proposed in the new public management 
concept (Lane, 2002; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Finally, the private sector can use its 
conceptual creativity and adaptive capacity to provide a different perspective on 
problems and provide for innovations and solutions “out of the box” (Kelly et al., 2004; 
Parker & Hartley, 2003), such as adaptive multi-purpose and mixed-use plans (Davies 
et al., 2005; Nijsten et al., 2008). This contrasts with the usually more sectoral and 
monofunctional character of government departments. 
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In addition to added value, early private involvement can also introduce additional 
risks to planning. First, competition, which is essential for exploiting the strength of the 
market in public planning processes, could be hampered if early private involvement 
leads to an early selection of a private partner. Competition is thought to provide the 
incentive for private parties to innovate (Daniels & Trebilcock, 1996). Second, early 
private involvement could lead to a more complex process (Pongsiri, 2002). Reasons 
for this can be found in the difficulty of simultaneously managing plan- and decision-
making and the private involvement process, and in the different languages, 
experiences and expectations of the public and the private sectors (Bult-Spiering & 
DeWulf, 2006; Lenferink et al., 2012). Third, another possible risk is the limitation of 
political or governmental freedom of choice as a result of private involvement being 
subject to procurement and planning regulations (Siemiatycki, 2010). Finally, it is 
difficult to define proper incentives in the early stages to prevent opportunistic 
behaviour by the market and government (Bajari & Tadelis, 2006; Mitropoulos & 
Howell, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Overview of the structure of the study and this article.  
 
In this article, we investigate to what extent the potential added values and risks 
associated with early private involvement identified can be recognized in practice. We 
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describe and examine a range of early private involvement models in the third and 
fourth sections, by looking at their goal and scope, the reward for participation, the 
incentive for creativity and the setup of the model. Subsequently, in the analysis section, 
we assess factors distinguished for the models and their case studies. Ultimately, this 
assessment provides insight into the potential of early private involvement to address 
complexity, strengthen public–private plan development and for application in Dutch 
practice. In Figure 2.1, a conceptual model is presented that summarizes the structure of 
this article. 
 
2.3 Private involvement in Dutch infrastructure planning 
To provide an overview of experience with early private involvement and assess its 
potential, the specifics of the Dutch context should first be explained. In this section, we 
briefly describe the context of the Dutch infrastructure planning process and the current 
position of the private sector in this process, and introduce the models for early private 
involvement. 
 
In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment is responsible for 
planning infrastructure and implementing, at the national level, the relatively 
comprehensive policy and regulation framework (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000; Petersen, 
2011; Teisman & Klijn, 2000). Its executive branch, the “Rijkswaterstaat” agency, is 
responsible for the design, construction, management and maintenance of projects in the 
main road infrastructure and waterways network (Van den Brink, 2009). The plan- and 
decision-making on investments in road infrastructure projects is realized through a 
strong national framework, known as the MIRT process.14 This process consists of three 
stages, exploration, plan development and realization, and functions as a funnel: a 
project gets increasingly detailed with fewer alternatives and opportunities for 
variation because at each stage go/no-go decisions are made. 
 
Traditionally, the dominant public parties engage the private sector at the end of the 
plan development stage. This occurs on the basis of a request for proposals after 
formal planning consent has been given. At this point, the preferred alternative 
resulting from the explorative stage is worked out by the government into a conceptual 
design in which 30 percent to 70 percent of the work is specified. Several key decisions 
are also taken at this stage, including the route decision, a local land-use plan or an 
environmental permit. The private contractor is then responsible for the final design and 
the construction. Early private involvement in the Dutch context, therefore, means 
involvement before the main conceptual decisions are made, early in the plan 
                                              
 
14 MIRT stands for “Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport”, which translates as “Long Range 
Programme for Infrastructure, Space and Transport” and is an annually updated programme setting out national 
investments in the physical-spatial field (i.e. highways, waterways, railways, water management works, housing 
and industrial estates). 
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development stage, or even earlier than that, at the explorative stage, before a 
preferred alternative has been chosen. 
 
If private involvement is applied, a choice needs to be made between several models 
of private involvement that can be divided into three main categories: pre-competitive 
(or non-competitive) involvement, competitive involvement and post-competitive 
involvement. In this article, we focus on the early, non-competitive models of private 
involvement, because these models have received only limited attention in literature, 
despite being applied in the early stages, which are considered as important to the 
success of collaborative planning. However, to draw a complete picture, we first briefly 
discuss competitive and post-competitive models. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Overview of the MIRT planning process and the private involvement categories and models. 
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In the Dutch context, competitive private involvement is contracting performed 
according to European Procurement Rules15 (European Commission, 2004). There are 
several models for competitive private involvement, including green procurement, 
competitive dialogue procedure and interweaving (for an extensive discussion of 
competitive instruments, see Lenferink et al. (2011; 2012), Arts and Faith-Ell (2012)). 
Post-competitive models relate to the management of contracts in which private parties 
are increasingly involved in the design, construction, maintenance and/or operation 
stages.16 In Dutch infrastructure planning practice, private involvement is extended 
through integrated contracts, such as Design and Construct, Design-Build-Finance-
Maintain and performance contracts (Leendertse et al., 2012). Figure 2.2 presents an 
overview of the stages in the MIRT planning process and the private involvement 
categories and models. 
 
As indicated earlier, the focus of this article is on pre- or non-competitive models, thus, 
excluding the procurement of construction of a work. These models are not specified in 
detail by European procurement rules. In Dutch practice, we recognize several non-
competitive instruments: market consultation, early design contest, market 
reconnaissance and unsolicited proposal. 
 
The goal of a market consultation is to consult private parties about the feasibility of a 
proposed scope, technical solution or process worked out by the government 
(Rijkswaterstaat, 2006). The model presents private companies' opinions on whether the 
technical, financial, organizational, legal and spatial preconditions are expected to 
have the desired results. The model is without any obligations for participating 
governmental and private parties and is often applied in Dutch planning practice. 
Although private companies can provide input into public consultations as part of public 
planning procedures (BERR, 2007) and market consultations are occasionally performed 
(see e.g. Department of Public Enterprise, 2001), a consultation solely aimed at private 
parties does not seem to be common practice in other countries. 
 
The early design contest is relatively unknown in Dutch infrastructure planning, but is 
often applied internationally in the field of architecture in the form of design 
competitions. The goal of an early design contest is to tempt private parties to 
generate creative solutions by providing a prize incentive. The government formulates 
a request for proposals containing a problem definition and preconditions. The quality 
of the ideas submitted by private competitors is assessed by a jury. 
 
                                              
 
15 European procurement rules are specified in national rules, e.g. the Dutch national procurement law. 
16 In 2004, Rijkswaterstaat introduced the policy “market, unless …”. This policy stipulates that private companies 
should be involved as much as possible and resulted from a neoliberal political trend to reduce government, which 
was continued into the current business plan (V&W, 2008). 
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The market reconnaissance seems to be a typical Dutch model, which was introduced 
recently and has so far only limitedly been applied in practice.17 The reconnaissance is 
an early design contest without a prize, aimed at getting unique and technically and 
financially feasible concepts from the private sector. The government provides a 
problem definition, a general scope and constraints and ambitions which the private 
parties can use to develop concepts. In return, private parties receive compensation for 
their engineering costs. 
 
An unsolicited proposal is a private idea, a proposition or a developed plan with which 
a private party approaches the government without having been invited to do so 
(Kroes, 2008; Regieraad Bouw, 2005). Unsolicited proposals originate from the US, 
where they are part of the national procurement regulations (General Services 
Administration, 2005). So far, they have only sporadically been applied in Dutch 
practice. Through unsolicited proposals, private input can be used by the government to 
define a project, but a direct translation of an unsolicited proposal into an awarded 
contract for a work or a service is only possible if the proposal is truly unique. A private 
proposer can also be rewarded by working out the idea or proposal through co-
research and co-development. 
 
2.4 Practical experience with the models 
2.4.1 Methodology 
Since most of the models have only recently been introduced to Dutch planning practice, 
roughly from 2005 onwards,18 experience is limited. Therefore, we selected four case 
studies for qualitative assessment (Figure 2.3). The case studies were selected to 
represent a range of experiences, in which we did not aim for statistical generalization 
(Yin, 2003). Data availability and progress in the planning process were important 
selection criteria: the cases needed to have completed the explorative stage of the 
MIRT process. The case studies are primarily based on document research (analysis of 
policy documents, guidelines and evaluative studies) and on around 30 interviews with 
expert practitioners from the public and private parties involved, carried out in the 
period July 2010–January 201119 to obtain a balanced insiders' view on the 
background and subtleties of the different cases. Findings were validated in four 
workshops with public and private experts and through the authors' extensive personal 
experiences. 
 
                                              
 
17 In addition to the Afsluitdijk Renewal market reconnaissance, discussed later in this article, the model was also 
applied to the IJmeerlijn in 2011 (RRAAM, 2011) and the Project Mainportcorridor Zuid in 2007–2008 (Van der 
Does de Bye, 2008). 
18 Mainly as a consequence of the new market policy, introduced in 2004, see footnote 16. 
19 These include project managers, legal experts and planning experts from the public parties involved in the case 
studies and project managers, tender managers, technical experts and legal experts from the private parties. 
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Figure 2.3: Location of case studies in Dutch road and rail infrastructure network. 
 
Five descriptive characteristics of the process - goal, scope, reward, incentives and 
setup - of the different pre-competitive models are used to describe the cases (Table 
2.1). These characteristics are based on previous research into early private 
involvement (Nijsten et al., 2008) and are associated with process innovation (Russell et 
al., 2006).20 The first two, goal and scope, make up the setting of the model applied, 
which will be discussed in the case description. The other three descriptive 
characteristics determine to a large extent the outcome of the model and will be used 
to provide lessons learned in practice. The reward offered to private parties is 
essential in the private parties' decision to participate, the incentive for sparking 
                                              
 
20 This article will not consider functional-technical innovation in practice, product innovation (Russell et al., 2006), 
which includes the use of advanced products or the consequences of these innovations on the quality of projects. 
Product innovation differs greatly in nature and extent between the models, and as such, comparing product 
innovation in the models does not provide added value. Therefore, product innovation will only be discussed in 
passing. 
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creativity is related to the private effort put into the model, and the setup of the model 
includes the relationship between the setting of the case (goal and scope), the selection 
process and the public planning processes. 
 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Early Private Involvement Models. 
 Market consultation 
Early design 
contest 
Market 
reconnaissance 
Unsolicited 
proposal 
Goal 
Opinions on 
government 
solution or 
process 
Best design for 
defined 
problem 
Conceptual 
solutions for 
defined 
problem 
Ideas without a 
predefined 
problem 
Scope & 
concreteness of 
project 
Related to 
specificity of 
government 
solution or 
process 
Limited scope, 
usually specific 
Broad scope, 
not specific 
Depends on 
character of 
proposal 
Reward for 
participation 
Information for 
future 
procurement of 
a project 
Prize and 
publicity 
Cost 
compensation 
Future 
procurement of 
a project 
Incentives for 
creativity 
No specific 
incentives 
besides reward 
Future 
procurement of 
a project 
Future 
procurement of 
a project 
Intellectual 
property rights 
protection 
Patented 
solution 
Publicity 
Setup  
Plenary meeting 
with possible 
one-to-one 
follow-up 
Contest with 
possible plenary 
kick-off meeting 
Dialogue rounds 
and staged 
selection process 
“Post-box” for 
private 
proposals 
 
2.4.2 Case: market consultation urgency programme refurbishment main road network 
(April 2009) 
Case description 
Rijkswaterstaat is refurbishing and upgrading the main road network in the period 
2010–2013. Thirty bottlenecks in the network have to be improved in a relatively short 
time to improve traffic flow. To accelerate the realization of this programme, 
Rijkswaterstaat has developed a new procurement approach for 16 projects 
(Witteveen & Bos, 2010; Witteveen & Dorée, 2011). The new approach bundled these 
projects into six packages, which were procured through short uniform processes that 
contained intense dialogue and communication with private parties. The new 
procurement approach was the subject of a market consultation in April 2009 
(Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a) that consisted of two parts. First, a general consultation with 
all interested market parties was conducted to inform the market parties about the 
intended process and to assess the private interest in discussing this in detail. One-to-
one in-depth discussions followed with selected parties. The market consultation was 
finished within 1 month (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009b). 
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Reward for participation 
In the interviews, the private parties have indicated that if information and creativity 
from the market are requested by government, something should be provided in return. 
Since there is no prize or reimbursement of costs, private parties have indicated that 
the added value of involvement is to be informed about the process and the 
government's intentions early, in preparation for a future procurement process. The 
public parties acknowledged this and mentioned that it is essential to keep private 
parties interested in future consultations, for example, by providing feedback on the 
results of the consultation and the actions taken. 
 
Incentive for creativity 
The market consultation model does not include a strong incentive for creativity, 
because private parties have a passive role. Therefore, in this case, both private and 
governmental parties have indicated that the plenary consultation resulted in strategic 
behaviour. The private parties did not provide insight into their thoughts in detail. The 
experts interviewed have indicated that although plenary consultation is a good way to 
start, one-to-one consultation provides the opportunity to gain more in-depth 
information (Andersson Elffers Felix, 2010). 
 
Setup of the model 
The governmental experts indicated that in a good market consultation, the market has 
to be asked a clear question about the intended process or solution, to get a clear 
reaction. Additionally, the question should encourage private parties to submit 
background information. However, this has its limits. Both private and governmental 
experts indicate that because there is no reimbursement of costs in a market 
consultation, the transaction costs should be minimized (in line with Witteveen & Bos, 
2010). Therefore, a short process concentrating on the essentials is considered 
necessary to minimize transaction costs and keep the parties interested in future market 
consultations. 
 
2.4.3 Case: early design contest steel bridges renovation                             
(January – November 2009) 
Case description 
Rijkswaterstaat is responsible for the maintenance of 274 steel bridges that need 
reinforcement. Traditional reinforcement is a complex process that would cause 
considerable nuisance to road and waterway traffic. Therefore, Rijkswaterstaat 
initiated an early design contest, “Steel Bridges Renovation”, to collect clever ideas 
about logistics, traffic engineering and/or construction that could limit nuisance to car 
users when renovating the steel bridges (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010). From January 2009 
onwards, 165 ideas were submitted, the 10 best of which were rewarded with EUR 
100,000 for further development in a second round. In November 2009, the winner of 
this second round received a price of EUR 500,000. If one of the selected ideas was 
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applied in practice within 5 years, it would receive another EUR 500,000. A special 
aspect of this design contest is that the intellectual property rights remained with the 
private sector, whereas traditionally patents were transferred to the contracting 
authority as part of the contract. The private party could, therefore, use the patented 
solution in other works. Rijkswaterstaat will pay a royalty to obtain a license to use the 
patented solution (see also Van der Burg & De Groot, 2009). 
 
Reward for participation  
Ideas from the private sector were assessed by a jury. In our study, public parties 
suggested that this jury should consist of well-known members able to reflect the 
contest's goal. Authoritative jury members can help private parties accept the 
qualitative judgment, while the reputation of the members can help generate publicity. 
In addition to the amount of available prize money, this publicity functioned as an extra 
reward that made the private sector take this design contest seriously. 
 
Incentive for creativity  
Private parties indicated that more contributions were submitted because the 
intellectual property rights in this early design contest remain with the private sector 
(see also Rijkswaterstaat, 2010). After all, the solutions developed could be submitted 
in other projects and competitions. Additionally, Rijkswaterstaat is not limited by a 
patent when deciding who to award a project to. It can pay the license holder a user 
fee and award the implementation to another private party (Van der Burg & De 
Groot, 2009). 
 
Setup of model  
Public parties mentioned that if a contest is linked to a specific issue, project or broader 
societal problem, it is easier to generate insight into the problems. In addition, it is more 
interesting for private parties to solve a problem if they know Rijkswaterstaat is 
struggling with it (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010). In this case, there were no selection criteria 
for participation. This resulted in the ideas elicited by the contest being creative but not 
always feasible. 
 
2.4.4 Case: Afsluitdijk renewal market reconnaissance                                           
(April 2008 – March 2009) 
Case description 
The safety of the IJsselmeer enclosure dam (in Dutch: Afsluitdijk) was assessed as 
insufficient in studies from 2000. This prompted the government to take action to 
increase the dam's safety. Simultaneously, the national government appointed the 
Afsluitdijk as a showcase of Dutch water engineering and climate adaptation. 
Rijkswaterstaat and regional stakeholders chose to carry out a joint market 
reconnaissance aimed at attaining creative integral concepts between April 2008 and 
March 2009 (Rijkswaterstaat et al., 2009). Eight consortia of private companies 
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developed a vision on the Afsluitdijk and the area directly surrounding it, including a 
spatial design, feasible in a technical, legal and financial sense. The consortia 
collaborated with the public project organization through dialogue rounds. Consortia 
were free to initiate the dialogues and could also interact with other public 
stakeholders. To facilitate collaborative decision-making, civil stakeholders were part 
of the jury. In addition to the integrated private concepts, Rijkswaterstaat developed a 
low-ambition alternative parallel to the market reconnaissance. Ultimately, this 
alternative was chosen for further development (Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, 2011) after budget cuts due to the economic crisis resulted in lower 
ambitions. Elements from the integrated private concepts were added by cherry-
picking (Lenferink et al., 2009). 
 
Reward for participation 
Rijkswaterstaat was aimed at fully compensating private efforts, less some private 
acquisition costs. However, compensation turned out to be lower for a number of 
reasons. First, the emphasis on broad experience with civil engineering projects in the 
pre-selection criteria caused the formation of large consortia, which led to high costs in 
setting up internal cooperation. Second, consortia indicated that Rijkswaterstaat 
displayed a tendency to ask for too many details because of the focus on technical and 
financial feasibility, increasing the consortia's efforts and costs. Third, the parties 
involved acknowledged that the consortia displayed a tendency to work out their 
concepts in too much detail considering the explorative nature of the request for 
proposals, because the parties felt they were in competition. This feeling was 
strengthened by the resemblance of the design of the reconnaissance to that of a 
competitive dialogue procurement procedure21 (Lenferink et al., 2011). 
 
Incentive for creativity 
The consortia's creativity mainly consisted of innovatively combining existing components 
and processes, i.e. “process” innovation. The reconnaissance did not result in structural 
product innovations. One reason for this was that the request to the private parties, 
which was to develop integrated concepts that could be innovative but did not have to 
be (Rijkswaterstaat et al., 2009). In order to spark private sector creativity, three 
aspects were essential. First, the visions remained the property of the developing 
consortium, and Rijkswaterstaat would have needed to buy a license from that 
consortium in order to use the idea. To facilitate this, a standard license agreement was 
developed, although the market parties indicated that this was done too late in the 
process (Burger & Van Wijk, 2008; Lenferink et al., 2009). Second, before commencing 
the dialogue, a protocol for sharing information was developed. In practice, this has 
                                              
 
21 It included dialogue rounds and staged selection of participants; see European Commission (2004). For more 
information on the application of the competitive dialogue procedure in the Netherlands, see Lenferink et al., 
2011. 
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ensured open communication without risking the exchange of consortium-specific 
information among the other participating consortia. Third, pre-selection criteria 
determined the kind of creativity: the character of the parties in the consortia was 
reflected in the creativity of the visions. For example, consortia that included dredging 
companies proposed visions that included major dredging activities. 
 
Setup of the model 
The model was applied with partial compensation for private parties' efforts. However, 
the market parties have indicated that they perceived the market reconnaissance as a 
competitive instrument, as discussed above. Before the reconnaissance, construction 
companies, in particular, requested that the reconnaissance be directly connected to the 
procurement of the construction of a work by awarding a contract to the private party 
with the best concept. Government and private plan developers indicated that such a 
connection was not feasible, due to political-administrative uncertainties. They argued 
for either a design contest with a considerable prize or market reconnaissance with 
compensation for effort and protection of intellectual property rights, with the latter 
option being chosen. The fact that instead of a private concept, the government-
developed concept was chosen for further development and elements of the private 
concepts were later added by cherry-picking was not well received by the 
participating private consortia (Lenferink et al., 2009). In addition, this was only 
possible if the private parties took additional time and effort to further elaborate these 
elements. Therefore, the parties expressed the need to formulate clear rules upfront 
that are respected throughout the process. 
 
2.4.5 Case: unsolicited proposal Breda – Utrecht rail connection                           
(March 2008 onwards) 
Case description 
The A27 highway is an important North-South connection in the Netherlands. In 2007, 
Rijkswaterstaat started a planning procedure to increase its capacity between Utrecht 
and Breda. The connection between Utrecht and Breda is a missing link in the railway 
infrastructure network. The road infrastructure planning procedure and the missing 
railway connection inspired BAM, a Dutch construction company, and Goudappel 
Coffeng, a traffic engineering consultancy firm, to develop an unsolicited proposal for 
the corridor between Utrecht and Breda (Goudappel Coffeng & BAM, 2008). They 
proposed combining the construction of the new railway link with the expansion of the 
A27 highway, in order to realize cost savings and create possibilities for regional co-
financing. An independent commission consisting of academics and engineering 
consultant experts concluded that the proposal was unfeasible (Commissie Spoor A27, 
2009). However, strong pressure from local governments resulted in additional studies 
into the proposal (Littel, 2010), which have not yet been completed. Currently, 
Rijkswaterstaat is continuing to plan to expand the A27 highway, but it has to account 
for possible bundling of the road infrastructure with a new railway connection. 
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Reward for participation  
It is essential for an unsolicited proposal to deliver the right idea at the right time to the 
right person with the right connections and information (Poot, 2009). Through interaction 
in other forms of early private involvement, the private sector can gain insight into 
planning procedures and the government's ambitions, permitting the discovery of 
windows of opportunity. The public and private parties have indicated this as essential 
for successful unsolicited proposals. 
 
Incentive for creativity  
An unsolicited proposal provides an opportunity to submit creative solutions. The private 
sector is not bound by specific preconditions or governmental requests. This provides the 
freedom to generate “out-of-the-box” combinations of functions. However, private 
parties have indicated that to make the development of a proposal worthwhile, the 
intellectual property rights of the proposals submitted should be protected better. At 
the moment, private parties feel that this regulation is either absent or does not work 
properly. 
 
Setup of the model  
The private parties mentioned that it is difficult for a commercial company to get 
support from government. New proposals are often seen as a threat to current planning 
processes. Government has often studied problems and issues for years and always 
seems to find sufficient reasons to disregard proposals from outside (Littel, 2010). 
Therefore, private parties should know their customer (i.e. government) and its structure, 
responsible employees, processes and planning procedures before submitting a 
proposal. Additionally, lobbying in media and politics is an essential precondition to 
launching a successful unsolicited proposal. In this specific case, lobbying the national 
and local governments kept the proposal “in the game” and ensured support for a 
financial contribution from local government for the proposal (Niessen, 2010). 
 
2.5 Analysis of early private involvement models in practice 
Potential added values and risks were distinguished from theory in the second section 
of this article. Table 2.2 summarizes the discussion of the models and cases (as 
examined in the previous sections) by displaying the role of these risks and added 
values in practice. 
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Table 2.2: Added values and risks of cases of early private involvement.  
 Market  
consultation 
Early design  
contest 
Market 
reconnaissance 
Unsolicited   
proposal 
Cases Urgency 
programme road 
refurbishment  
Steel Bridges 
Renovation 
Afsluitdijk Renewal Breda - Utrecht 
rail connection 
Added values 
Detailed and 
committed 
feasibility 
information 
Partly, only 
information on 
outlines. Limited 
commitment, since 
information sha-
ring is voluntary 
Yes, dependent on 
request and 
guidelines for 
contest 
Yes, detailed and 
committed 
information in 
explorative stage. 
Best results by 
intense dialogue 
Unclear, the 
committed 
feasibility details 
need assessment 
by government 
Lifecycle 
perspective 
No, the request 
was for a process 
consultation 
Yes, adaptiveness 
on lifecycle basis 
was requested in 
contest 
Yes, adaptive 
models were 
requested on 
lifecycle basis 
No, not present in 
proposal 
Professionalisati
on of the 
planning 
process 
Yes, critical 
comments on 
predefined 
process led to 
adaptation 
Yes, by providing 
connection of 
reward with 
realization 
Yes, short time-
frame stimulated 
tight, professional 
government. Crea-
tivity inspired dis-
cussions in 
decision-making 
No, incentive for 
professional 
attitude towards 
proposal is absent. 
Negative attitude 
towards outside 
ideas persists 
Conceptual 
creativity 
Limited, private 
sector is limited by 
government's pro-
posal. General 
consultation led to 
strategic answers 
Yes, but strong 
incentive on 
feasibility 
Yes, active 
developing role of 
private party. 
New creative 
ideas out-of-the-
box 
Yes, private sector 
fully free to de 
Risks 
Hampering 
competition 
No, consultation is 
without 
obligations, results 
are public 
Possibly, reward if 
realized can 
influence 
procurement 
No, reconnaissance 
is without direct 
relationship to 
procurement 
Possibly, unclear if 
and how proposal 
will be procured 
Complex 
process 
No, consultation 
fits the traditional 
government-
dominated process 
Partly, clear rules 
are provided, but 
range of creativity 
is difficult to 
manage 
Partly, active role 
of private sector 
and status of 
model can be 
difficult to manage 
Yes, unsolicited 
proposal can cross 
ongoing planning 
procedures and 
political discussions 
Limitation of 
political 
freedom of 
choice 
No, consultation 
without 
obligations, so 
free choice of 
government 
Possibly, 
government can 
be influenced by 
contest, especially 
if prize is related 
to realization 
Partly, discussion 
between use of 
total concept and 
cherry-picking 
Partly, discussion 
initiated by 
private proposal, 
government is 
“forced” to choose 
Opportunistic 
behaviour 
Possibly, no 
obligations, so no 
responsibility for 
opportunistic input 
No, depending on 
the quality of the 
judgment 
Partly, the 
concepts mirror the 
character of the 
involved parties 
Yes, assessment of 
opportunistic 
behaviour of 
private sector 
necessary 
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The market consultation is the most commonly applied model for early private 
involvement in Dutch infrastructure planning, because it is easy to use, it does not 
interfere with possible future procurement and it has relatively low transaction costs. 
Therefore, market consultation proves suitable for checking the intended process in a 
pre-competitive stage. However, practice shows that market consultation contains a 
limited incentive for sparking creativity. Private parties can only react to an intended 
solution. As such, the model provides only a limited incentive for collaboration, which 
can be found in the one-to-one dialogues. 
 
In an early design contest, the best solution is chosen by a governmental client and used, 
possibly supplemented by good components from other ideas. The early design contest 
can be applied to specific, worked-out problems. The size of the prize partially 
determines the power of the incentive to deliver creative ideas. The jury judgment of 
the contest can cause uncertainty for private parties: it is impossible to define and 
specify all the criteria in advance, so qualitative criteria need to be applied that leave 
a greater margin for subjectivity on the part of the independent jury. The contest 
involves active private involvement, but does not stimulate public–private collaboration. 
The public and private parties are separated by the contest's competitive character. 
 
In a market reconnaissance, no winning private concept is chosen: all the ideas can be 
used by government to compose a final concept. The market reconnaissance requires 
government and market to be prepared for an extensive dialogue, which involves more 
transaction costs than a market consultation or early design contest. The incentive to 
deliver creativity is based on cost reimbursement and intellectual property rights 
protection, which is difficult because, in practice, most innovations consist of 
combinations of existing techniques. Without protection of intellectual property rights, a 
market reconnaissance is similar to consultancy. Creativity can be stimulated, as the 
Afsluitdijk case shows, but the creativity generated proved to be closely related to the 
selection criteria. The model has great potential for public–private collaboration: public 
and private parties are encouraged to interact to come to private visions that reflect 
public wishes and ambitions. 
 
The unsolicited proposal differs greatly from other early private involvement models. It 
is essential to situate unsolicited proposals carefully in public plan- and decision-
making. This requires considerable private insight into public planning procedures. In 
practice, private parties seem to underestimate the duration of the processes involved, 
the intensity of the stakeholder involvement required and the strict rules and procedures 
that play a role in the complexity of careful plan- and decision-making. Successful 
private unsolicited proposals are, therefore, exceptional in the Netherlands. Similar to 
market reconnaissance, this model also depends on the arrangement of intellectual 
property rights protection. Although this model involves pro-active private parties, 
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government adopts a passive, somewhat reluctant attitude towards solutions invented 
by other organizations, which limits the potential for public–private collaboration. 
 
The discussion of the various models shows that the models could make use of the input 
of private parties. However, there is more to this than added values and risks: practice 
shows that the models' goals and scope need to fit the case, proper rewards and 
incentives need to be provided and the models' setup need to reflect and incorporate 
these elements effectively (Table 2.1). In practice, the goal and scope of a project 
needs to be examined before applying a model. The different models have different 
goals and different scopes, and can serve different purposes. However, a structured 
assessment of these purposes before choosing a certain model seems lacking (Lenferink 
et al., 2012). Rewards are crucial to stimulate private participation and keep the 
private sector interested in early private involvement, both for the future of a project 
and for early private involvement. Private parties have indicated that insight into how 
government will handle their input is essential for their future participation, and that 
steps need to be taken to ensure successful early private involvement in the future, 
especially with regard to intellectual property rights regulations. Such regulations could 
also act as incentives for creativity and stimulate the private parties' efforts. In the 
setup of all four models, the need for transparency and clear rules is evident. Although 
government should clearly delineate the planning issue, the challenging character of the 
early involvement initiative should be maintained by not working out initiatives in detail 
(Codecasa & Ponzini, 2011). Doing this will provide opportunities for innovation and 
can make initiatives adaptive to change at the project level and at the political level 
(Sagalyn, 2007). 
 
2.6 Conclusions and recommendations on early private involvement 
In conclusion, early private involvement offers government and business organizations 
opportunities to collaborate and strengthen plan development in an early pre-
competitive stage of the planning process, when options are still open and private 
parties have not been contracted. Early private involvement in Dutch infrastructure 
planning stimulates the effective use of technical knowledge in planning (Beauregard, 
2005) and can serve as preparation for establishing PPP (Wettenhall, 2003). As such, 
it can offer a strategy that fits the governance of networks (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; 
Koppenjan, 2005). 
 
In Dutch practice, government and business organizations are generally positive about 
early private involvement in the explorative, pre-competitive stages of infrastructure 
planning. We have shown that unlocking the potential of early private involvement and 
strengthening plan development requires a reward for private sector participation, an 
incentive to come up with creative solutions and a setup that is clear and 
straightforward and supported by proper regulations (see fifth section). The potential 
of the different models for addressing complexity and to facilitate public–private 
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collaboration varies. Moreover, the potential application of the early private 
involvement models - the extent to which private parties can help to improve the 
planning process and how and when private parties should be involved - differs per 
early private involvement model. Analysis shows that the market reconnaissance model 
of early private involvement has the greatest potential for strengthening Dutch plan 
development, while the unsolicited proposal model seems difficult to apply in Dutch 
practice (see Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3: Potential for strengthening plan development by early private involvement.  
Potential… Market  
consultation 
Early design  
contest 
Market 
reconnaissance 
Unsolicited  
proposal 
… to address 
complexity 
 
Low Low High Medium 
Needs worked-out 
proposed solution 
or proposed 
process 
Needs concrete 
requests, objects 
and/or question 
Options are open in 
both process and 
solutions 
Open and creative, 
but often not fitting 
plan and decision-
making 
… for 
public–
private 
collaboration 
 
Very low  
Passive private 
parties, limited 
incentive for 
private parties to 
collaborate 
Medium  
Active private 
parties and 
possibly NGOs, but 
limited incentive to 
collaborate 
High 
Active private 
parties and 
incentives for 
public–private 
collaboration 
Medium  
Pro-active private 
parties, limited 
incentive for public 
parties to 
collaborate 
… 
application in 
practice 
Apply relatively 
late  
in explorative 
stage for check on 
proposed process 
and solutions, 
without 
collaboration 
Apply relatively 
late  
in explorative 
stage for creativity 
on specific 
elements, with 
limited operational 
collaboration 
Apply early 
 in explorative 
stage for 
conceptual 
creativity, with 
intense strategic 
collaboration 
Accommodate 
if possible within 
existing plan- and 
decision-making 
processes. Potential 
is proposal-specific 
 
In order to address complexity in infrastructure planning, the models seem to stimulate 
better government decision-making by providing reliable and relevant practical 
information, knowledge and expertise. In addition, private conceptual creativity could 
help provide innovative solutions to address complex issues. Early private involvement 
stimulates the search for public–private collaboration. By actively involving private 
parties, an attitude change in government could be stimulated: from a closed, 
hierarchical government with vertical relationships to other parties (Wettenhall, 2003), 
towards a customer-oriented organization open to horizontal collaboration and 
community involvement (see also Van den Brink, 2009). With regard to the application 
of early private involvement, the conditions under which the models can effectively be 
applied in Dutch planning practice vary. We found that market reconnaissance and 
design contest models can best be applied early in the explorative stage, because they 
require more open project scopes to deliver creative and innovative solutions. The 
market consultation can best be applied later in the planning process as a check on 
proposed solutions, because the private parties have a passive role in this model. The 
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potential and application of the unsolicited proposal is context-specific and dependent 
on the degree of freedom provided within the planning framework to come up with 
independent private proposals. 
 
Based on our findings, we can make two major recommendations for future research. 
Although new public management and PPP are internationally recognized 
developments in planning (Lane, 2002), not all countries have the strong planning 
tradition and framework of the Netherlands, in which planning is strongly regulated by 
government (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000). Therefore, at first sight, market reconnaissance 
could prove to be particularly difficult to apply elsewhere. On the other hand, 
unsolicited proposals require less public government control, which makes this model of 
early private involvement difficult to apply in the Netherlands, but potentially effective 
in other countries (this is demonstrated by the fact that this model has been applied in 
several countries, see Hodges and Dellacha, 2007, for an overview). We recommend 
investigating in depth to what extent our findings on early private involvement models 
are also relevant and applicable in other countries with different planning frameworks 
and traditions. 
 
Another recommendation is to improve the connection between early private 
involvement and civil society. Currently, interaction between government and business 
organizations and interaction between government and civil society seems to take 
place in separate arenas. Connecting community involvement and private involvement 
could potentially increase the feasibility and creativity of proposed projects through 
private involvement, while the involvement of civil society could provide for broader 
societal support. After all, Sagalyn (2007, p. 14) has stated that “public commitment is 
vulnerable to continual assault”. Poor public involvement can lead to negative pluralism 
(Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003), in which plan and project development are delayed or 
halted. As a first step towards connecting the separate arenas, civil stakeholders could 
take part in juries, appraisal committees and other organizations and networks involved 
in the contact with the private sector to create forums for dialogues between multiple 
public and private agencies (Innes et al., 2010). By bridging the divide between 
market and civil society, early private involvement could strengthen plan involvement 
even further. 
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3 Early contractor involvement in Dutch infrastructure development:  
Initial experiences with parallel procedures for planning and procurement 
 
Abstract 
Traditionally, in the Netherlands, the procurement procedure for infrastructure 
does not start until the public decisionmaking procedure is fully completed. In 
the new procurement strategy, early contractor involvement is applied by 
carrying out the procurement procedure and the public planning procedure 
simultaneously. This article explores the first experiences and lessons learned 
with early contractor involvement in four Dutch infrastructure projects. It can be 
concluded that the new strategy adds value in terms of time gains, improved 
project control and more innovative solutions. However, to optimize early 
contractor involvement, the differences between the competitive procurement 
procedures and the open, cooperative public planning procedures need to be 
bridged. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the Netherlands, government is responsible for the development and maintenance of 
the road infrastructure network. At the national level, the Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management (hereafter: Ministry of Transport) is responsible for the 
national highway network. Until recently, the Ministry of Transport was the dominant 
actor within the infrastructure planning process. It took care of the majority of tasks – 
including engineering, which was carried out by its own engineering department. The 
role of contractors at the project-plan preparation stages (engineering, designing, 
impact assessment studies) was usually limited to that of consultants. After the formal 
consent decision, contractors become involved in the construction (contracting of building 
activities) and operational stages (contracting out of maintenance) through procurement 
procedures. 
 
Traditionally, in the Netherlands, the procurement procedure for the (re)construction of 
large infrastructure projects only starts after the public route determination/ 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure has been completed successfully and 
resulted in a Route Decision that provides planning consent and sets the framework for 
the procurement procedure, because it is based on a broad assessment of 
environmental and other impacts, and on intensive consultation with regional and local 
parties. The Route Decision determines the location or route and the design of the road 
in terms of its height and width, and is legally binding. On the basis of a Route 
Decision, environmental permits have to be granted and expropriation can be carried 
out. After the Route Decision, only limited decisionmaking takes place. Because of the 
direct environmental consequences, only marginal deviations from the Route Decision 
are allowed during the procurement procedure and the subsequent construction. The 
advantages of applying the route determination and procurement procedure 
traditionally, in series are: 
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- simple planning processes because of serial application;  
- clear division between public and private roles and applicable procedures; and 
- controlled procurement procedure, partly due to a clear, publicly committed scope, 
laid down in formal decisions.  
 
The Netherlands is a small and urbanized country, with many claims being made on (the 
same) available space, making spatial planning a complex affair. This makes 
infrastructure projects challenging in technical as well as spatial terms. Flyvbjerg et al,  
(2003a), and Flyvbjerg et al., (2003b) and the Duijvestein committee (Tweede Kamer, 
2004) have shown that the overestimation and underestimation of revenues and costs 
as well as the multiple, sometimes conflicting roles and responsibilities of government 
cause problems when it comes to project control.  
 
Applying the traditional approach is time-consuming. Especially the route decision/EIA-
procedure takes time, as a broad set of alternatives is included and intensive 
discussions with local and regional parties take place. In addition, deviating from the 
Route Decision would imply that the route determination/EIA-procedure has to be 
(partly) carried out again. Therefore, a national governmental research committee has 
looked for ways to realize time gains in the procedure (Elverding, 2008).  
 
Last but not least, the approach provides contractors with little room to deviate from 
the solution laid down in the Route Decision. Improvements can be made only with 
regard to technical details at the operational level (e.g. logistics, engineering and 
choice of materials). The spatial design of the road remains fixed. This has a negative 
effect on the possibility to incorporate innovative ideas on the part of the contractors. 
Therefore, the potential for realizing added value, reducing environmental impacts and 
achieving cost savings are limited.  
 
Recently, the Ministry of Transport has been looking for ways to involve contractors at 
an earlier stage and more actively in the development of infrastructure and in the 
generation of solutions for mobility-related problems. The main goals of this new 
approach of early contractor involvement (ECI) (Burke, 2003; V&W, 2005; Nijsten & 
Arts, 2007) are the following: 
- Project control: decisionmaking based on committed bids from contractors, providing 
a more robust information base for the consent decision, a practical and transparent 
decisionmaking process and fewer (often costly) changes during construction; 
- Time gains: gaining time by conducting parallel procedures rather than conducting 
them sequentially; and 
- Innovation: using the conceptual freedom, innovative and creative input of 
contractors (better price/quality ratio through competition) (Mosey, 2009) to arrive 
at a higher quality and more sustainable solutions. 
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In international infrastructure planning practice, enabling private investments (e.g. by 
concessions) can also be recognized as a goal of approaching contractors early and 
involving them in a more intensive way. Thus far, this has not been an overriding interest 
in involving contractors early in the Netherlands. First of all, there are only limited 
possibilities for tolling, making it less interesting for private investors to become 
involved. Tolling is limited because there are insufficient alternatives to toll roads for 
car users, because the quality of the secondary road network is insufficient and 
constructing a separate network of toll roads is almost impossible in a heavily 
urbanized and crowded country like the Netherlands. In addition, the country has a high 
quality national highway network. Secondly, the government has considerable funds at 
its disposal, among other things from gas revenues in the economic structure funds, which 
means that private investments by concessions contracts are not necessary. However, the 
introduction of road pricing schemes is currently being discussed, although the aim is not 
to gain revenues from (parts of) the highway network, but rather to find a way to 
distribute the costs of maintaining and improving the road network fairly among the 
actual users of the cars and the infrastructure. Although financing and maintenance are 
increasingly applied in integral Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) contracts, these 
contracts are not based on a tolling principle. Instead, the availability-based contracts 
aim at improving project control in construction, maintenance and exploitation by 
incorporating the proper checks and balances of the financial market.  
 
Basically, early contractor involvement (ECI) aims at involving construction (and 
maintenance) contractors in the procurement process before the Route Decision to 
provide a solution to the shortcomings in infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a; 
Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b; Haynes & Krmenec, 1989; Van der Heijden, 1996). There are 
two specific ways to start the procurement early and combine the procurement 
procedure with the route determination/ EIA-procedure: 
- Parallelization: the procurement procedure starts before the consent decision is 
reached and as such runs parallel to the route determination/EIA-procedure. There is 
no exchange of information between the procedures; and 
- Interweaving: the procurement procedure starts before the consent decision is 
reached and is interwoven with the route determination/EIA-procedure; the 
procedures are coordinated and information is exchanged explicitly. 
 
Besides combining the procurement and public planning procedures, early contractor 
involvement could also be achieved by first selecting a contractor in a procurement 
procedure and then starting the route determination/EIA-procedure. This approach has 
not yet been applied in road infrastructure planning the Netherlands, but there are 
examples in the United Kingdom. The procedure would involve concessions being 
auctioned among private parties, which, in the current institutional setting, is not possible 
in the Netherlands. Furthermore, a major drawback of this approach is that it limits 
competition by the early selection of a contractor, and removes a stimulus to optimize 
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plans in the public- planning procedure. As such, it is not an approach that is considered 
in the Netherlands and therefore it is not included in this paper. 
 
After several years of gaining experience with ECI in the Netherlands, the question 
arises whether or not the objectives (increased project control, achieving time gains and 
stimulating innovation) have been realized. The aim of this article is to answer this 
question and additionally discuss lessons that have been learned by exploring the 
strengths and weaknesses of several infrastructure projects involving parallelization or 
interweaving. To understand early contractor involvement, some background 
information on the relevant procedures in the Netherlands is needed, which is why, in 
the next two sections, the Dutch infrastructure planning procedure and the applicable 
procurement procedures are discussed. Subsequently, the concept of early contractor 
involvement is examined in greater detail and the research design is discussed. Next, 
the experiences from practice are described and the conclusions presented, followed 
by reflection and recommendations.  
 
3.2 Planning procedures 
The planning procedure for the (re)construction of national roads is laid down in the 
Dutch Infrastructure (Planning Procedures) Act (V&W, 2006b). In the so-called route 
determination/EIA procedure, the plan preparation and EIA procedures are fully 
integrated (see Figure 3.1). At the moment, a bill to revise existing legislation, which 
includes a slightly revised route determination/EIA procedure, is being discussed in 
parliament. The main changes involve a simplification and combination of some of the 
steps in the procedure to achieve time gains and improvements in the participation 
process. In addition, revisions of the EIA-regulations will be enacted in July 2010. 
However, these revisions will not cause major differences with respect to the issues and 
conclusions discussed in this paper. The selected projects have followed the procedure 
that existed prior to the revisions, which is described in greater detail below. 
 
The first step of the procedure involves the Ministry of Transport drawing up a Notifica-
tion of Intent (NoI), which broadly outlines the proposed road development project that 
has resulted from the Reconnaissance Study in the explorative stage. The NoI includes 
an indication of the problem, the project objectives and a number of alternative 
solutions. It determines the scope of the EIA study. The NoI is made public and a first 
round of consultation, advice and public review is conducted to determine the scope of 
the Route Plan/EIS (EIS stands for environmental impact study). Next, the Ministry of 
Transport prepares a Route Plan/EIS, in which the project proposal and its alternatives 
are elaborated and assessed with regard to their (environmental) impact. Various 
alternatives are usually considered. In addition, more detailed variants are often 
worked out regarding specific bottlenecks or the spatial layout of the project. 
 Chapter 3 – Early contractor involvement in Dutch infrastructure development  71 
 
 
  
 
 
Generally, the Route Plan/EIS considers the environmental impact as well as traffic-
related, spatial and socio-economic issues. The Route Plan/EIS is subject to a second 
round of advice and consultation. On the basis of the information in the Route Plan/EIS 
and the review, the Minister of Transport – together with the Minister of the Environment 
– selects the preferred alternative.  The project is then worked out in greater detail in 
the Draft Route Decision prepared by Rijkswaterstaat, which is then subject to a third 
round of public review and advice. Finally, the Ministers of Transport and the 
Environment make a final decision, after which the relevant provincial and municipal 
authorities are required to include the route in their regional and land-use plans 
respectively. Furthermore, the various authorities involved grant the permits required to 
implement the project. This subsequent decisionmaking process is in fact a pro-forma 
Explorative Study
Rijkswaterstaat draws up 
Notification of Intent
Public review, advice & consultation
Advice guidelines by EIA Commission
Final Guidelines 
by Ministers of Transport & Environment
Rijkswaterstaat prepares
Route Plan / EIS
Standpoint preferential alternative by
Ministers of Transport & Environment
Public review, advice & consultation
Review of EIS by EIA Commission
Rijkswaterstaat elaborates project
And prepares Draft Route Decision
Public review, advice & consultation
Final Route Decision by
Ministers of Transport & Environment
Possibility for lodging objections
Appeal to court
Decision-making on land use plans,
Permits etc. (various authorities)
EIA follow-up (monitoring & evaluation)
Ministry of Transport (Rijkswaterstaat)
1.  Announcement
2.  Dialogue I
Selection
Evaluation
Application
Bid / offer
Dialogue II
3.  Final Bid
Preliminary 
Award
Elaboration / Explanation
Award of 
contract 
(grant)
Construction / Operation / 
Maintenance
Transfer (delivery)
Figure 3.2: Competitive dialogue procedure Figure 3.1: Route determination/ EIA-procedure. 
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process, because the legally binding Route Decision has already been finalized. Finally, 
after the procurement procedure has been completed, the construction of the road can 
start.  
 
3.3 Procurement procedures 
In the Netherlands, the European Public Procurement Directive (EU 2004/18/EC) is 
implemented through the “Decree on procurement regulations for award of contracts by 
contracting authorities” (NL 2005/650). The EU-directive identifies different 
procurement procedures for public works, supply and service contracts: 
1. Open procedure, no pre-qualification, direct awarding (see art. 1 paragraph 11 (a) 
and art. 28 EU 2004/18/EC); 
2. Restricted procedure, with pre-qualification of at least 5 competitors, direct 
awarding (see art. 1 paragraph 11 (b), art. 28 and art. 44 paragraph 3 EU 
2004/18/EC); 
3. Negotiated procedure without prior publication, with pre-qualification, negotiation 
terms of contract with competitors before awarding, only under very strict 
application conditions (see art. 1 paragraph 11 (d) and art. 30 EU 2004/18/EC); 
4. Negotiated procedure with prior publication, with pre-qualification, negotiation 
terms of contract with competitors about the bids before awarding (hereafter: 
negotiated procedure). This procedure applies when the nature of the project is such 
that specifications cannot be drawn up with sufficient precision to permit awarding 
the contract by means of the open or restricted procedure (see art. 1 paragraph 11 
(d) and art. 31 EU 2004/18/EC); and 
5. Competitive dialogue, with pre-qualification, dialogue with competitors before 
bidding, specifically introduced for complex projects and applicable when the 
following conditions apply (see art. 1 paragraph 11 (c) and art. 29 EU 
2004/18/EC): 
- Procuring a particularly complex contract; and  
- The contracting authority finds it impossible to objectively define the means of 
satisfying its needs or to assess the technical, financial and/or legal solutions which 
the market has to offer. 
 
On the basis of the Public Procurement Directive, the competitive dialogue and the 
negotiated procedure are the most obvious alternatives when it comes to applying ECI 
(V&W, 2005; Jurgens & Orobio de Castro, 2005; Arts et al., 2006). Both procedures 
include the possibility to perform the following (Van Valkenburg & Nagelkerke, 2006): 
- Develop solutions on the basis of a functional specification; 
- Conduct a (confidential) dialogue with participating market parties; 
- Divide the procurement procedure into phases, to be concluded with (interim) bids 
(Bregman, 2003; Van der Bend, 2003); and 
- Realise competition throughout several phases (Petit, 2003).  
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The two procedures vary mainly in terms of their complexity: for more complex 
projects, the competitive dialogue seems suitable, whereas the negotiated procedure 
can be applied to simpler projects. Figure 3.2 shows the general procedure for the 
competitive dialogue (2004/18/EC). The core elements of the competitive dialogue 
are as follows (see Hoezen & Hillig, 2008): 
- Development of projects on the basis of functional specifications and technical 
requirements (Terms of Reference, ToR); 
- Staged process (each stage concluded by (interim) bids and competition over 
several stages (parties may be excluded)); and 
- Criterion for awarding the contract to the most economically advantageous tender 
(MEAT), which means that, in addition to price, quality aspects are also important 
criteria. 
 
3.4 Concept of early contractor involvement 
Early contractor involvement is a relatively new approach to infrastructure planning in 
the Netherlands as well as internationally (e.g. United Kingdom, see Nichols Group, 
2007). It is related to other terms, like early supplier involvement (Wynstra et al., 
2000) and supply chain management (Akkermans et al., 1999), which are popular 
terms in other areas of engineering and in business and economics. The terms share the 
goal of integrating different stages in the planning and contracting processes (a 
lifecycle perspective, see Eggers & Startup, 2006; Lenferink et al., 2008). The key to 
early contractor involvement through interweaving is primarily the way in which the 
procurement procedure is designed, which means that it is important that  
- There is room for creative solutions;  
- There is intensive exchange of ideas; and 
- The values (objectives, needs) are considered in relation to the risks (time, money, 
quality). 
 
In the 2004 business plan of the Ministry of Transport’s operational division  
Rijkswaterstaat – the Directorate-General of Public Works and Water Management – 
the principle of “market, unless” was introduced and translated into a corporate 
procurement strategy (V&W, 2004; 2005). This principle is also included in the business 
plan “Agenda 2012” (V&W, 2008b). Tasks that are not part of the core business are 
sourced out to market parties. The implementation of this strategy has led to large-
scale application of Design and Construct (D&C) contracts for construction,  
performance contracts for maintenance and DBFM contracts for large projects (see 
Lenferink et al., 2011a). The underlying idea is that added value to society – best 
value for tax payers’ money – can be achieved by providing more room for 
contractors in the early stages of the infrastructure development process.  
 
“Market, unless” caused a substantial change in the procurement specifications that are 
sent to the competing contractors. No longer are ready-made projects put on the 
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market for bidding with an exclusive focus on price. Instead, open and functional 
questions are formulated, which have to be elaborated by the contractors in their 
proposal. The subsequent projects are awarded on the basis of quality (most 
economically advantageous tender: best value procurement). However, the optional 
DBFM contracts only add value to innovation if contractors are sufficiently free in their 
design and choice of construction method (Pakkala, 2002; Pakkala et al., 2007) and 
maintenance approach over a long period. This freedom can be given if the 
participants are involved early in the planning process – in the route 
determination/EIA-procedure.  
 
Both the competitive dialogue procurement procedure and the route determination/EIA 
public planning procedure have a staged and funnel-shaped process. In both 
procedures, various solutions are generated, studied and elaborated in greater detail 
in successive stages on the basis of the definition of the problem and objective. In both 
procedures, one solution is eventually selected via an evaluation framework: the route 
decision and the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT), respectively. Essential 
elements of interweaving are that information about risks and values are exchanged, 
that the procurement and planning procedures are linked to each other, meaning that 
the phases of both procedures are coordinated, and that decisions in the separate 
procedures are made at the same time. In this process, the planning procedure is 
leading and the procurement procedure is linked in parallel and interwoven with the 
route determination/EIA-procedure at essential moments. Both procedures remain 
separate tracks. No new procedure is created in which elements of both procedures are 
mixed. It is merely a matter of executing both procedures simultaneously, if the 
(estimated) potential added value is greater than the process and contract risks 
involved.  
 
The difficulty that needs to be addressed is to prevent the two procedures from 
diverging and to arrive at different end points in terms of scope, quality and/or price, 
which means that it is important for the information from one procedure to feed the 
other (exchange of ideas) and for the same evaluation framework to be applied to the 
decisionmaking procedure as much as possible (Jurgens & Orobio de Castro, 2005). As 
far as the interweaving approach is concerned, the framework developed by the 
Ministry of Transport (V&W, 2005) lays down a process in which the two procedures 
meet at certain points, when information (about impacts and risks) is exchanged, after 
which they continue on their parallel tracks. This could be seen as a form of ‘living apart 
together’. In the parallelization approach, the procurement procedure also runs parallel 
with the route determination/EIA procedure, the difference being that the focus is not 
on the exchange of information. It is limited to an early timing of procedures and to 
connecting them in parallel. This could be seen as living like neighbours at the same 
floor of an apartment block.  
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In the traditional approach, the Ministry of Transport uses its own (cost) estimates for its 
projects. Whether these estimates are feasible or correct only becomes clear after the 
procurement, which is traditionally after the Route Decision has been made. This is a 
major drawback of the traditional approach, as at such a late stage of the planning 
process, there is/should be no way back (the Route Decision has been taken), while the 
estimate may suffer from (over)optimism (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b). This has also been 
pointed out by the Parliamentary Duijvestein Committee (Tweede Kamer, 2004). They 
state that, in infrastructure projects, issues regarding the underestimation of costs and 
the overestimation of benefits are common. Using ECI, the cost estimates can be checked 
for feasibility at an earlier stage in the planning process. 
 
The route determination/EIA-procedure has three stages at which parallelization or 
interweaving may commence: 
1. After the Notification of Intent is published; 
2. After providing the guidelines for the EIS ; and 
3. After providing the Draft Route Decision. 
As a consequence, there are at least three models for early contractor involvement (see 
Figure 3.3). An early start to combining the route determination/EIA and procurement 
procedures (even before the Notification of Intent) allows the contractors to propose 
their own solutions (Figure 3.3, Model 1). The drawback is that the formal 
administrative procedures, in comparison to the duration of regular procurement 
procedures, are time-consuming. This may result in risks, such as changes in the scope of 
the project and outdated data and related excessive transaction costs. Actually, the 
most important causes of delays in route determination procedures prove to be delays 
themselves (Kempenaar et al., 2005; V&W, 2003; Elverding, 2008). If a project is 
delayed often, its context will be subject to considerable changes, resulting from things 
like new regulations and requirements, new scientific insights, new developments in the 
planning area, the entry of new stakeholders in the political arena and changes of 
views, policy and values. In practice, therefore, the route determination/ EIA-procedure 
(or parts of this) often has to be re-worked in an iterative process. For a procurement 
procedure, such delays are disastrous, which is why a clear political and administrative 
commitment to a project is vitally important (Elverding, 2008).  
 
Combining the procurement and route determination/EIA procedures at a later stage 
(e.g. after the EIA-study or the draft route decision) may help avoid the drawbacks of 
an early start (Figure 3.3, Models 2 and 3 respectively). However, opportunities for 
contractors to propose innovative solutions will be reduced. Especially in Model 3, the 
added value of an exchange of information will be rather limited, since the scope of 
the project is more clearly delineated. Therefore, in Model 3, parallelization will be 
more likely than interweaving. In essence, the timing of interweaving is a trade-off 
between, on the one hand, exploiting as much as possible opportunities for innovation 
and, on the other hand, limiting the additional (political) process risk related to an early 
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start and prolonged procurement procedures (Arts et al., 2006). The decision to apply 
early contractor involvement and adopt a more or less sophisticated approach 
(interweaving or parallelization) is a trade-off between risks and potential added 
values. The sooner the two procedures are linked together, the greater the need for the 
greater risks to be offset by the potential added value. Since not all issues will have 
priority, it is preferable to choose one main goal when developing a strategy for early 
contractor involvement. Of course, this may be combined with defining some sub-goals 
and constraints. Therefore, it is important to clarify at an early stage which added 
value contractor involvement may have for the project in question. To this end, the Dutch 
government uses the tools called market scan and market consultation.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Three models of interweaving procedures (Models 1-3) and the traditional approach of a 
process in series (Model 4) as applied in the Netherlands. Source: V&W, 2005. 
 
The market scan has to be applied to every new public infrastructure project. It is an in-
house analysis from the government perspective, which makes clear in a structured way 
whether or not early market involvement may provide opportunities for added value. 
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This scan should be carried out early in the planning process of a project, because of 
the Ministry’s “Market, unless…”policy (see above). The scan looks for potential value 
for money (i.e. in real monetary terms or in terms of time or quality); it identifies which 
market parties may offer this added value and how and when to approach them 
(V&W, 2006a).  
 
The market consultation can be seen as an external check of the interest of market 
parties in a given project and in the best way for them to participate. The instrument is 
connected to the European Public Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC (i.e. consideration 
8), which allows for the possibility to request advice prior to the procurement procedure 
by means of a  technical dialogue or to accept unsolicited advice, which can be used to 
define the procurement/contract documents. A market consultation can be seen as an 
exchange of information that is organized by the government with interested (pre-
selected or not) market parties or experts about the coordination of mutual 
requirements for the preparation of a (major) government project. Consulting market 
parties makes it possible to  test whether certain technical, financial-economical, 
organizational, juridical or spatial pre-conditions would have the desired result. In 
addition, the government can discuss the organizational set-up of the procurement 
procedure. A requirement is that the market consultation does not result in the exclusion 
or limitation of competition of market parties. Therefore, government should prevent 
certain market parties from being given preferential treatment that results in either an 
unfair competitive advantage or, equally undesirable, an exclusion from the 
procurement procedure.  
 
3.5 Research design 
To answer the research question, whether or not the goals and expectations of ECI 
(increased project control, achieving time gains and stimulating innovation, see Arts et 
al., 2006) are met, the authors have studied four infrastructure projects in the 
Netherlands. The comments on an earlier version of this article presented at the IPPC 
2008 conference (Van Valkenburg et al., 2008) were used to investigate the 
interweaving practice further, using the findings in the annual interweaving monitor 
(V&W, 2007; WB Consulting, 2009a). In the investigated projects that are currently 
under construction, the procurement and route determination/EIA-procedures were 
carried out parallel to or through interweaving. This article is based on the initial 
experiences with early contractor involvement in these projects and the developments in 
infrastructure planning in the Netherlands and internationally (see e.g. FHWA, 2005). 
As a consequence, this article can be characterized as being descriptive and qualitative 
in nature.  
 
The selected projects are investigated through interviews with project managers, 
document research (e.g. procurement documents and internal Rijkswaterstaat studies 
(V&W, 2007; WB Consulting, 2009a, 2009b) and through attending Rijkswaterstaat-
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symposia on the subject. Additionally, the authors have used their personal experience 
in dealing with early contractor involvement. The number of projects being investigated 
is in line with the explorative nature of this paper: describe the experiences as broadly 
as possible to derive general conclusions. The findings are used to arrive at a 
theoretical generalization (Yin, 2009) by considering them in a wider perspective 
relating to interweaving at both the national and international level. The findings could 
be related to insights in adjacent areas, For example developments in supply chain 
management and early supplier involvement are interesting, as well as developments in 
area-oriented infrastructure development and integrated sustainable delivery of road 
infrastructure (Heeres et al., 2010). However, due to of the broad character of the 
analysis, we decided to limit the study to conclusions regarding infrastructure planning 
and procurement.  
 
The following four projects were investigated (see also Figure 3.4):  
1. Project N31 Highway Zurich – Harlingen (hereafter: N31 Zurich-Harlingen); 
2. Project Capacity expansion Second Coentunnel (hereafter: Second Coentunnel); 
3. Project A4 near Steenbergen (hereafter: A4 Steenbergen); and 
4. Project Passage A2 Maastricht (hereafter: A2 Maastricht). 
The four projects were chosen because they vary in their approach to ECI, in their aims 
(time gains, project control and/or innovation), and in the type of ECI, which varies from 
parallelization (N31 Zurich-Harlingen) to early interweaving (A2 Maastricht), see Table 
3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Map of the Netherlands with the four cases indicated 
 
To investigate the approach to ECI in the different cases, three dimensions are 
examined (Nijsten & Arts, 2007): 
- Time: does contractor involvement start early or late in the planning process?; 
 Chapter 3 – Early contractor involvement in Dutch infrastructure development  79 
 
 
- Space: is the focus on line-infrastructure (the road) or is the scope more area-
oriented (integrated planning, combining the road with other spatial planning 
initiatives)?; and 
- Role: the role of the contractors in the planning process; is it a re-active role (testing 
proposed plans and alternatives) or an active role (developing alternatives and 
planning proposals)? 
Because the choices regarding these three dimensions determine the added value of 
ECI, they are examined to see to whether the goal of ECI is realized.  
 
Table 3.1: Goal and type of ECI in investigated infrastructure projects.   
 N31 Zurich -
Harlingen 
Second Coentunnel A4 Steenbergen A2 Maastricht 
Goal of ECI Time gains Project control  
(time control) 
Project control  
(budget control) 
Innovation,  
project control 
Type of ECI Parallelization 
Model 3 
Parallelization 
Model 3 
Interweaving  
Model 3 
Interweaving  
Model 1 
Sources: V&W, 2005; 2007; WB Consulting, 2009a. 
 
3.6 Experiences with early contractor involvement  
In this section, the practical experiences with ECI in the four investigated projects are 
discussed, starting with a short description of the various projects. Next, the goals and 
the expectations regarding application of early contractor involvement are addressed 
and a description of the approach followed in the specific case and lessons learned is 
provided. In addition, Table 3.2 contains background information on the cases, 
including character, budget, contract and key moments in the planning process. 
 
Table 3.2: Character, budget and timing of investigated infrastructure projects.   
 N31 Zurich 
Harlingen 
Second 
Coentunnel 
A4 Steenbergen A2 Maastricht 
Character Highway capacity 
enlargement 
Enlarging 
capacity  by 
constructing 
extra tunnel 
Relocating 
highway and 
enlarging capacity 
Tunnel construction 
combined with real 
estate 
development 
Budget (mln €) 30  2117 * 280  540 
Contract D&C contract DBFM contract D&C contract D&C contract 
Start procurement November 2005 July 2005 December 2007 December 2006 
Contract close July 2006 April 2008 August 2009 October 2009 
Start Construction July 2007 September 2009 End of 2010  2011 
Completion December 2008 2012 2013 2016 
Note: * = including the Westrandweg project.  
Source: V&W et al., 2008; 2009; BCI 2006. 
 
3.6.1 Project N31 Highway Zurich - Harlingen 
The N31 Zurich-Harlingen project is part of a wider plan to enhance traffic safety and 
increase traffic capacity on the N31 road in the province of Friesland. The project 
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includes upgrading the two-lane road to a four-lane road to increase traffic safety. On 
the basis of the Route Plan/EIS, the results of public consultation and legally required 
advice, the Ministers of Transport and the Environment determined a preferred solution: 
a four-lane road extension. Because the project was not particularly complex, the 
restricted procedure has been applied instead of the competitive dialogue procedure.  
 
Goals and expectations of early contractor involvement 
The N31 Zurich-Harlingen was the first project in the Netherlands in which the 
procurement procedure started before the route determination/EIA-procedure had 
been completed. The possibility to apply early contractor involvement in this project 
became clear after the project study stage was (almost) completed: the Minister had 
already formulated the Standpoint. Both the project quality and the project budget 
were therefore fixed. Due to the late start of ECI, the added value of interweaving was 
limited. A decision was made to adopt ECI in the form of parallelization because of the 
time constraints resulting from commitments regarding the project’s date of completion. 
To enable timely completion, parallelization of the (remaining steps of the) route 
determination/EIA procedure and the procurement procedure was regarded as fruitful. 
Therefore, the main objective of early contractor involvement in this project was to 
realise time gains.  
 
Description of the approach to early contractor involvement 
The procurement started directly after the Draft Route Decision was made, which meant 
that the procurement procedure therefore occurred parallel with the end of the project 
study phase (analogous to Model 3 in Figure 3.3). A necessary precondition for this 
approach was the approval of a pre-decision on the financing of the project (an 
internal decision within the Ministry), which enabled funding to be distributed, and the 
continuation of the process without a definitive Route Decision. In the pre-qualification 
of the restricted procedure, the (mandatory minimum of) five participants were selected 
in a lottery. These parties were allowed to make a bid. 
 
Early contractor involvement did not result in substantial technical innovations in this 
project. Because the Draft Route Decision had already been made, the contractors 
could not influence the development of alternatives or the scope of the project. 
However, they were able to fill in knowledge gaps in the (Draft) Route Decision. For 
instance, the length of the process and the risks could be assessed better using the 
knowledge of the contractors involved in the procurement procedure, which resulted in 
improved project control. Early contractor involvement was also helpful in the 
negotiations with stakeholders. The contractors helped solve implementation-related 
issues, e.g. by providing detailed information on the types of available sound barriers.  
 
The procurement process benefited from the parallelization approach. The results of the 
project study could be implemented easily and early. This made the development of 
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Terms of Reference (ToR) for the procurement procedure easier, and allowed for a 
better fit between the ToR and the outcomes of the project study. MEAT-criteria did not 
play a role in awarding the contract.  
 
The construction was completed in December 2008. Before ECI, in the form of 
parallelization, was considered, the construction was planned to be completed at the 
end of 2009. This means that, in total, the early contractor approach resulted in a gain 
of 11 months in the planning and procurement phases compared to the traditional 
sequential approach.  
 
Lessons learned 
- The time gained by parallelization is substantial even if early contractor involvement 
commences at a relatively late stage. 
- A parallelization approach after the Draft Route Decision can result in a potential 
conflict between the Route Decision and the ToR of an integrated contract. The level 
of detail of the Draft Route Decision could limit the creative freedom of the 
contractors involved in the procurement and, subsequently, in the construction. A 
further specification of the (Draft) Route Decision to improve the legal position of the 
stakeholders, together with the formal-juridical character of the route 
determination/EIA-procedure, can limit the possibilities and room for creativity of the 
contractors.  
- The transaction costs of the project were relatively low compared to the total 
budgeted costs. Because of the narrow scope of the project and its simple character 
from a technical/spatial view, the room for creativity on the part of the contractors 
was limited. Therefore, one might wonder whether it is justified, from a transaction 
costs point-of-view, to have five participants develop solutions. Although a minimum 
of five participants is required for the restricted procedure (art. 44 paragraph 3 EU 
2004/18/EC), it could be argued that three participants would also have sufficed 
(which is the minimum for the competitive dialogue procedure (Lenferink et al., 
2011b)). 
- There has to be commitment among the government actors beforehand. Especially in 
this case, with multiple actors responsible for funding and a project with an 
experimental character, agreement about the scope, preconditions and the ToR, the 
main conditions for the procurement procedure, proves to be essential. 
 
3.6.2 Project capacity expansion Second Coentunnel 
The project Capacity expansion of the Coentunnel is part of an infrastructure 
construction program that aims at stimulating accessibility in the greater Amsterdam 
area. The project includes the design and construction of a second Coentunnel, the 
renovation of the existing Coentunnel and a 30-year exploitation and maintenance 
contract. The resulting DBFM contract also includes (co) funding of the project by the 
contractor. As was the case with the N31 Highway project, ECI started at the end of the 
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project study phase. Market parties were invited to suggest changes to the Draft Route 
Decision. A DBFM contract was realized through a competitive dialogue procedure in 
three stages: 
1. In the first stage, the number of competitors was reduced to three on the basis of a 
proposed realization strategy that addressed five essential elements for success; 
2. In the second stage, the procurement documents were optimized, and the realization 
strategy and inventory of risks and wishes, as part of the awarding criteria in the 
case of consultation, were discussed with the competitors; and 
3. In the third stage, an agreement over the dialogue products, the procurement and 
the DBFM contract was reached. Subsequently, the final bids were requested and 
submitted, and the winning contractor could be selected.  
 
Goals and expectations of early contractor involvement 
Before ECI commenced, a concept for the Draft Route Decision was formulated (Model 
3 in Figure 3.3), which determined the desired project quality. The Draft Route Decision 
was elaborated in parallel with the procurement procedure, and at the end of 2008 
the Route Decision became irrevocable. Through ECI, the Route Decision intended to 
include the outcomes of the public consultation as well as possible beneficial measures 
of the contractor. These measures should have ensured a (legally) more robust Route 
Decision, which indicates that the aim of ECI in this project was project control. 
 
Description of the approach to early contractor involvement  
The issue of air quality is critical to the success of many road development projects in 
the Netherlands. In the procurement procedure, air quality was used as a qualitative 
sub-award criterion. This criterion had to be met; failure to do so would result in a 
(fictitious) penalty on the bid. To this end, the contracting authority formulated a 
reference package that would improve local air quality. The contractors could copy 
these elements from the reference package into their bids, optimize the measurements 
or offer a new package of measurements that would improve air quality. Attractive 
measurements formulated in the bid of the intended contractor would be included in the 
Route Decision. 
 
However, during the procurement procedure, some external (unfavourable) 
developments and new insights regarding air pollution emerged (Busscher et al., 2010). 
For instance, the biggest pollution sources were located outside of the project scope, 
resulting in a limited ability for market parties with regard to local air quality. As a 
result, the criterion of air quality lost its importance as a MEAT-criterion. It prevented 
the development of creative ideas on this subject, while the investments of the 
contractors regarding this criterion were considerable. Eventually, a verdict of the court 
involving cancellation of the Route Decision of another project (the A4 Burgerveen-
Leiden, see Rijkswaterstaat, 2007) because of insufficient EIA-studies (regarding air 
quality issues) had an impact on the Second Coentunnel project. Additional studies on 
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air quality caused the Minister to make amendments to the Route Decision: an air 
pollution barrier must be constructed alongside the highway. The proposed measures 
by the preferred bidder were not included in this amendment. One consequence of 
these problems was that the MEAT-criteria played a limited role in awarding the 
contract 
 
Lessons learned  
- The risks of postponement of the final Route Decision were included in the award 
criterion of risk allocation. This made it possible to allocate a risk to the party that 
would present the lowest financial estimates regarding that risk. One might argue 
about the wisdom of allocating these kinds of risk to private contractors, since it is 
questionable whether contractors are able to bear such risks, because they cannot 
influence the public planning procedure, whereas government can. 
- Creative and integral ideas that did not fit within the scope of the project as defined 
in the Route Decision were not considered in the procurement procedure, for reasons 
related to the internal decisionmaking process of the Ministry of Transport and the 
boundaries set in the public-public covenant. As a result, no substantial technical 
innovations were realised after adopting the parallelization approach. 
- The added value of early contractor involvement in this case lies in time gains and 
improved project control, because the market bids were known when the consent 
decision was made. 
 
3.6.3 Project A4 Steenbergen 
The A4 Steenbergen project is part of the construction of the A4 highway between 
Dinteloord and Halsteren. Based on the EIS, the Minister decided that the A4 would be 
constructed to the west of the village of Steenbergen. The regional parties were in 
favour of constructing an aqueduct to cross the harbour of Steenbergen. The Minister 
decided to construct a (cheaper) bridge, unless private parties would be able to 
construct an aqueduct within the project budget, which, for the aqueduct, included a 
regional contribution. ECI started at the end of the project study phase after the 
Standpoint of the Minister (Model 3 in Figure 3.3, see WB Consulting, 2009a) was 
made public. Market parties were invited to come up with suggestions to improve the 
Draft Route Decision, focussing especially on the possibility of constructing an aqueduct. 
 
Goals and expectations of early contractor involvement 
The ECI mainly aimed at investigating whether the fixed project quality (the construction 
of an aqueduct) was feasible within the available budget by interweaving public 
planning and procurement procedures. A secondary aim was to optimize the quality of 
the solution that was chosen within the available budget. 
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Description of the approach to early contractor involvement 
Procurement was carried out through a competitive dialogue. In 2007, five parties 
were invited to join this dialogue. The start of the dialogue was delayed for six months 
for budgetary reasons (WB Consulting, 2009b). After three rounds of dialogue, the 
competitors were requested to make a preliminary bid for the project based on the 
construction of an aqueduct. The bids were compared to the undisclosed available 
budget for the aqueduct (consisting of the national funds and the regional contribution). 
If all the bids exceeded the available budget, the competitors could make another bid 
for constructing a bridge. However, the maximum bids fell within the budget of the 
project, and three competitors were selected for a fourth dialogue round, using (part of 
the) MEAT-criteria, with price being the most important criterion (95 percent). After a 
fourth dialogue round, which focused on optimizing the proposed solutions, the three 
final bids were assessed using the full MEAT-criteria. The project was awarded in 
August 2009, with the final Route Decision planned for December 2010. 
 
Lessons learned 
- Some sort of market consultation prior to selecting the preferred alternative and 
before starting the ECI would have helped determine the added value of ECI, which 
in turn would have made it possible to select a suitable model based on the goals 
and possibilities of the project. 
- The planning and procurement experts should cooperate in one team in the 
preparation of a project in order to address the differences in the dynamics of the 
project study and procurement process. However, this may result in time overruns, 
because the teams have different objectives. The project study aims at selecting a 
widely acceptable solution and achieving legal certainty through a rigid, albeit more 
open planning process, keeping as much of the requirements of the solution open 
until the end. The less rigid procurement procedure is carried out in a more 
conditioned environment and aims at quickly making it clear what the requirements 
are for developing a viable solution that can be contracted.  
- Inventing, coordinating and developing an interweaving approach may take time. In 
this project, it took about one year. It has to be seen whether overall time gains 
and/or improved quality or project control outweigh the costs of the increased 
preparation time. 
- Coordination of decisionmaking processes within the Ministry of Transport proves to 
be important for timely decisionmaking and for the procurement procedure. 
Coordination could be achieved through public-public covenants that lay down 
financial and process agreements, including possible scenarios. 
 
3.6.4 Passage A2 Maastricht  
The current flow of traffic on the A2 highway through the city of Maastricht poses 
environmental and health-related problems for the people living adjacent to the A2. 
The A2 also separates the different neighbourhoods of Maastricht. In 2003, the 
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Ministry of Transport, the Province of Limburg and the municipalities involved agreed to 
develop a solution to the above-mentioned problems. The goal was to come up with an 
integral and sustainable solution for the various issues of accessibility, liveability and 
safety, while dissolving current spatial barriers and offering opportunities for urban 
redevelopment. In June 2006, it was decided that a tunnel offered the best solution.  
 
Goals and expectations of early contractor involvement 
The goal of the ECI was to improve innovation and project control, as the project 
budget was fixed for the combined construction of the tunnel and real estate 
development in an interwoven public planning and procurement procedure. 
  
Description of the approach to early contractor involvement 
The planning procedures (the national route determination/EIA and the local land-use 
plan procedures) started in 2004 with the publication of the Notification of Intent, 
before starting the procurement procedures (interweaving Model 1, see Figure 3.3). 
The authorities formulated the requirements in the Terms of Reference, which consisted 
of design, construction, temporary measures during construction, communication with 
stakeholders and procedural integration of the infrastructure and real estate. In 
addition, the market parties could distinguish themselves by meeting to a greater or 
lesser extent various wishes laid down in an ambition document identifying the intended 
added value. The budget was predefined and fixed. The bid that complied with the 
Terms of Reference and met the highest number of ambitions, within budget, would be 
awarded the contract. The evaluation was based on the following criteria: integration 
and synergy, accessibility and traffic flow, architectural and ecological quality, nature 
and the environment, reliable techniques, the situation during construction and the 
duration of the construction process. 
 
The project was procured through a competitive dialogue, because of the complexities 
involved in the integral project. In December 2006, the selection for the dialogue took 
place. In the first stage, five consortia presented their vision of the project and a 
project management plan. Three competitors proceeded in a second round of the 
dialogue, which began in October 2007. The competitors submitted a detailed integral 
plan in the second half of 2008. The plans were made public in order to measure 
(public) support and to minimize the risk of being forced to make amendments to the 
plan after the project was awarded. After this consultation phase, the plans could be 
altered on the basis of about 250 reactions and the final bids could be submitted. In 
June 2009, the winning bid was determined on the basis of full MEAT-criteria, and the 
contract was signed in October 2009. The winning offer, the proposed construction of a 
stacked tunnel, will subsequently be translated into a Route Decision and EIA report.  
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Lessons learned 
- The procurement procedure requires confidentiality, maintaining a level playing field 
and giving clarity about the awarding procedure. On the other hand, the public 
planning process aims at transparency, openness and support. These aims are 
contradictory and could lead to conflicts. The parties involved should therefore have 
a sufficient degree of authority to enable necessary decisions to be made quickly 
and they should be willing to make sacrifices for a successful cooperation. This 
requires skilled public personnel able to maintain the level-playing field while 
optimizing the proposed solutions. 
- A combined project including road (re)construction and redevelopment of the urban 
area enhances the potential for innovative solutions. However, this requires well-
coordinated public procedures as well as sufficient preparation time to develop an 
organizational framework and “process-architecture” (Bregman, 2009). A clear 
mutual agreement among the various public parties (authorities) is essential and can 
be laid down in a public-public covenant (Nijsten & Arts, 2007). The proposed 
solutions can transcend the predefined conditions and limitations. This raises the 
question whether the conditions and limitations should be changed, and if so, whether 
these changes disrupt the level-playing field or give away the developed solution? 
- The market parties involved experience the length of the procurement process as a 
burden on their available capacity. Furthermore, the level of detail of the offers 
requested in the first phase should not be too high. During the process, the details, 
for instance the side effects, will become clearer. Generating committed bids, 
however, requires a certain level of detail that involves calculations and cost 
estimates. Therefore, the contracting authority should provide standards for 
calculations and products. This also limits the effort put into assessing the bids. 
- Public participation is essential:  stakeholders should be involved continuously. 
However, some information regarding the procurement procedure must be kept 
confidential. It is difficult to keep information inside a “controlled environment” when 
applying an interwoven approach.  
 
3.7 Analysis 
On the basis of the discussion of some of the initial experiences with early contractor 
involvement in the Netherlands, it can be concluded that it is a potentially promising 
approach. In Table 3.3, the main findings from the case-studies are presented, including 
the goal, type and results of the ECI and the time, space and role dimensions as 
distinguished by Nijsten and Arts (2007). 
 
As seen in the case studies, choices with respect to these dimensions result in different 
process set-ups. These more or less match the goals that early contractor involvement 
may serve, which are discussed below.  
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Table 3.3: ECI-findings from the case studies summarized 
 N31 Zurich 
Harlingen 
Second 
Coentunnel 
A4 Steenbergen A2 Maastricht 
Fixed project 
condition  
Project budget 
and quality 
Project quality Project quality Project budget 
Use of MEAT-
criteria 
Virtually none 
(fixed budget and 
quality) 
Limited use (fixed  
quality) 
Limited use (fixed 
quality, strongly 
on price) 
Fully applied 
(Points for quality 
wishes and 
ambitions) 
Expected goal 
of ECI (pre-
defined) 
Time gains Project control 
(time control) 
Project control 
(budget control) 
Innovation (project 
quality) 
Time  
(start  of ECI) 
Late Late Not early, not late Early 
Space  
(project scope) 
Line-oriented Line-oriented Line-oriented Line and area-
oriented 
Role of 
Contractor 
Limited and re-
active 
Re-active (Re-)active Active 
Results 
(tentative) 
Time gains, project 
control 
Project  ontrol  
(time control) 
Project control 
(budget control) 
Innovation, project 
control (on budget) 
 
3.7.1 Project control 
Improving project control turns out to be an important goal in most cases. With respect 
to project control, the role of contractors can be re-active or active. Giving them a re-
active role will, in general, only provide project control. If contractors are given a re-
active role, they are asked to test the proposals that have been developed in the 
planning procedures (e.g. EIA alternatives) with regard to their feasibility (technical, 
financial, constructability). This is a relatively straightforward approach that may start 
at a late stage of the planning process and involves fewer risks and commitment on the 
part of contractors (although it also provides little room for innovation). A re-active role 
fits well with the parallelisation approach. If contractors play a more active role, they 
are asked to develop alternatives themselves. Although this will improve project control, 
it offers great potential for innovation and for realising time gains. However, this 
approach is more difficult to implement, requires commitment from both government 
and market parties, as well as an open dialogue and an open exchange of 
information. Consequently, both an early start and an interweaving approach are 
recommended to encourage contractors to play an active role.  
 
Applying ECI provides more control over the costs of a project. The prices of the bids 
are made clear earlier in the process. Allowing market parties to be involved in the 
route determination/EIA-procedure makes it possible to base the decisionmaking on 
committed viable bids, because the bids are laid down in hard contracts, which 
increases (budgetary) certainty. This is not only relevant from a cost perspective, but 
also in terms of safeguarding the implementation of environmental and/or social 
mitigation measures laid down in the Route Decision. The consent decision has a more 
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robust information base, which is important, not only to the competent authority, but 
also to stakeholders and shareholders. Nowadays, in the Netherlands, maximum 
budgets are often set for infrastructure projects. The added value of ECI can then be to 
provide certainty regarding the feasibility of the ambitions within the maximum budget 
(as in the A4 Steenbergen case). 
 
3.7.2 Time gains  
Currently, many project studies suffer from time delays (Arts, 2007; Kempenaar et al., 
2005). The route determination/EIA-procedure should take 5.5 years to finish. In 
practice, the average time it takes is about 10 years (Elverding, 2008). The early 
involvement of contractors may result in a more practical and transparent 
decisionmaking process, resulting in a more disciplined and less time-consuming project 
study stage. Contractors alert government agencies to delays as part of the rules of the 
procurement procedure and because their transaction costs will become higher by 
delays. Government has to manage the time limits of the project study phase better, in 
order to achieve gains in time. This implies that governments should aim at clearly 
defining the scope, the problem and goals, the ambitions, the budget and the duration 
of the project, which will positively encourage a more practical approach. In addition to 
ECI, other initiatives that can limit the time needed to complete planning procedures are 
currently being adopted, like the “Faster and Better” approach. This approach aims at 
speeding up the planning process by delimiting the scope and the number of 
alternatives early in the process. It could result in a time gain of 6 to 12 months of time 
in the planning process (V&W, 2008a). The increased focus on speeding up the 
planning process is also applied in projects that are part of the Spoedaanpak 
(“Urgency approach”) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010).  
 
Although the preparation of ECI may require some time – especially for an 
interweaving approach – important time gains can be realized. This is still possible if 
contractors are involved at a fairly late stage of the planning procedure, as the 
traditional sequence of procedures costs much time. Both the interweaving approach 
and the parallelization approach make it possible to realize such time gains. Gaining 
11 months, as in the relatively “simple” N31 case, is therefore a promising result. 
However, the question remains whether in more complex projects, parallelization aimed 
at realizing time gains is sufficient. In such projects, other goals, such as innovation and 
project control, may be more important. It must be noted that, in addition to achieving 
time gains, ECI can also be useful in preventing time losses (“time control”). In the 
analysis and Table 3.3, time control is part of the aspect project control, as discussed 
earlier. 
 
3.7.3 Innovation  
To realize innovation, an early start in the planning procedure of contractor involvement 
is essential. The earlier contractors are involved, the more room there is for innovation. 
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Room for innovation can help improve project quality and result in more sustainable 
solutions. The case studies make it clear that, to achieve innovation, parallelization 
alone is not enough, but exchange of information should be enhanced through an 
interweaving approach that starts early. This will give contractors an active, developing 
role, which can be enhanced by adopting a broad project scope – an integrated area-
oriented scope instead of an exclusive focus on building line-infrastructure (see 
Bregman, 2009; Heeres et al., 2010). 
 
The best opportunities for using innovative and creative input of contractors are to be 
found in the early stages of the planning process (OGC, 2004). Adopting interweaving 
approach may help include the operational knowledge of contractors (about 
construction, exploitation and maintenance) early on in the route determination/EIA-
procedure. By stimulating competition between the contractors in the bidding process, 
optimization of solutions will be generated at an early stage of the planning process of 
an infrastructure project. Moreover, these solutions are simultaneously part of public 
debate in the route determination/EIA procedure and they can be included in the 
(Draft) Route Decision (see the A2 Maastricht case). As a consequence, this consent 
decision is based on committed “buildable” bids from market parties rather than on 
(cost) estimations by government itself, resulting in a more robust information base of 
the decision. Overall, this allows for a better use of the operational knowledge and 
creativity of contractors. In addition to smarter, faster and/or cheaper solutions (e.g. 
optimised life cycle costs) for the Ministry of Transport, added value may also be found 
in factors such as spatial and environmental quality – e.g. area-oriented solutions, 
better linkage of construction, operation and maintenance stages (Lenferink, 2007; Arts, 
2007).  
 
However, an early start of interweaving implies increases the costs and risks in 
procedures and processes. The transaction costs involved are substantially higher, for 
the bidders as well as for the contracting authority. Currently, research is conducted on 
how to limit these costs, and/or how to provide sufficient compensation. Possible 
solutions are to make an earlier selection of the competitors and to reduce the amount 
of products and documents requested by the contracting authority. Both possibilities 
have their weaknesses. An earlier selection reduces competition, limiting the potential 
for innovation. Fewer products and documents can make it necessary to provide clarity 
regarding the essential elements of a project. Contractors consider “government that 
knows what it wants” as a very important pre-condition to their becoming involved in a 
procurement procedure. In other words, government should provide a clear and 
focused definition of the problems and objectives, preferably laid down in a public-
public covenant. In practice however, this proves hard to achieve in the complex settings 
of infrastructure projects in the Netherlands.  
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3.8 Conclusions and discussion 
Early contractor involvement has recently been introduced in Dutch road infrastructure 
planning practice. The aim of this article is to determine whether or not the objectives 
are being met. Additionally, this article provides an assessment of parallelization or 
interweaving in practice. The conclusion may be that especially an interweaving 
approach may serve the various goals of early contractor involvement, while 
parallelization can also be very relevant when it comes to realizing time gains and 
improving project control.  
 
For successful early contractor involvement, the parties involved have to acknowledge 
that insecurity is inherent: there has to be room for innovation. The parties involved 
have to get used to the fact that procurement can influence the public planning 
procedures and vice versa. They have to relinquish securities and detailed promises, 
without losing complete control. Recent experiences in the Netherlands illustrate that, 
while time efficiency and greater project control are relatively easy to realize through 
early contractor involvement, innovation is harder to realize. This can be seen as a 
learning process in which all parties need to find their role. It is essential to consider ECI 
early in the planning process because its added value in terms of innovation depends 
very much on the room that exists in the planning procedures, which becomes smaller as 
the planning process proceeds. Therefore, initiatives have been started in which ECI is 
applied even earlier in the planning process, even before the project study stage has 
started. Such involvement in the explorative stage is applied in the Dutch Afsluitdijk and 
PMZ projects (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009; Projectdirectie PMZ, 2008; Lenferink & Arts, 
2009). Although these initiatives are considered successful in terms of innovation, they 
have thus far not resulted in completed projects. Some disadvantages of ECI can be 
recognized as well. The process risks involved are considerably higher, both for the 
competitors and for the contracting authority. Because projects have not yet been 
completed, it remains to be seen whether any form of ECI (parallelization or 
interweaving) is ultimately beneficial at all. It is unclear whether the added value of ECI 
in terms of project control, innovative solutions and/or time gains outweigh the 
increased transaction costs and procedural risks involved. 
 
If the decision is made to opt in favour of ECI, a well-considered choice between 
parallelization and interweaving needs to be made. To that end, the relationship 
between the added value of active involvement of market parties and the risks 
involved in the project and the contract should be considered (see Figure 3.5). If the 
risks of (re-) active involvement supersede the added value, then parallelization is the 
safe choice. The focus of ECI would then be on improving project speed and achieving 
time gains. Although interaction with contractors would be limited,   the contractors can 
also be involved re-actively to provide increased project control. If the added value of 
increased interaction is greater than the project and contract risks involved, 
interweaving is likely to yield the best results. This would allow for a stronger focus on 
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project quality (and possibly some project control) and the active involvement of market 
parties.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Added value and risks in type of ECI applied, related to project goal and the role of 
market parties. 
 
As mentioned earlier, early contractor involvement has recently been introduced and 
this explorative paper examines only the initial experiences in four projects. Several 
challenges, practical problems and pitfalls remain. Also, not all the practical 
consequences are clear yet. Obviously, a follow-up study comparing the conditions of 
early contractor involvement in infrastructure planning with the findings in other fields 
would be valuable and is recommended. In the next sections, we discuss two of the 
remaining challenges in infrastructure planning: the nature of procurement and planning 
procedures (openness versus confidentiality) and the roles of the parties involved (it 
takes two to tango). 
 
3.8.1 Openness versus confidentiality 
Combining the procedures of procurement and route determination/EIA is a complex 
matter as they are based on fundamental principles of law that are potentially 
conflicting – contract law versus public law (Arts et al., 2006; Van Valkenburg & 
Nagelkerke, 2006). The route determination/EIA procedure focuses on careful 
decisionmaking regarding infrastructure development, in which the interests of residents, 
the environment, etc., must be safeguarded. Key values are openness to the public, 
“checks and balances” and public consultation and advice. Central issues in the 
procurement procedure are free and open competition. This requires unambiguous 
criteria for contract award that are defined prior to the procedure. It is not possible to 
introduce new award criteria during the procedure; however, these criteria can be 
worked out in greater detail. To protect intellectual property and to prevent “cherry 
picking” – market parties “borrowing” each other’s useful ideas – sufficient 
confidentiality is needed in dealing with alternatives brought forward by market 
parties during the procedure (see OGC, 2004).  
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If the two procedures are interwoven, the environmental impact of the alternatives will 
usually have to be described in the EIS, and there is a potential conflict with the 
confidentiality needed in the procurement procedure: an otherwise closed process is 
opened up via interaction with market parties (Arts et al., 2006). The  resulting tensions 
will not prohibit the process, but clear arrangements have to be made beforehand 
between market parties and government about requirements regarding input 
information and the way this is dealt with in the planning and decisionmaking process 
(Arts & Faith-ell, 2010). This comprises issues such as baseline information, level of 
detail, use of methods, quality of results, process of dealing with results of public 
review, advice and decisionmaking, and questions after (preliminary) awarding, and, 
related to this, the possibility for compensation of extra costs (reimbursement). 
 
3.8.2 It takes two to tango 
Although at first sight it may seem a small step, the procurement of construction and 
maintenance before, instead of after, the formal consent decision (i.e. Route Decision) 
has huge implications (Arts et al., 2006; V&W, 2005). It results in a fundamentally 
different approach to the planning of infrastructure projects and a change in the 
relative roles of government, market and other parties. Government has to step back 
and leave room for the market, and engage in continuous, ongoing dialogue with the 
market parties (Lenferink et al., 2011b). Government becomes more of a facilitator or 
stage manager of the planning process and safeguards the process rules (apart from 
the formal moments when it takes decisions). Although contractors have greater 
freedom, they have to accept that political dynamics become part of their 
entrepreneurial risk. Third parties, residents, environmental organizations and other 
stakeholders have legal rights. Accordingly, the public decisionmaking process has first 
priority. If decisions in procurement and route determination/EIA-procedures do not 
correspond, the latter procedure will proceed and the former will stop.  
 
Not every project is suited to early contractor involvement, as both public and private 
parties have to acknowledge its usefulness: “it takes two to tango”. There are indeed 
many new risks related to early contractor involvement. However, the new opportunities 
and advantages may well outweigh these risks. In particular, long-term projects with 
opportunities for exploitation during the operational stages and opportunities to earn 
investments back will be relevant. One could think of road construction projects with a 
DBFM contract, projects for which concessions are granted or projects involving area 
development. These may include, for instance, projects where, in addition to road 
construction (and management and maintenance), development of business sites, offices, 
recreation facilities and/or housing takes place. An example of this is the A2 project in 
Maastricht. Such projects have more balanced revenues in relation to the (risks of the) 
investments involved. The interests of the market party (developer) will be intrinsically 
more congruent with the interests of government, resulting in an improved operation of 
procurement and contracting mechanisms. As the scope becomes broader (including 
 Chapter 3 – Early contractor involvement in Dutch infrastructure development  93 
 
 
area (re)development next to line-infrastructure development), an important issue is 
that the procurement procedure usually has to be interwoven with the route 
determination/EIA procedure, as well as with other (spatial) planning procedures such 
as a land-use plan procedure. The challenge will be to develop the organizational and 
institutional arrangements carefully in order to overcome fragmented government and 
to realize an integrated approach that results in more sustainable infrastructure 
planning.  
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4 Public-private interaction in contracting: Governance strategies  
in the competitive dialogue of Dutch infrastructure projects  
 
Abstract 
The competitive dialogue (CD) procurement procedure aims to structure and 
facilitate public-private interaction in procurement. In this article we examine 
CDs of four complex Dutch road infrastructure projects and explore how the 
mix in public-private interaction between the three governance strategies of 
cooperation, competition and co-ordination is influenced by various external 
influences. We found that public authorities' strict legal co-ordination can 
structure the CD-process, but may divert attention from necessary interaction 
on project-specific complexities. Combined with private contractors’ focus on 
competition, this does not stimulate public-private cooperation. We conclude 
that the CD is a promising tool for facilitating public-private interaction, but, in 
practice, the optimal mix of governance strategies is not achieved. We 
recommend strengthening cooperation by stimulating public and private tender 
organizations to collaboratively search for opportunities to deal with 
complexity in planning. 
  
4.1 Introduction 
Time and cost overruns in the construction of infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2002) illustrate government’s difficulties in dealing with increasing complexity of 
current infrastructure planning. Governments can no longer solely act as the dominant 
and most powerful actor in a hierarchically controlled top-down process (Handy, 
1990). Increasing interaction of government with other actors involved in planning is 
often considered an alternative way of addressing the complexity; see collaborative 
and communicative planning discussions (Healey, 1997). In infrastructure planning, 
increased involvement of business organizations is an example of such stronger actor 
involvement (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008). 
 
In procurement of road infrastructure, a confrontation between plan development and 
implementation takes place, when plans are worked out towards and translated into 
projects. Public-private interaction at this stage might help to deal with the complexity 
experienced in developing infrastructure projects. It could enable private parties to 
gain a better understanding of public needs and proposed contracts, and also make 
public authorities receive more creative and innovative, better grounded and 
constructible bids (Lenferink et al., 2012a). 
 
In order to better address legal, financial and technical complexity the European 
Commission has introduced the competitive dialogue (CD) procurement procedure (see 
directive 2004/18/EC articles 1.11 and 29; EC, 2004). In CDs, public procuring 
authorities and private bidders engage in pre-bid public-private dialogues over public 
wishes and desires and proposed private solutions. The CD procedure is implemented 
for complex national road infrastructure projects in the Netherlands by Rijkswaterstaat, 
100  Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle 
 
the executive agency of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. Initially, its 
implementation suffered from a slow start and a low deal flow (Balance and Result, 
2008). However, compared to other European countries, the CD is currently applied 
more often by Dutch national government and predominantly in road infrastructure 
projects (De Mars & Craven, 2010). The CD was applied twenty-seven times by 
Rijkswaterstaat in the period March 2006 – September 2012 (TED, 2012). As a result, 
experiences with CD procedures have increased. 
 
The CD is aimed to deal with complexity and implies a combination of the governance 
strategies of co-ordination, competition and co-operation (Robinson et al., 2000). The 
CD is applied by government to structure and regulate (co-ordination) procurement. The 
procedure carefully co-ordinates interaction through which public parties and private 
parties work out the project and possible solutions together (cooperation). The CD is 
aimed to select and award the private party that offers most value for money 
(competition). The mix of these governance strategies is context and project dependent 
and may be influenced by project complexity characteristics. It is unclear how the mix 
of governance strategies is reached in CD projects, which project complexity 
characteristics play a role in reaching this mix, and how the governance mix affects 
public-private interaction in CDs. 
 
In this article we aim to gain greater insight into public-private interaction in Dutch CD 
procedures. More specifically, we explore how complexity (the main precondition for 
applying the CD procedure; EC, 2004) influences the mix of the cooperation, 
competition and co-ordination governance strategies. In addition, we explore how this 
mix depends on the growing level of Dutch experience with applying the CD. To this 
end we investigated four recent large Dutch infrastructure projects where CDs have 
been applied through semi-structured interviews with experts from involved public 
procuring agencies and private contractors. 
 
Research on the CD has primarily focused on its probable consequences not on actual 
experiences in practice. Most of the studies focus on legal complexities involved (see 
Burnett, 2009), for example comparing the CD with other procedures (Nagelkerke et 
al., 2008), exploring legal differences in application of the CD across Europe 
(Arrowsmith & Treumer, 2012), or investigating the relation between procurement 
procedures, including CD, and public-private partnerships (Tvarnø, 2006). Solino and 
De Santos (2010) discuss probable effects of the CD procedure from a transaction cost 
economics perspective. In project management literature, procurement procedures, such 
as the CD, have been investigated for the role of cooperation in dealing with current-
day challenging project contexts (Erikssen & Westerberg, 2011). Korthals Altes and 
Taşan-Kok (2010) discusses procurement procedures from a governance perspective on 
relational networks. In contrast with the studies above, Hoezen (2012) focuses on 
practical experience with the CD procedure and examines negotiations in Dutch CD 
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practice. However, she does not further explore the relation of the CD procedure with 
governance and public administration. 
 
Until now, the CD has not been investigated from a governance point-of-view, although, 
as explained above, governance strategies are explicitly included in the procedure’s 
character. This article provides insight into how public and private parties currently 
interact in CDs and how this interaction could potentially be improved in future complex 
projects. These Dutch insights are relevant for practitioners in infrastructure planning in 
European countries, such as the United Kingdom and France (Burnett, 2009), where the 
procedure has also recently been introduced. Investigating public and private 
experiences could provide insights in how governance strategies can help to deal with 
project complexity, which is relevant for public administration and project management. 
The observations provided in this article specifically link to theoretical discussions on 
governance in planning (Martens, 2007), on the potential role of private parties in 
public-private partnerships (Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Steijn et al., 2011), and on 
collaborative planning in a complex society (Healey, 2007). 
 
In the following section, a theoretical framework is provided which elaborates on 
public-private interaction, and the CD procedure is described further. Section 4.3 deals 
with the research design. In Section 4.4, experiences are described by exploring 
organizational issues and complexity factors in Dutch practice. Section 4.5 links these 
findings to the governance strategies of cooperation, co-ordination and competition. 
Finally, we provide conclusions in Section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Theoretical framework 
4.2.1 Mixing governance strategies in public-private interaction  
Ashby (1956) and Nooteboom (2007) recognize that variety is required to deal with 
complexity. Variety provides options for government to react to the unforeseen 
developments in complex contexts. However, such options need to be within 
government’s capacity (Nooteboom, 2007): Government cannot see, handle or grasp 
solutions that are too far out-of-the-box and outside its capacity. Public-private 
interaction can help to provide for more variety, but can also help to increase 
government’s capacity to handle variety. The increased capacity is caused by the 
learning effect as a result of interaction. Such interaction can be facilitated through CDs 
in which different models of organization are combined. Three models are generally 
distinguished in planning and public administration literature: the market model, the 
network model, and the hierarchical model (see Bevir, 2011; Davies, 2005; Powell, 
1990; Thompson et al., 1991; Rhodes, 1996). We relate three governance strategies 
to these models, competition to the market model, cooperation to the network model 
and co-ordination to the hierarchical model (Robinson et al., 2000; similar strategies 
can be found in Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Martens, 
2007) (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1: Different types of public-private interaction relating to the three strategies of governance. 
 
Competition can be defined as “a process of selection, turmoil and change where 
disequilibrium conditions prevail” (Thompson et al., 1991, p6). The driver of competition 
is rent-seeking behavior of market parties. Its advantages are flexibility, variety and 
especially cost efficiency as a result of actors competing for resources. However, as 
Erridge and Nondi (1994) have pointed out, competition in its extreme form is 
incompatible with achieving value for money. Asymmetries in knowledge and 
experience (Stiglitz, 1998) occur in the client-supplier relation in procurement 
(Sanderson, 2008) and are present between private market parties. These asymmetries 
can dominate competition and make it geared towards achieving cost efficiency only, 
disregarding possibilities to increase value (e.g. through innovation). 
 
Cooperation is connected to the network model (see Powell, 1990) or partnership 
model (Blomqvist, 2002), which can be situated between the market and hierarchy 
models (Demil & Lecocq, 2006). Through cooperation social relations are formed 
“between mutually dependent actors which form themselves around policy problems or 
clusters of resources” (Klijn et al., 1995, p. 439). Cooperation may lead to increased 
project quality because of the shared risks and information and the joint development 
of products (Blomqvist, 2002). Too much cooperation could also have some drawbacks, 
including non-commitment in endless rounds of negotiation, which may result in a lack of 
transparency, decreased democratic legitimacy of planning processes and distortions 
of the level playing field. 
 
Co-ordination can set outlines for interaction: freedom needs to be provided to private 
parties to compete and cooperate, but also boundaries need to be set by a co-
ordinating public actor. We regard co-ordination therefore as protecting government’s 
core responsibilities by providing rules to actively steer and regulate behavior of actors 
(in line with ‘central coordination’ or ‘hierarchy’, Dahl & Lindblom, 1992). The main 
advantages of a hierarchical model include cost efficiency through economies of scale 
as a result of exploitating the monopoly position of government and a structured, 
stable and directive approach to planning (Blomqvist, 2002). Although co-ordination 
could lead to stability and efficiency, it could turn out to be stifling and lead to failure 
if applied excessively (Doak & Karadimitriou, 2007). 
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The traditional approach to infrastructure planning can be characterized as mainly 
hierarchical: a dominant government works out desired end products in detail (Lenferink 
et al., 2012b), leaving limited opportunities for competition. Over the last decades it 
has become clear that hierarchical approaches, which solely rely on government co-
ordination, are impossible in complex settings (Handy, 1990; Healey, 2007). It is 
increasingly difficult for governments to adapt to changing values and demands of 
complex society, leading to government failure (Van der Heijden, 1996). Over the 
years, competition has been introduced in planning, for example through the new public 
management concept (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). As a result, market involvement is 
stimulated and government is redefining its role and responsibilities. Cooperation has 
also received increased attention in infrastructure planning, which is reflected in the rise 
of collaborative and communicative planning and other related interactive planning 
approaches at the end of the 1990s (Healey, 1997; Glasbergen & Driessen, 2005). 
Although collaborative approaches imply cooperation and partnerships, they are 
traditionally aimed at residents group and third party involvement. Cooperation with 
private business organizations, such as construction and engineering companies, seems 
to receive less attention in planning and public administration. Such market parties 
possess knowledge and experience in project development, construction and operation 
(Lenferink et al., 2012b), which competition and cooperation can help to unlock. 
Therefore an approach needs to be found with different coexisting organization 
structures (Stoker, 2004), which is neither central, nor top-down (Kickert, 1997), and 
incorporates elements of the market and network organization models (Rhodes, 1996; 
Kjaer, 2004). 
 
An effective combination of co-ordination, competition and cooperation would balance 
the objectives of government and market parties involved, as proposed in the co-
opetition concept (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Van Buuren et al., 2010). 
However, effective public-private interaction between government and market may be 
difficult: competition is a dominant driver in the interaction with market parties in CDs 
(Lenferink et al., 2011). Carefully applied co-ordinative procedures may stimulate 
cooperation and ensure fair competition through public-private interaction: co-
ordination could make procedures more efficient and more effective by providing 
structure and certaintie; competition can stimulate more cost effective and innovative 
solutions; and cooperation can make process and solutions better fit to the project 
context and parties’ ambitions. The question is how to combine these strategies in CD 
procedures for complex infrastructure projects? Especially since, in CDs, external factors 
also influence the mix of governance strategies.  This influence can differ between 
projects, as each CD is context and project specific. Furthermore, learning effects may 
occur as experience with the CD procedure is gained. For example, the organizational 
set-up may be improved to better balance governance strategies (see Figure 4.2). 
104  Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle 
 
Figure 4.2: Conceptual model - balancing co-ordination, cooperation and competition.  
 
4.2.2 The competitive dialogue procedure 
The European Union provides four procedures for procuring public works: the open, the 
restricted and the negotiated procedure and the competitive dialogue (CD) procedure 
(EC, 2004). In the open procedure, any party is invited to tender. There are no 
possibilities for short-listing candidates or for interaction on the contract. In the 
restricted procedure the contract authority shortlists candidates to tender and 
interaction on the contract is not allowed. In the negotiated procedure there are no 
detailed rules as to how interaction should take place or when interaction should end 
before contract signature, but interaction is only possible after potential contractors 
have submitted an offer. The European Commission questioned the appropriateness of 
this procedure in complex projects as substantive negotiations with a preferred bidder 
could distort competition (OGC, 2008). In addition, the European Union was looking to 
stimulate innovation (Nagelkerke et al., 2008; Petersen, 2010a). Therefore, the CD was 
introduced in 2004, which compared to other procurement procedures, incorporates a 
structured approach to the public-private interaction (Essig & Batran, 2005) and 
prohibits extensive interaction after a preferred bidder is chosen (EC, 2004; OGC, 
2008) (see Table 4.1). 
 
Public-private interaction in CDs, as translated into Dutch practice, can take place 
through three channels. First, in dialogue meetings, the procuring authority and 
candidate meet to discuss matters. The agenda-setting for such meetings is free: both 
parties can bring in discussion points. Dialogue meetings include formal decisions and 
are closed to the public. A second channel is through specialist meetings, in which 
specialists of both parties discuss in an informal and consultative setting. A last channel 
is the questions and answers tool, through which candidates can ask either individual or 
co-ordination
competition cooperation
= public-private 
interaction balanced 
for governance 
strategies
= external factors’ 
influence on 
interaction
= possible ratio of 
governance strategies 
in public-private 
interaction in CD 
practice
Project 1
Project 2
Project 3
Project n
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general questions on project issues. The contracting authority decides whether questions 
are individual, and thus confidential, or general, and thus open to all participants. 
 
Table 4.1: Main characteristics of the process of the CD procedure and the role of interaction.  
Aim Identifying and defining the means best suited to satisfy the needs of the procuring authority. 
Start 
Publishing project notification and participation invitation in Official Journal of 
European Union. 
Selecting the requests of the consortia to participate on pre-qualification criteria. 
Inter-
action 
Contract aspects may be discussed with chosen candidates during dialogue that 
can involve several rounds.  
Individual dialogues with level playing field (non-discriminatory) are facilitated. 
Submit-
ting 
offers 
Final tenders are made on basis of solution or solutions presented and specified 
during dialogue. 
Clarifying, specifying, fine-tuning submitted tenders at request of contracting 
authority is allowed. 
Changes which distort competition are prohibited.  
Selection 
Most economically advantageous tender (price and quality) is selected on basis of 
award criteria in contract notice or descriptive document. 
The selection can be performed in stages. 
Based on EC, 2004; Nagelkerke et al., 2009. 
 
According to article 1.11 of the 2004/18/EC guideline (EC, 2004), CDs can only be 
applied in case of complex settings, where open or restricted procedures will not allow 
the award of the contract. Projects are complex if contract authorities are (a) not 
objectively able to define the technical means for satisfying their needs or objectives, 
and/or are (b) not objectively able to specify the legal and/or financial make-up of a 
project (see Tvarnø, 2006). Although Dutch national guidelines on the CD-procedure 
exist (Nagelkerke et al., 2009), implementation of the CD differs from project to 
project. In each case, it is necessary to translate the general European procedure, which 
“does not regulate the conduct of the dialogue in detail” (EC, 2005), into a project-
specific set-up that takes into account the specific institutional and local setting (similar 
to the implementation of nature development in ‘structural’ and ‘specific contexts’, 
Vikolainen et al., 2012). This organizational set-up can for example include information 
distribution, timing of the stages, and the relation with other projects. 
 
4.3 Research design 
4.3.1 Operationalisation  
In this article we focus on practical experiences, by investigating external influences 
that may affect public-private interaction in the CD. Dutch practice is first investigated 
by describing organizational issues, which public and private tender teams have to deal 
with Project organizations have to account for the institutional setting when applying the 
CD: they make the procedure fit local stakeholders and local practice. Such issues 
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include management of time, information and human resources in the organization of 
CD procedures. Subsequently, three complexity factors are investigated that may 
influence public-private interaction in the CD: financial, technical and legal complexity. 
These factors are easy to comprehend for the involved actors because they directly 
relate to the justification for applying the CD procedure (see EC, 2004). Financial 
project complexity relates to financial rewards and compensations in both dialogue 
and contract. Technical complexity consists of opportunities and risks that arise from 
technical and physical characteristics of a project, which can comprise the construction 
method, and area and actors included in the project scope. Legal complexity is 
operationalized by legal roles and contractual responsibilities in the procedure and the 
contract (see Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2: Definition and factors of contextual influence on balance of public-private interaction. 
 Definition Investigated factors 
Organizational 
issues 
Issues in the organizational 
setting and set-up of the CD 
procedure 
Human resources management, Time 
management, Information management 
Financial 
complexity 
Complexity caused by financial 
project and contract 
characteristics 
Rewards and compensations in the CD, 
Project financing, Role of financial experts 
in the CD 
Technical 
complexity 
Complexity caused by technical, 
physical project characteristics 
Technical project opportunities, Technical 
solutions discussed, Role of technical 
experts in the CD 
Legal 
complexity 
Complexity caused by 
procurement procedure and 
contract characteristics 
Legal roles and responsibilities, Role of 
legal experts in the CD 
 
4.3.2 Methodology 
We selected four projects that have completed the CD procedure from a limited 
amount of available Dutch cases (see Corbin & Strauss, 2008): the A10 Second 
Coentunnel project (A10), the Passage A2 Maastricht (A2), the A15 Maasvlakte-
Vaanplein (A15) and the A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal (A12). All cases are considered as 
complex and large for the Netherlands. However, they vary in nature of complexity 
and aim of the public-private interaction (see Table 4.3), which enable us to assess the 
influence of project context and complexity on experiences with public-private 
interaction in CD procedures.  
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Table 4.3: Characteristics of the investigated projects.  
 A10 Second 
Coentunnel 
Passage A2 
Maastricht 
A15 Maasvlakte- 
Vaanplein 
A12 Utrecht-
Veenendaal 
General characteristics 
Degree and type 
of complexity 
High  
(especially legal) 
High  
(especially 
technical) 
High  
(especially 
technical) 
Moderate 
 
Nature of 
complexity 
Environmental 
impact of tunnel 
(air quality), one 
of first DBFM 
contracts, one of 
the first CDs 
Parallel 
procedures of 
planning and 
procurement, one 
of first CDs, real 
estate 
development 
incorporated 
Expansion through 
highly populated 
and densely 
industrialized 
area, incorporated 
tunnel and bridge 
construction  
Limited room for 
accommodating 
the expansion of 
the highway 
Aim of public-
private interaction 
Project control  
(esp. budget 
control) 
Project quality 
Project control  
(esp. budget 
control) 
Project control  
(esp. budget 
control) 
Project control 
(esp. time control) 
Time gains 
Organizational characteristics 
Duration process  35 months 35 months 25 months 18 months 
Selection of private 
participants 
N (= unselected) – 
5 parties – 3 
parties – 1 party 
(= winner) 
N – 5 – 3 – 1 N – 3 – 3 – 1  N – 4 – 3 – 1  
Selected bidder Coentunnel 
company:  
Dura Vermeer, 
Arcadis, BESIX, 
CFE, Dredging 
International, TBI 
Construction, Vinci 
Avenue2: Strukton 
Civil Projects, 
Strukton 
Construction & 
Real Estate, Ballast 
Nedam Infra & , 
Development  
A-Lanes A15:  
Ballast Nedam, 
John Laing, 
Strabag, Strukton  
Poort van Bunnik:  
BAM PPP, BAM 
Wegen, BAM 
Civiel, BAM 
Infratechniek, BAM 
Infraconsult. 
Financial characteristics 
Construction costs 1200 million Euros 700 million Euros 1400 million Euros 300 million Euros 
Contract value 600 million Euros 630 million Euros 1095 million Euros 260 million Euros 
Average bidding 
costs  
7 million Euros 10 million Euros unknown unknown 
Financial 
compensation  
2,75 million Euros 3 million Euros Approx. 2 million 
Euros 
Approx. 1,1 
million Euros 
Technical characteristics 
Goal project Extra capacity  Environmental 
quality and safety 
Extra capacity  Extra capacity, 
enhanced safety 
Character Extra tunnel and 
renovation of 
existing tunnel 
Construction of 
tunnel with real 
estate 
development 
Extra lanes 
between the 
Maasvlakte and 
interchange 
Vaanplein  
Extra lanes 
between 
interchange 
Lunetten and 
Veenendaal 
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 A10 Second 
Coentunnel 
Passage A2 
Maastricht 
A15 Maasvlakte- 
Vaanplein 
A12 Utrecht-
Veenendaal 
Maintenance Yes, 30 years 
(also during 
construction) 
No maintenance 
included 
Yes, 24 years 
(also during 
construction) 
Yes, 23 years 
(also during 
construction) 
Setting Urban: industrial 
area 
Urban: city centre Urban: industrial 
area 
Rural: city ring 
road 
Construction period 2009-2012 2010-16 
infrastructure 
2010-2025 real 
estate 
2011-2015 2010-2013 
Legal characteristics 
Publication of 
notification 
June 2005 December 2006 December 2008 January 2009 
Invitation of 
participants 
December 2005 March 2007 July 2009 September 2009 
Final offer May 2007 May 2009 June 2010 April 2010 
Selection bidder June 2007 June 2009 September 2010 May 2010 
Contract close April 2008 October 2009 December 2010 June 2010 
Contract type Design-Build-
Finance-Maintain 
Design & Construct Design-Build-
Finance-Maintain 
Design-Build-
Finance-Maintain 
Based on: Kooiman, 2007; Projectbureau A2 Maastricht, 2010; Rijkswaterstaat, 2009b, 2009c, 
2010b, 2011; V&W, 2009; WB Consulting, 2009. 
 
Regarding the organizational characteristics: the CD processes took at least 18 months, 
in which the two more recent projects (the A12 and A15 projects) took less time to 
complete the CD procedure than the older ones. The projects do not show notable 
differences in their financial characteristics. With regard to the technical characteristics, 
the primary goal of the A2 project is to enhance environmental quality and safety, 
whereas the other projects are mainly aimed at increasing capacity. Regarding the 
legal characteristics, the long period between selection of the preferred bidder and 
contract close in the A10 case is noteworthy. At this stage problems with air quality 
arose that needed to be solved first. In the case of the A2 project a different contract 
type (Design & Construct) was chosen, which, in contrast to the other cases, also included 
real estate development. 
 
Experiences with the CD in these projects were primarily investigated by conducting 19 
semi-structured interviews with practitioners and experts on predetermined subjects: CD 
process; organizational, financial, technical, and legal issues; and future of CD and 
public-private interaction. The interviewees could bring in personal experiences and 
own discussion topics (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005). In addition, document analysis 
complemented the findings and provided for necessary further interpretation (Dubois & 
Araujo, 2007). In-depth interviews were chosen because of the explorative nature of 
this research, which enabled us to obtain inside information of closed and confidential 
procurement procedures, and on topics that were considered sensitive or controversial. 
Fourteen project-specific interviewees were selected from the public parties, based on 
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the Integrated Project Management model (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008): contract managers, 
general project managers, and legal experts who participated in the projects. In 
addition, we performed five interviews with contract managers at leading Dutch 
construction companies, which were involved in the selected CDs. Because of 
confidentiality private tender team members were not always allowed or willing to 
cooperate. In such cases, we interviewed tender managers, who supervise multiple 
tenders for construction companies. 
 
4.4 Public and private experiences with the competitive dialogue 
4.4.1 Organizational issues 
The interviewees indicated that in general the setup of the dialogues has recently 
undergone a positive development. Public and private parties involved feel that the 
consistency and objectivity of the selection mechanism have improved and observe that 
the awarding criteria are more transparent and better worked out in the more recent 
dialogues of the A12 and the A15, as compared to the two earlier projects. Three 
specific organizational issues that may influence the public private interaction were 
addressed by the interviewees: information management, human resources 
management and time management. 
 
Because of inclusion of financing and maintenance components in new integrated 
contract forms, such as DBFM (Design-Build-Finance-Maintain), more information is 
needed up-front in the planning process, before procurement starts. The public 
interviewees indicate this as a difficult issue. A public official indicated that it is ‘difficult 
to obtain all the relevant information’ and ‘distribute information efficiently to the 
market’. Especially information coming from other public organizations, such as road 
districts, can be absent or outdated. Simultaneously, private interviewees struggle with 
an information overflow. In their opinion, when starting up the CD, contracting 
authorities often just hand over a bulk of data and they have to spend some time 
arranging, selecting and prioritizing the data. In addition, consortia state that 
involvement of foreign bidding parties, as occurred in the A15 case, also delays the 
project or affects quality of the bids: Tender documents had to be translated and 
foreign companies were not as aware of specific conditions as their Dutch counterparts. 
 
Another issue relates to human resources management. During preparation and 
implementation of the CD, changes in personnel often occur, at the public and the 
private side. Also, once the CD is completed and the construction begins, often 
substantial changes in personnel take place. Public and private interviewees 
unanimously acknowledge that this causes a loss of tacit knowledge and negatively 
influences personal trust-relations, generated during informal moments in the CD 
process. Also availability of personnel causes problems. Recently the deal flow of 
regular Dutch infrastructure projects in which the CD is applied has increased. Besides 
the regular workload, 30 additional road infrastructure expansion projects are 
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included in the so-called Urgency Approach (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010a). One of the 
selection elements the approach is assessing competences of key personnel in the 
contractors’ project organization. As the Urgency Approach receives priority projects 
were developed faster than usual, contractors assign their best personnel to those 
projects. This makes it difficult for public and private parties to appoint qualified, 
experienced people to other projects. A private interviewee indicates that his company 
‘has to be careful and selective in assigning their people’ and ‘has to make use of less 
experienced employees for the regular projects’. Assigning less experienced people 
can lead to organizational inefficiencies, because lessons learned from previous 
procurement procedures are not taken into account.  
 
Current time pressure on tenders potentially has positive and negative consequences for 
the process and outcomes of CDs. Time pressure mainly consists of political pressure on 
procuring organizations by setting strict deadlines, which, if not met, have serious 
consequences for budget or political approval of a project. Time pressure can result in 
shorter procurement procedures and lowered transaction costs, which is unanimously 
mentioned by private parties as a major concern in CDs (in line with Petersen, 2010b). 
This was clearly experienced in the A2 case. Combining real estate with infrastructure 
development allowed for an integral dialogue on a technical, content-wise basis, which, 
however, also made procurement relatively lengthy and costly. High transaction costs 
caused a participant to intentionally disqualify itself from being awarded the contract. 
Through time pressure, transaction costs can be lowered. However, time pressure can 
also have negative consequences. By increasing time pressure, less time is available for 
interaction on technical, legal and financial aspects, which form the legal basis for 
applying the CD procedure. 
 
4.4.2 Financial complexity  
Public and private interviewees both indicate that financial complexity influences 
interaction in the CD. Public parties are inexperienced with an active role of finances in 
the public-private interaction, which, in their opinion, challenges their traditional co-
ordinative role. Private parties also acknowledge the financial complexity, but do not 
experience this as an issue in the public-private interaction. They predominantly 
experience financial complexity when consortia are set-up and when finances need to 
be secured for the final bid. The interviewees addressed some specific issues regarding 
the financial complexity, which will be discussed below: the role of financial actors, the 
preferred bidder debt funding competition and the compensation for CD participation. 
 
The financial complexity of the investigated projects is greater than in regular road 
development projects, as confirmed by the interviewees. In the D&C contract of the A2 
case, the increased financial complexity is caused by the multiple sources of public 
funding: from national, provincial and municipal governments. In the A10, A12, and 
A15 DBFM projects financing is not only a public concern, but part of the contract 
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scope. Inclusion of a private Finance-component in the contract made CDs complex 
because of what a government official described as a ‘lack of experience with an 
active and visible role of financiers in procurement’. Interviewees indicated that 
involvement of committed financiers can limit opportunities for interaction and 
innovation because of their focus on risk avoidance, using proven solutions and making 
constructible bids. Although experience with this issue is growing, financing remains a 
complex issue because of the economic crisis.  
 
The difficulties with private financing of infrastructure projects can be accommodated 
for by organizing a preferred bidder debt funding competition, as proposed in the 
more recent A12 and A15 cases (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009b; 2009c). In such a 
competition, also proposed by HM Treasury (2006) for application in the UK, not all 
bidders have to provide fully committed bids during the dialogue. Only the preferred 
bidder has to find financiers, after the CD has been completed (Rijkswaterstaat, 
2009a). Possible advantages as perceived by government officials are that ‘the 
financial market will not be stressed as much’ and ‘the procurement procedure might be 
shortened’. Recognized potential disadvantages are that financiers can give less input 
on the bids and financial clarity remains longer uncertain. In the investigated cases, 
opportunities for a debt funding competition have not been used, because market 
parties indicated that they could arrange for the committed financing upfront (see 
Rijkswaterstaat, 2011). 
 
Another financial complexity issue is the compensation bidders receive for participation 
in the CD, which is insufficient according to private parties. This issue was especially 
being mentioned in the A2 case, where average bidding costs were three times higher 
than the compensation (see Table 4.3). Public parties acknowledge this issue in all 
projects, but respond for example that the compensation is ‘higher than in most other 
countries’ and that private parties have to see their contribution ‘as part of a 
company’s research and development and as part of their entrepreneurial risk’. The 
public contracting authorities experience difficulties in estimating private party’s 
bidding costs. Reasons provided are a lack of knowledge or feeling for private 
bidding costs at the public side and that private parties do not take the financial 
compensation into consideration in their bidding strategy: they, as a public interviewee 
states, ‘solely aim at getting awarded the contract’, no matter what the bidding costs 
are. The private parties state that competition causes them to increase their effort in 
terms of time and money in order to win the contract. 
 
4.4.3 Technical complexity 
Public interviewees consider technical complexity as the main reason for applying the 
CD. Because of scarcity of space and high population density, many stakeholders are 
involved in infrastructure projects, increasing their complexity. The public parties 
consider interaction over technical aspects of proposed solutions as essential. The 
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private parties also want to discuss technical aspects of the project, but are cautious in 
discussing proposed solutions because of strong competition: private parties are afraid 
of cherry-picking. The interviewees addressed the following issues regarding technical 
complexity: the project and process limitations on technical interaction, the awarding 
criteria and the focus on risks and control.  
 
Most of the interviewed parties feel they did not experience as much technical 
interaction as expected on basis of the complexity argument in the EU directive. In the 
A10 case, the opportunities for interaction on technical issues were limited because the 
decision to apply a CD was made late in the process: several issues had already been 
decided upon, which narrowed down options for the private parties. In the A12 case 
the limited technical interaction can be explained by the project character: a relatively 
simple expansion of infrastructure, without technically challenging elements, although 
with limited available space. Another reason for limited technical interaction in all 
projects (A2, A10, A12, and A15) was, what a private interviewee described as, a 
‘restrictive interpretation’ of the CD process. Open interaction about possible technical 
solutions took place in corridors and in informal specialist meetings, but was limited in 
the formal legalistic dialogue meetings. A commonly given reason is the cautious 
attitude of bidders and procuring authorities with regard to stating anything on record.  
 
However, some developments in the CD also stimulate interaction on technical 
complexity. A major development addressed by the interviewees is the introduction of 
most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) awarding criteria. These criteria are 
based on both quality and price. In the A12 case, for example, the criteria specifically 
valued innovation by smart planning of construction works, limiting effects on traffic 
flow and on environmental nuisance and enhancing residents’ perception of the efforts 
to limit these effects. Local stakeholders, i.e. municipalities and residents, have been 
actively involved in judging the bids as members of the appraisal committees. This 
stimulated a broader dialogue with a collaborative character. 
 
Nevertheless, in all projects, bidders displayed a cautious attitude with regard to 
discussing their proposed solutions in the dialogue, which was fuelled by concerns over 
controllability of the CD. Private parties indicated that they trust the procuring 
authorities’ intention to keep confidentiality, but also felt that a mistake would easily be 
made. This caused them to not discuss their proposed solution in the early dialogue 
stages and protect their competitive advantage. Instead they focused on what 
government officials describe as ‘finding irregularities, problems and openings in 
tender documents’ to make sure other bidders also perceived risks and took those into 
account in their bids.  
 
The procuring authorities also demonstrated a cautious attitude. Reasons for this can be 
found in the character and development of the contracting authority, i.e. 
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Rijkswaterstaat. Over the years it experienced significant reorganizations to slim down 
the organization, but these negatively affected the technical knowledge within the 
organization (see Van den Brink, 2009). This seems to be a wider phenomenon; public 
agencies in other countries deal with the same issues (GAO, 2008). To keep control 
‘they [Rijkswaterstaat] tend to ask for many details and products in procurement’, 
according to a private tender manager. The resulting detailed character of the 
dialogue limited opportunities for technical interaction and resulted in high bidding and 
transaction costs. This notion can also be found in other Dutch evaluative studies with a 
stronger legal focus (Hoezen, 2012; Kolkman & Floor, 2008). Government officials 
indicated that by gaining more experience with CDs they hope to overcome this. 
 
4.4.4 Legal complexity 
The private parties experience a strong emphasis on legal complexity in the CDs, which 
limits cooperation during the CD. Public parties justify this emphasis by the innovative 
character of the contracts chosen and the importance of a co-ordinated and structured 
CD. The interviewees addressed the following legal complexity issues: the over-
presence of legal experts, the strictly applied guidelines and the central role of the 
contract. 
 
In the investigated CDs, legal complexity is increased by the introduction of integral 
contracts and parallel execution of public planning procedures and tender procedures 
(see Lenferink et al., 2012a). As a response, there is a strong presence of legal experts 
from public and private parties in the dialogue. Several private parties mentioned ‘an 
over-presence of legal experts’, especially in the A12 case. This caused a legalistic 
attitude towards the setup of the dialogue. All rounds were performed strictly 
according to standardized Dutch CD guidelines. This also happened in rounds in which 
interaction did not provide added value: a private bidder stated that they ‘are 
experienced in delivering a sound draft business plan for the first selection stage’ and 
‘do not need much interaction over this’.  
 
Another issue is the emphasis put on legal guidelines for performing the dialogue, which 
limits opportunities for technical and financial interaction. A strong legalistic attitude 
caused interaction to be kept tight in order to maintain the level playing field. A cause 
for this is the decreasing availability of technical knowledge (see Section 4.4.3). The 
dialogues were set-up and performed in strictly bounded stages. This caused problems 
in the A12 and A15 cases. It was impossible to change earlier discussed and finalized 
contract documents on the basis of discussions in later dialogue stages (Rijkswaterstaat, 
2011). This prevented private opportunities to be realized and limited future pro-
active involvement of private parties.  
 
Another legal complexity issue is the role of the contract. During the dialogue, involved 
parties felt that ‘the contract and the legal experts took in a central place’, as one 
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public official describes. A reason is that the newly introduced integrated contracts are 
more complex: they include maintenance as in the A12, A15 and A10 DBFM contracts, 
or include real estate development, as in the A2 case. Although both public and private 
parties acknowledge that a contract is only the start of long-term public-private 
cooperation, legalistic and cautious attitudes cause the dialogue to be primarily aimed 
at setting-up and signing a detailed contract. 
 
4.5 Analysis  
4.5.1 Governance strategies 
The complexity factors and organizational issues, as described in Section 4.4, influence 
co-ordination, competition and cooperation in the public-private interaction. In Table 
4.4 the positive and negative experiences with the governance strategies are 
displayed for the investigated organizational issues, financial, technical and legal 
complexity. 
 
Competition may lead to flexibility, variety and cost efficiency (Blomqvist, 2002). In 
practice, we find this also in the investigated CD projects. However, it depends on the 
degree of interaction possible between public and private parties. Competition is 
stimulated by the improved selection and awarding mechanisms, such as the MEAT 
awarding criteria. These criteria can only be judged if solutions are worked out project- 
and context-specific, which market parties find difficult to do without sufficient 
interaction with the contracting agency over demands and wishes. Such interaction is 
limited because of strict co-ordinative guidance and the carefully maintained level 
playing field. This reflects the work of Stiglitz (1998), who noticed the necessity to 
accommodate for possible client-supplier asymmetries in information and power. 
However, it is not only competition that drives interaction. Although clearly present in 
the CD, competition is not as dominant as earlier studies would suggest (Hoezen, 2012), 
because co-ordination also plays on important role. 
 
In theory, co-ordination attributes to a structured and stable directive approach 
(Blomqvist, 2002). This effect is noticeable in practice: it has resulted in more objective 
CD-processes, which helps to facilitate a well-functioning market. The experiences 
illustrate that co-ordination is achieved by developing detailed guidelines and strictly 
applying these, which structures interaction. This corresponds to the reasons for 
introducing the CD procedure: improving guidance and structure in negotiating contracts 
(OGC, 2008). However, in line with Van den Brink (2009) and Johansson (2012), we 
find that public agencies experience difficulties in abandoning the traditional directive, 
co-ordinative role. Private parties feel limited by a controllability reflex of the 
government, caused by unfamiliarity with letting go of responsibilities and allowing for 
competition and cooperation. This resulted in more strict co-ordination by the public 
parties, which, to a certain extent, is inherent to the position of government. As Kickert 
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(1997) explains “government cannot dominate and unilaterally, hierarchically dictate, 
but is, nonetheless, not completely horizontally equivalent to all other actors” (p. 738). 
 
Cooperation may lead to an increase of quality, sharing of risks and information by 
jointly developing products (Blomqvist, 2002). Korthals Altes and Taşan-Kok (2010) 
find that trust relationships are not established or sought after in CD. This contrast with 
our findings in practice: public and private parties experience more opportunities to 
express their wishes and ambitions in the CD than other procurement procedures, and, 
through finding a common understanding, a basis for trust relations is established. CDs 
include public-private interaction that can provide insight in each other’s world. The 
introduction of the procedure seems to help facilitate interaction and prevent 
opportunistic behavior aimed at realizing short term gains (Kadefors, 2004; Laan et 
al., 2011). However, it can be difficult to achieve cooperation in the CD because of the 
conservative attitudes of public actors (fuelled by strong co-ordination) and private 
actors (fuelled by strong competition). As a result, dominating legal attitudes inspire 
conservative dialogues resulting in detailed long-term contracts, which do not provide 
flexibility to deal with society’s dynamic character and limit cooperation beyond the 
procurement stage. 
 
Table 4.4: Positive and negative experiences with public-private interaction in CDs.  
 Governance strategies 
 Competition Cooperation Co-ordination 
External 
factors 
   
Organiza-
tional issues 
- 
 
 
+ 
Projects compete for 
personnel 
 
More transparent 
awarding criteria 
- 
 
 
+ 
Personnel changes limit 
tacit knowledge and 
trust building  
Increased possibilities 
for public-private 
interaction 
- 
 
 
+ 
Inefficient information 
distribution  
 
Professionalized set-up of 
dialogue 
Financial 
complexity 
- 
 
 
+ 
Insufficient compen-
sation for effort of 
private parties 
Increased financial 
focus on affordability 
- 
 
 
+ 
Public inexperience in 
interacting with 
financial institutions  
Stimulated cooperation 
with financial parties 
- 
 
 
+ 
Inexperience in dealing with 
new financial arrangements  
 
Early insight in affordability 
and financial feasibility 
Technical 
complexity 
- 
 
 
+ 
Decision-making limits 
room for technical 
solutions 
Interaction on public 
ambitions inspires 
competition 
- 
 
 
+ 
Cautious, reserved 
public and private 
attitudes 
Context specific set-up 
of CD stimulates 
interaction 
- 
 
 
+ 
 
Detailed public co-
ordination limits interaction  
 
Increased third party 
involvement in awarding 
projects  
Legal 
complexity 
- 
 
 
+ 
Strictly followed 
procedures result in 
obsolete interaction 
Guidelines structure 
interaction and 
competition 
- 
 
 
+ 
Focus on contract limits 
attention to long-term 
cooperation  
Complex contracts 
introduce opportunities 
for interaction  
- 
 
 
+ 
Detailed contracts give 
false sense of control 
 
Standardized contracts and 
guidelines structure the CD 
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4.5.2 Mixing strategies in the CD process 
Experiences show that, in CD practice, the mix in public-private interaction seems to be 
dominated by competition and co-ordination. At the public side, tensions exists between 
co-ordination in order to maintain control in the CD with a maintained level playing 
field, and facilitating possibilities for competition and cooperation, e.g. by awarding 
cooperative capacities in context-specific project environments. Private parties display 
a strong drive for competition, which limits cooperative interaction on technical issues of 
proposed solutions. In general, the mix of governance strategies in the public-private 
interaction in the CD can therefore be situated near the competition-co-ordination axis 
in Figure 4.2. 
 
The opportunities for interaction differ over time during the CD process. In the beginning 
many interaction opportunities exist, especially on public wishes and ambitions. 
However, strong competition and fear of cherry-picking make private parties reluctant 
to discuss ideas and proposed solutions. Instead, interaction is focused on obtaining 
background information and finding irregularities in the preconditions set by the public 
parties. In later stages, after the first selection round has taken place, private parties 
need to work out proposed solutions further, and therefore search for public input. 
However, public parties tend to limit this interaction. Instead they aim to control private 
parties by asking for details in their solutions and focus on maintaining the level playing 
field. As a consequence, private solutions can only limitedly be improved by the public 
input at this stage of the CD. 
 
Because of the dominant co-ordination (hierarchy) and competition (market) in the CD, 
proposed private solutions are only limitedly discussed and detailed public 
preconditions are imposed. Both these governance strategies obstruct the dialogue over 
perceived problems and proposed solutions and cause that the competitive dialogue is 
not applied to its full potential. As a result, the CD cannot effectively connect with the 
dynamic society, in which network structures are increasingly relevant (Johansson, 
2012). 
 
The opportunities for interaction do not only differ during the CD process, but also 
differ between the CD projects. A reason is that projects differ: in technical complexity 
of the solution, in contract type and in scope of the project area. The cases of the A2 
and the A12 seem to offer most opportunities for public-private interaction. As 
experience with the CD procedure is gained, regulation, process and structure have 
become clearer to the public and private parties. As a result, the more recent A12 and 
A15 projects have completed the CD in a shorter time period (see Table 4.3), lowering 
the transaction costs. Also, the more recent projects show that experience is gained with 
complexity issues. For example, in integrated contracts, active involvement of financial 
actors and the MEAT awarding criteria have become more familiar. The experiences 
show that through learning, interaction opportunities in the CD are becoming better 
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streamlined. Effective interaction can start earlier and can be focused on issues in which 
it provides added value: the complexities of the project. 
 
4.6 Conclusions: strengthening public-private interaction 
In this article we explored how CDs’ organizational set-up and how, in public-private 
interaction, complexity factors influence the governance strategies of cooperation, 
competition and co-ordination, and how the mix of strategies depends on practical 
experience. We conclude that although the CD facilitates interaction and helps to 
develop public-private relations, strong competition is intrinsically conflicting with trust-
building necessary for cooperation (in line with Lenferink et al., 2011). The Dutch 
experiences show that public-private interaction in the CD procedure is facilitated, but 
that it could be strengthened by better balancing cooperation, competition and co-
ordination. This article illustrates that within the limited experiences with the CD 
procedure in Dutch national road infrastructure planning, the framework of governance 
strategies as developed by Robinson et al. (2000), is dominated by two strategies: co-
ordination (by the public parties) and competition (by the private parties). The 
unbalanced interaction leads to increased juridification, which obstructs cooperation in 
the CD (in line with Korthals Altes & Taşan-Kok, 2010). 
 
Two important learning effects influence public-private interaction in the CD. First, 
improved learning with public-private interaction by increased application of the CD 
might decrease the insecurity that fuels the legal co-ordinative dominance of 
government. After all, analysis shows that involved public and private actors 
unanimously evaluate the CD procedures as positive: they feel that more transparent 
awarding criteria are developed and that transaction costs have been limited in more 
recent projects. Furthermore, until now, there have not been legal claims that justify the 
cautious legal attitudes. It seems to be a matter of time before involved parties are 
familiar enough with the CD to start abandoning their conservative attitudes and start 
discussing the creative and innovative solutions. To stimulate this process further, public 
and private insights and experiences should be collected and distributed: for example 
by facilitating discussion among the community of practice in informal platform 
meetings. 
 
The second learning effect pertains to the way complexity is dealt with. The involved 
parties seem not to be aware that “context, complexity and governance are 
interrelated” (Kickert, 1997, p. 738). The applied strategies in the competitive 
dialogue are not aimed at addressing and dealing with complexity. The CD procedure 
facilitates opportunities to jointly explore the context in order to find ways to deal with 
complexity. For example a balanced governance mix to deal with complexity can be 
found by better utilizing incentives for public-private cooperation in MEAT awarding 
criteria and best value procurement (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010a; Rubery et al., 2012). 
Such project- and context specific opportunities could help stimulate cooperation, while 
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maintaining competition, and realize a development towards co-opetition (Van Buuren 
et al., 2010) within the co-ordinative framework of a CD procedure. Currently, existing 
opportunities to deal with complexity are not grasped because of strong co-ordination 
and competition. To improve this, involved parties should be made more aware of the 
opportunities for addressing complexity and the added value for money, which 
cooperation in the CD could provide. Transparent processes are essential when 
applying incentives for cooperation, because it can ensure that co-ordination and 
competition will not result in stifling overregulated CDs, with competition on price (see 
Ruberry et al., 2012). Further research could provide insight into how Dutch experiences 
with governance strategies relate to experience with in other European countries, for 
example by connecting to the work of Petersen (2010b) and Johansson (2012). 
 
Besides fostering learning in CD procedures, we recommend gaining insight in the 
possibilities to expand public-private interaction beyond procurement. Interaction could 
be part of an on-going dialogue that spans the planning lifecycle (Lenferink et al., 
2011) in which public and private parties gain continuous insight in each other’s 
opinions, wishes and ambitions leading to improved relations. Conceptually, early 
public-private interaction in a pre-contracting stage could prepare public and private 
parties for CDs (Leendertse et al., 2012). Subsequent public-private interaction in 
procurement helps to come to a contract in which the stage is set for post-contracting 
public-private interaction in construction and maintenance, possibly through adaptive 
public-private project partnering and alliances (Domberger et al., 1997; Laan et al., 
2011). Further research is needed to investigate whether and how added value of 
private party involvement can be used in other stages of the planning process to 
strengthen infrastructure projects. Although further research is needed, the findings in 
this article suggest that the CD can co-ordinate public-private interaction and provide 
for cooperation and competition to help cope with challenges of complexity in 
infrastructure projects. 
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5 Towards sustainable infrastructure development through integrated contracts: 
Experiences with inclusiveness in Dutch infrastructure projects 
 
Abstract 
Current complex society necessitates finding inclusive arrangements for 
delivering sustainable road infrastructure integrating design, construction and 
maintenance stages of the project lifecycle. In this article we investigate 
whether linking stages by integrated contracts can lead to more sustainable 
road infrastructure development by assessing public and private experiences 
with inclusiveness of integrated Dutch Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) 
projects throughout the procurement, design, construction and maintenance and 
operation stages. Through semi-structured interviews and document analysis, 
we find that public and private parties experience that inclusiveness is increased 
by DBFM contracts, although differences between investigated actor, scope 
and time dimensions of inclusiveness exist. We conclude that integrated 
contracts can lead to more sustainable infrastructure development because of 
the lifecycle optimization incentives provided by the linked contract stages of 
design, construction and maintenance. Based on our findings we recommend 
pursuing three avenues towards more sustainable infrastructure development: 
green procurement, strategic asset management and relational contracting. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, projects have become increasingly complex (Williams, 1999), 
which is also recognized in Dutch road infrastructure projects (Arts, 2007). Traditional 
project management approaches cannot account properly for increased complexity in 
the planning arena. ‘Implementation gaps’ (Dunsire, 1978) between stages in the 
lifecycle of projects occur: between government-dominated plan-making, and 
implementation, dominated by the private sector. As a result, planning processes for 
new road infrastructure proceed slowly and regularly come to a standstill and 
completed projects show shortcomings in cost and time overruns (Committee Elverding, 
2008; Flyvbjerg, 2005). In addition to the shortcomings in time and costs of the current 
transport planning process, other challenges are emerging that are related to the 
quality of infrastructure projects: infrastructure delivery is increasingly aimed at 
increasing the specific quality of achieving long-term sustainability. This could be 
realized by increasing the inclusiveness of infrastructure projects, by looking for new 
partnerships (Wakeman, 1997), which transcend traditional economic, social and 
ecological pillars in the Triple Bottom Line of sustainability (Elkington, 1999). 
 
Increased inclusiveness can be found by stressing the linkages, interconnections and 
interdependencies that are inherent to the concept of sustainability (Gibson, 2005). 
Along this line, Arts (2007) proposes to integrate the lifecycle of projects by increasing 
the inclusiveness in the actors, scope and time dimensions. Increasing inclusiveness in the 
actors dimension would mean that government distributes responsibilities to other actors, 
e.g. local stakeholders or consortia of private parties, in such a way that more 
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expertise can be employed. This could better serve the various local and national 
interests, leading to better balanced outcomes with broader public support. By 
increasing inclusiveness in the scope dimension of infrastructure projects, synergies can 
be discovered between infrastructure and their surroundings. These can help to improve 
the overall quality of an area and provide opportunities to arrive at more sustainable 
solutions (Heeres et al., 2012). Inclusion in the time dimension encompasses linking the 
stages in the planning lifecycle. Better coordinated and integrated lifecycle stages 
could enable for a more sustainable planning process and product (i.e. the road 
infrastructure). 
 
In the Netherlands as well as in other European countries, more integral contracts are 
increasingly applied with so-called Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) lifecycle 
contracts being one important example (Eggers & Startup, 2006). In a DBFM contract, 
a private party is responsible for design, construction, financing and maintenance 
(Hodge et al., 2010; Yescombe, 2007). DBFM contracts are regarded as closely 
related or even similar to Design-Build-Finance-Maintain-Operate (DBFMO) and 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) contracts (see Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2006; 
Herrala et al., 2011), because operation usually includes maintenance. These 
integrated contracts that are generally applied in Europe, also show similarities with 
the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) contracts, 
as applied in the United States, in the fact that stages are integrated and the funding is 
a responsibility of the private sector (Pietroforte & Miller, 2002). Specific to the 
application of DBFM contracts in the Netherlands, however, is that maintenance is 
strictly divided from operation. Maintenance can be distributed to market parties in 
DBFM contracts, whereas, operation, the exploitation through network management, 
currently remains a strictly public responsibility (Chao-Duivis, 2011). As a consequence, 
private parties cannot generate income out of the network management (e.g. through 
tolling). Private consortia merely play a role in financing infrastructure in advance and 
earning back their investments by receiving availability payments from government 
during operation. 
 
Integral DBFM contracts have only fairly recently been introduced to road 
infrastructure. Although sometimes difficult to measure because contracts are still in the 
operation stage (Nilsson, 2009) and because there is a lack of data on operating costs 
and outputs (Jensen & Stonecash, 2005), the first projects show possible efficiency 
gains, increased project control and are delivered better in time and within budget as 
compared to traditional contracting (Committee Ruding, 2008; Dutch Ministry of 
Finance, 2010; Klijn, 2009; WB Consulting, 2009). These evaluative studies on DBFM 
projects do only reflect the ‘hard’ outcomes of project management: they give 
indications of time and cost implications. Little is known, however, about the experiences 
of involved public and private stakeholders interacting and cooperating within such 
integrated contracts. Such insights would be valuable because it may uncover directions 
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for improving and streamlining current integrated contracts, which eventually may result 
in (further) time, and cost gains, but also in increased quality of products. 
 
Therefore, the goal of this article is to gain greater insight into current experiences of 
key participants involved in integrated road infrastructure-related DBFM contracts, and, 
more specifically, to explore potential directions for improvement of such contracts. 
Accompanying research questions include: what are current experiences of public and 
private stakeholders involved in integrated contracts regarding current DBFM practice 
and the inclusiveness of such contracts? Which avenues for increasing inclusiveness and 
greater sustainability can be recommended from analyzing linkages between stages in 
Dutch DBFM contracts? To answer these questions we conducted 25 semi-structured in-
depth interviews with Dutch experts that work either for construction companies or for 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. Within the interviews we focused on 
inclusiveness in three dimensions, i.e. actors, scope and time, in line with Arts (2007). 
Interviewees were asked about their experiences with integrated (DBFM) contracts on 
these dimensions and about room for improvement. Additionally, we analyzed project 
evaluation studies and other relevant ‘grey’ literature. 
 
The investigation of Dutch practice is relevant to an international audience because, as 
part of the broadly applied neoliberal agenda (England & Ward, 2007) in Western 
countries, contract integration takes place at a broader, international scale. The 
findings and conclusions may therefore be applicable to other Western countries as 
well. In addition, this article relates to the search for ways to incorporate inclusive 
sustainable development into policy and business activities (Labuschagne & Brent, 
2005). The article therefore fits project management after the practice-oriented turn 
(see Blomquist et al., 2010), which shifted the focus to the development of projects' 
processes over time and includes the wider context and its contingencies and 
dependencies (see Engwall, 2003; Söderlund, 2002). 
 
In the remainder of this article, first, we give a background on the development 
towards DBFM contracts, after which we provide the theoretical framework and 
research design. Following that, the issues in stages and linkages of integrated contracts 
are discussed per project stage: procurement and design, construction, and maintenance 
and operation. In the conclusions and discussion section (Section 6), the role of 
inclusiveness and sustainability in the implementation of integrated contracts is 
discussed. Finally, we provide potential ways for increasing sustainability of DBFM 
projects: green procurement, strategic asset management and relational contracting. 
 
5.2 Policy setting: development towards integrated contracts 
5.2.1 Historical overview 
At the end of the 1990s, the new public management ideas (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992) resulted in a shift across Western governments: a reassessment of government's 
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core competences was necessary (Pollitt et al., 2007) and in a neoliberal agenda of 
privatization more tasks and responsibilities were distributed to the private sector 
(England & Ward, 2007). Executive departments were transformed into agencies: e.g. 
Rijkswaterstaat in the Netherlands and the Highways Agency in the United. Kingdom 
(Highways Agency, 2009; Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). Tasks are transferred because it is 
expected that private contractors are able to identify and develop innovative facilities, 
deliver more quickly and at lower cost, and can provide private funding and operate 
facilities more efficiently (Savas, 2000). In most Western countries the trend towards 
integrated long-term contracts can be recognized (Pietroforte & Miller, 2002) and this 
development is not limited to road infrastructure (see e.g. Chao et al., 2005 on 
integration in the electricity supply sector). 
 
As in many other countries, in the Netherlands government was traditionally responsible 
for plan-making, construction and maintenance of road infrastructure. The rather 
inward-oriented executive department of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment (“Rijkswaterstaat”) controlled the planning procedure from the beginning to 
the end, from agenda-setting and explorative studies to management and maintenance 
of delivered infrastructure (Arts, 2007; Van den Brink, 2009). Until the late 1990s, 
Rijkswaterstaat did so by working out the desired solution in detail in a ‘RAW-bestek’: 
a specification including a detailed technical design with underlying preliminary 
calculation of materials needed and construction time. Based on this estimate, 
contractors could calculate their bids and the lowest bidder was awarded the 
construction contract. After completing construction, maintenance was performed by 
public road districts or contracted out in separate maintenance contracts, which were 
also specified in detail (see Model 1 in Fig. 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1: Development of integrated contracts in the infrastructure project lifecycle. 
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In the Netherlands the neoliberal agenda started with outsourcing maintenance to 
contractors. Specified products and processes were no longer put out to tender, but 
instead performance levels were required by Rijkswaterstaat in so-called performance 
maintenance contracts (see Fig. 5.1, Models 2a/2b). Contractors were allowed more 
freedom to optimize maintenance by applying innovative methods for more efficient 
maintenance. Shortly after, also the approach to the construction of infrastructure was 
revised. Contractors were made responsible for working out technical design 
specifications by establishing Engineering and Construct (E&C) contracts (see Fig. 5.1, 
Model 2a). Positive experiences with E&C contracts paved the way to more inclusive 
Design and Construct (D&C) contracts (see Fig. 5.1, Model 2b). Instead of providing an 
elaborated design in detail, in a D&C contract the contracting authority only requests 
certain outputs to be delivered, based on the general demands and wishes of involved 
public parties. In 2008, D&C contracts became the standard form of contracting within 
Rijkswaterstaat (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). The next step in the integration of stages in 
infrastructure projects was taken by introducing Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) 
contracts (see Fig. 5.1, Model 3) in which design and construction tasks are combined 
with performance maintenance over a longer contract period. DBFM contracts are 
currently the standard for complex projects at the national level in the Netherlands, 
and are increasingly applied (see Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1: Closed and proposed contracts (between brackets) for Dutch road infrastructure projects. 
 June 2009 June 2011 August 2012 
RAW 2 (0) 0 0 
Engineering & Construct (E&C) 2 (0) 1 (2) 0 
Design & Construct (D&C) 19 (2) 13 (10) 13 (3) 
Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM)  2  (3) 5 (2) 5 (5) 
 
5.2.2 DBFM contracts 
DBFM contracts aim to integrate over time the stages of design, construction, and 
maintenance into a single arrangement. Financing is also a part of the contract, but is 
arranged for in procurement and plays a role in project control throughout the other 
lifecycle stages. The name of DBFM therefore does not entirely reflect the sequence in 
which the stages and activities take place. Traditionally, design, construction, and 
maintenance stages are separated and poorly integrated, leading to suboptimisations 
(Dorée, 2001). In DBFM contracts, the contractor delivers a service (i.e. availability of 
infrastructure) during a period that can span 15 to 30 years. Through integrated 
contracts, government distributes responsibilities to other actors, e.g. local stakeholders 
or consortia of private parties. Potentially more expertise can be employed, which 
could better serve the various local and national interests, leading to better balanced 
outcomes with broader public support. In DBFM contracts the tasks in design, 
construction and maintenance are transferred from the public client to the private 
contractor. Because government remains client and contracting authority, and, as such 
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remains responsible for strategic planning, DBFM cannot be considered as ‘pure’ 
privatization (Dutch Ministry of Finance, 2010). By extending and broadening the scope 
of infrastructure projects, i.e. including more activities in (parts of) the road network, 
synergies can be discovered between infrastructure and their surroundings, which can 
help to improve the overall quality of an area and provide opportunities to arrive at 
more sustainable solutions (Heeres et al., 2012). 
 
In contrast to Dutch DBFM contracts (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a), internationally contracts 
often are expanded to DBFMO contracts (see Model ? in Fig. 5.1; Yescombe, 2007), 
which include private operation by tolling, e.g. in Spain, Italy, the Czech Republic and 
Germany (BNP Paribas Fortis, 2010; PS, 2010). Tolling is generally not included in the 
Netherlands because of the historical availability of a good national highway network 
without tolling in the Netherlands, a heavily urbanized country with little available 
space (Lenferink et al., 2012). However, recently three projects with tolling possibilities 
were identified in national policy of 2011: The A15 highway between Ressen and 
Zevenaar, the connection between the A16 and A13 highways and the Blankenburg 
highway tunnel near the harbour of Rotterdam (Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, 2011). 
 
5.3 Dimensions of inclusiveness: towards a more sustainable planning approach  
Sustainability has been under debate for decades, especially since the UN report ‘Our 
common future’ (WCED, 1987), after which numerous attempts have been made to 
translate sustainability into measurable components. A well-known example is 
Elkington’s concept of the Triple Bottom Line, which proposes three elements of 
sustainable development: social, ecological and economic (Elkington, 1999) that also 
resemble the elements in the people (social), planet (ecological) and profit (economic) 
concept. However, it is difficult to apply these concepts to design, construction and 
maintenance and subsequently assess their performance (Chong et al., 2009). 
Moreover, the definition relies on the traditional economic, ecological and social pillars, 
which causes continuation of traditional thinking and business-as-usual (Gibson, 2005). 
Gibson (2005) therefore proposes to emphasize the linkages, interconnections and 
interdependencies that are at the core of the concept. In Dutch practice, the former 
Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (2002) proposed to 
link the current situation to a broader spatial dimension (“there”) and a time dimension 
(“later”) in order to reach sustainability. Furthermore, Arts (2007) suggests that 
sustainability can be achieved by applying more inclusive planning processes. His 
proposed inclusionary approach includes a shift in the actors, scope and time 
dimensions (Arts, 2007). 
 
The actor dimension comprises the inclusion of actors in the planning, contracting and 
implementation process. It relates to theoretical developments in collaborative planning 
(Healey, 1997) and collaborative alliances (Gray & Wood, 1991), which are reflected 
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in the development from classical to neoclassical contracts (Lyons & Mehta, 1998). 
Classical contracts include as many contingencies as possible in order to reduce the 
possibility of claims and disputes' (Cheung et al., 2006). In Dutch infrastructure planning, 
the previously discussed RAW contracts can be regarded as classical contracts, in which 
the project is carefully hedged (Collingridge, 1983) from outside influences. In contrast 
to classical contracts, neoclassical contracts such as DBFM and D&C consider longer time 
periods, involve more actors and personal interaction and allow for a lower degree of 
discreteness (Lyons & Mehta, 1998).  
 
The scope dimension considers the spatial inclusion of other socio-economic functions in 
road infrastructure development, shifting the project focus from infrastructure itself to 
the combination of infrastructure and the surrounding area (Heeres et al., 2012). This 
expanded focus is necessary because current society is in need of ‘new scales for 
planning intervention’ (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009) in order to deal with problems 
in infrastructure planning. In exploring these new scales, the theoretical concepts of co-
development, in which each involved sector brings their values and expertise (Cervero, 
2009) into the process, in order to come to a ‘mutual gains approach’ (Susskind & 
Cruikshank, 2006). By exploring and extending traditional project boundaries to 
incorporate for opportunities in adjacent sectors, potential synergies could be 
discovered. These could enable a transformation from monofunctional to multi-functional 
development and facilitate more inclusive development (Arts, 2007). 
 
The time dimension reflects the integration of stages in the project lifecycle. Currently, 
stages are separated and poorly integrated (Dorée, 2001), leading to implementation 
gaps (Dunsire, 1978). By connecting stages better, interaction could be realized in 
which knowledge and expertise could be used to better adjust activities to each other 
(Bult-Spiering et al., 2005). These ideas are also reflected in the work on supplier 
integration (Martinsuho & Ahola, 2010) and manufacturing sector life cycle integration 
(Labuschagne & Brent, 2005). Creating opportunities to perform lifecycle optimizations 
could enable to better realize project goals and connect to stakeholders’ interests. In 
doing so, more inclusiveness regarding the time dimension can be realized (Arts, 2007). 
 
In this article we focus on inclusiveness in three dimensions: actors, time and scope. This is 
done partly because a focus on inclusiveness fits within project management’s increasing 
attention to process management (see De Bruijn et al., 2002) and the actuality of 
projects (Cicmil et al., 2006). But, more important, we think that the actor, scope and 
time framework better reflects the collective and transformative character of 
sustainability. Inherent to this perspective on sustainability is an incentive to seek 
relations, as projects are related through their actors, their scope and their 
development over time. 
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5.4 Research design 
In this article we focus on gaining greater insight into current experiences of key 
participants involved in integrated road infrastructure related DBFM contracts in the 
Netherlands. We do this primarily on the basis of information gained from in-depth 
interviews enriched with information from project evaluation studies and other relevant 
‘grey’ literature. Documents analyzed include evaluative studies carried out by the 
Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and consultancy agencies. The 
evaluations cover the introduction of new contracts, the performance of contractors and 
issues related to inclusiveness. We selected documents that consider Dutch planning 
practice and analyzed them for the actor, scope and time dimension. Subsequently, we 
confronted document analysis findings with the findings from interviews.  
 
Interviews were conducted with actors involved in the implementation of DBFM contracts 
in road infrastructure projects: the A15 highway between Maasvlakte and Vaanplein, 
the Second Coentunnel project, the A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal, the A59 highway 
between Rosmalen and Geffen and the N31 Waldwei. These five project were 
selected because they are the first national level DBFM projects in the ‘growing DBFM 
practice’ in the Netherlands that have completed construction and are currently into the 
maintenance stage. As such these projects can provide insights into the role of 
inclusiveness in all stages included in integrated DBFM contracts. The interviewees 
include public and private legal, financial, planning and management experts in the 
Netherlands (see Appendices 5.1 and 5.2 for an overview) that were selected because 
they work with DBFM projects and reflect a broad range of fields of expertise. They 
usually are involved in multiple DBFM projects, or have sufficient insight in Dutch DBFM 
projects, because of the small, but growing DBFM practice. This allows them to connect 
and relate issues in multiple projects and bring forward learning experiences from the 
perspective of their field of expertise. The majority of the 25 selected interviewees 
works for construction companies or at the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment. In order to gain greater insight into current experiences of key 
participants involved in integrated road infrastructure related DBFM contracts, and, 
more specifically, to explore potential directions for improvement of such contracts, a 
qualitative study seems both relevant and appropriate. The semi-structured interviews 
allow a structured discussion of predetermined issues and developments relating to the 
actor, scope and time dimensions, as well as flexibility for the interviewee to include 
personal experiences and discussion topics (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005) and the 
possibility for the interviewer to ask clarifying questions and explore issues in-depth. 
Topics addressed related to three dimensions of inclusiveness: actors, scope and time. In 
all dimensions, opportunities and limitations for increasing inclusiveness were explicitly 
discussed (see Table 5.2 for the results).  
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Table 5.2: Effects on sustainability per dimension of inclusiveness in stages of DBFM contracts. 
 
- Regarding the actor dimension, aspects investigated cover cooperation and 
interaction between involved actors, which consist of stakeholders and shareholders 
from government, market and civil society. The topics researched are cooperation 
between public client and private contractor, relations of client and contractor with 
civil society, and relations between the involved project and line organizations.  
- The dimension of scope is operationalised by investigating relations between spatial 
function included in the spatial scope and adjacent spatial functions in the 
surroundings at the project level. In infrastructure projects, proposed and existing 
spatial functions are brought together, for example housing, nature and mobility.  
- Discussed topics in the time dimension are relations between contract stages over 
time, and the way these are integrated and information is exchanged. This includes 
relations between the infrastructure included in the project and the infrastructure 
network at a higher level. 
Stage Inclusiveness 
dimension 
Sustainability Effects  
Positive Negative 
Design & 
Procurement 
Actors Cooperation within consortia;  
Broader, socially relevant 
award criteria. 
Closed non-participative character 
of procurement; Renewal of public 
participation after procurement 
difficult. 
Scope Integrated synergetic designs; 
Area-oriented, context-
sensitive award criteria. 
Limited design freedom due to 
detailed legal character of 
procurement. 
Time Life-cycle perspective in 
designs and bids: life-cycle 
costing. 
Detailed, extensive, complex 
contract; Difficult to define 
sustainability upfront. 
Construction Actors Construction aimed at 
minimizing nuisance. 
Stage closed to public parties 
(except procuring authority). 
Scope Added value is realized, 
synergies may be created. 
Interdependences may result in 
time and cost overruns. 
Time Freedom to include quality-
based long-term maintenance 
considerations in construction. 
Traditional task distribution 
prevails: activities split up into 
design, construction and 
maintenance contracts. 
Operation & 
Maintenance 
Actors More attention to 
maintenance actors in earlier 
stages. 
New actors involved have to deal 
with previously closed detailed 
agreements. 
Scope Context-sensitive maintenance 
strategy. 
Tension between specific contract 
and general tasks of asset mana-
gement tasks at network-level. 
Time Life-cycle management 
applied. 
Difficult to measure performance; 
Operation disconnected from 
project lifecycle. 
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One can see that dimensions are connected and possibly overlap, which is essential for 
an inclusiveness perspective on sustainability. For example, spatial claims (scope) are 
negotiated between stake- and shareholders (actors) in order to adjust construction and 
maintenance activities (time) to each other.  
 
The section on Dutch practice (Section 5.5) is structured to fit the analysis of inclusiveness 
dimensions discussed above: findings with regard to actor, scope and time dimensions 
are grouped along different stages of integrated contracts: design and procurement, 
construction, and maintenance and operation. These stages represent parts of the 
project life cycle for which a range of similar names exist in international project 
management (Labuschagne & Brent, 2005; Ward & Chapman, 1995). Procurement is 
also included because it plays an essential role in the setup of DBFM contracts. Also 
procurement activities are closely linked to design activities and because procurement is 
often performed simultaneous with design. The discussion of the maintenance stage is 
combined with operation, because these activities are related and performed 
simultaneously. 
 
Financing is not a part of the discussion of the DBFM contract stages in the next section, 
because financing is not a separate stage, but plays a role throughout procurement, 
design, and maintenance stages. In addition, in Dutch DBFM contracts government is the 
primary responsible party for funding the infrastructure. There is no opportunity for 
private parties to fund the infrastructure and subsequently generate income in the 
operation stage, for example through tolling. The included Finance component in Dutch 
DBFM contracts therefore merely services as an incentive to guarantee private actors 
performance. Private parties finance the infrastructure in advance and have to lend 
from banks or other financial institutions. The private parties are paid back by the 
contracting authority on the basis of their performance. A common way of measuring 
performance is road availability during construction and maintenance (Eggers & 
Startup, 2006). If a private party performs well in construction and maintenance, it 
eventually gets repaid the pre-financed sum plus interest and a profit during the course 
of the contract. The interviewees indicated that including the Finance component can 
help to offer business opportunities to the private sector to materialize efficiency gains 
in DBFM projects. In the experience of public and private parties it can also assist in 
developing a more businesslike perspective on road infrastructure investments: banks or 
institutional investors that act as financiers aim to secure investments and therefore 
closely control project performance (see also Dutch Ministry of Finance, 2003; Eversdijk 
& Korsten, 2008). 
 
5.5 Practice: Integrated contracts in the Netherlands 
In this section, for each stage investigated, design and procurement (Section 5.5.1), 
construction (Section 5.5.2), and maintenance and operation (Section 5.5.3) first a 
general description of the character of each stage will be given, which includes issues 
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related to linking to previous stages. For example, the discussion of the construction 
stage also covers the link with previous design and procurement stages. Afterwards, for 
each stage dimensions of inclusiveness will be discussed for different stages of DBFM 
projects: first based on document analysis, secondly on interviews and illustrated by 
quotes. 
 
5.5.1 Design & procurement 
In design and procurement stages of DBFM projects, inclusiveness and sustainability 
become visible in the way government’s wishes and ambitions are translated into 
procurement preconditions and awarding criteria. Designing road infrastructure is a 
major part of the preparatory activities and largely determines the manner of 
construction, maintenance and operation. Procurement implies political decisions to be 
made beforehand on project’s objectives, constraints and requirements. To make such 
decisions, the public planning procedure attempts to rationally limit uncertainties in the 
project, contract and procedure by applying hedging (Collingridge, 1983). Public 
authorities gather data and work out alternatives until a desired level of certainty is 
reached (Committee Elverding, 2008), and request detailed bids from private parties 
in procurement, when projects are published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union. Examples of regulations and guidelines that channel this demand for detail are 
the guidelines for applying the competitive dialogue procurement procedure 
(Nagelkerke et al., 2009), which is usually performed for Dutch DBFM projects, and the 
standard DBFM contract (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a).  
 
Issues in the design stage of DBFM contracts are strongly related to the link with the 
stage of procurement. In order to secure a contract, private consortia work out designs 
in detail in the procurement (WB Consulting, 2009), although only outputs are 
requested (see Section 5.2). This enables a better judgment of practicalities and risks 
involved in the proposed solution, so that a better bid can be made. Analysis of 
practice reveals that this overzealous attitude of the management of consortia increases 
transaction costs in procurement. Almost all respondents from the procuring agencies 
and from industry see this factor as attributing to increased transaction costs. 
“Overzealous questions from project organizations in long tender processes can help 
define competitive offers, but they can also make us go too deep, increasing costs” 
(private director tender division). Therefore to secure a contract in procurement, private 
parties have to do part of the design before the contracting. Performing private design 
activities before the contract is closed can lead to innovation, time gains and more 
business-like, ‘grounded’ bids (Lenferink et al., 2012). However, private parties indicate 
that design activities that remain after award of the contract are limited and can be 
similar to the engineering component in E&C contracts: making a technical specification 
on basis of a selected, worked-out design. 
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Actor dimension 
Regarding the actor dimension the rather closed character of procurement, as 
described above, provides difficulties for cooperation between contractors and 
procuring authorities and for involving civil groups. Lenferink et al. (2012) mention this 
is inherent to the closed and confidential character of procurement. In contrast to public 
planning procedures where the public is formally involved, in procurement procedures 
the public is generally not involved or only involved limitedly. Nooteboom (2006) states 
that a hedged, bounded space for negotiation is created that acts as a safe 
environment for negotiating solutions and contracts. In procurement, a development 
towards broader, socially relevant awarding can be recognized by evaluating bids on 
price and quality through applying MEAT criteria (Most Economically Advantageous 
Tender, a requirement when applying the competitive dialogue procurement procedure, 
see EC, 2004) and experimenting with awarding on the basis of value and 
cooperation.  
 
The interviewees indicate that it is difficult to hedge of procurement in practice. A 
public planning manager states that it is difficult to “keep local politicians and civil 
groups silent and at ease during this part of the process”, because of their limited 
involvement. The public can feel excluded during a closed and confidential procurement 
procedure, which can fuel opposition to the implementation of the project. Public 
procuring authorities indicate that it is difficult to re-involve the local stakeholders in the 
project when procurement is successfully completed with a contract awarded. 
Experiences with MEAT criteria are obtained in the DBFM project of the A12 highway 
between Utrecht and Veenendaal in which corporate social responsibility is included as 
one of the qualification and awarding criteria and civil groups are actively involved in 
judging the bids (see also Rijkswaterstaat, 2009b). The interviewees indicate that 
MEAT-criteria opened up possibilities for more cooperation with civil society. In 
addition, they mention that steps are currently undertaken to introduce more flexible 
ways of procurement, such as making interviews with key experts from private 
contractors a part of the awarding criteria. 
 
Scope dimension 
Lenferink et al. (2010) describe the trend to hedge the planning and procurement 
process by detailed public planning procedures and a strict legalistic attitude towards 
the actors involved in planning and procurement procedures. Numerous procedural 
standards are involved, such as the DBFM standard contract (Chao-Duivis, 2011; 
Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a) and the competitive dialogue standard (Nagelkerke et al., 
2009), which can restrict the flexibility regarding the scope in design and procurement. 
Compared to traditional contracts, contractors are supposed to have more freedom to 
specify the solution in DBFM contracts, because of area-oriented, context-sensitive 
award criteria. Such award criteria are, for example, applied in the project of the A12 
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between Utrecht and Veenendaal, in which preventing traffic and environmental 
nuisance during construction and maintenance is one of the award criteria.  
 
The interviewees indicate that context-sensitive award criteria applied in procuring 
DBFM projects can be regarded as an example of the increased attention to the 
relation between a project and its surroundings. They acknowledge that the project aim 
partly determines the flexibility for inclusiveness in the scope dimension. If the 
connection between functions is actively sought in a broader scope, more stakes are 
involved, which subsequently increases transaction costs. In line with Lenferink et al. 
(2010; 2012), the public and private interviewees mention for example that the D&C 
contract for the A2 Maastricht project (with tunnel and urban redevelopment) is aimed 
at optimizing project quality and will provide the freedom to design multi-use solutions, 
while the DBFM projects of the Second Coentunnel and the A15 highway corridor 
between Maasvlakte and Vaanplein are aimed at project control, and the D&C project 
of the N31 between Zurich and Harlingen D&C project is aimed at achieving time 
gains. Although the interviewees feel that the standards for procuring DBFM projects 
can be useful in promoting efficiency at the organizational level, they can also restrict 
flexibility regarding the scope at the project level: “over-specified procurement results 
restrict the room for innovative designs after the contract is awarded” (private project 
advisor). 
 
Time dimension 
In the time dimension of inclusiveness ties between design and procurement help in 
identifying possibilities to streamline processes. By involving the market parties in both 
these activities, time gains can be achieved as procedures are adjusted to each other, if 
the start of the procurement is timed properly. Lenferink et al. (2012) found that if 
market parties are approached early in the process, political uncertainties can make a 
project too risky for market parties to become involved in. On the other hand, if 
procurement is started late in relation to planning and design, political decision-making 
will have narrowed opportunities for market parties to effectively deal with technical-
spatial issues in the project.  
 
The interviewees mention that an inclusive perspective on the time dimension is 
introduced in designs and bids as life-cycle costing plays a role. In the Second 
Coentunnel DBFM project, for example, contractors were required to conform to ISO 
15288 standards, which is a systems engineering standard covering processes and 
lifecycle stages. The interviewees regard such systems as helpful, because they 
stimulate a lifecycle perspective. However, the interviewees are aware that systems 
engineering can be applied too rigidly, which does not fit the inclusive character of 
sustainability. Sustainability is difficult to define upfront and translate into performance 
targets: “the fuzzy character of sustainability can make it lose ground to other factors 
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in procurement that are easier to define, such as cost and time efficiency” (public 
contract manager). 
 
5.5.2 Construction 
The construction stage in a Dutch DBFM project has remained fairly similar to traditional 
contracted projects. In this stage, the contract has been awarded, the planning 
procedures have been completed and the political decisions have been taken. The 
private (sub) contractor constructs the infrastructure as specified in the contract and the 
public authority supervises the private activities. 
 
Linking construction to earlier design and procurement stages is not new. As explained 
in Section 5.2, there is considerable experience with D&C contracts. The danger of 
linking design and construction in a contract is that these activities become a black box 
for government, as they are no longer prepared or performed by government. Public 
and private parties acknowledge this as an issue because “loss of expertise in design 
and construction can lead to a decrease in capability to judge quality of bids and 
guide following stages” (public contract manager). This issue also is recognized in 
practice in the US (GAO, 2008) and in the UK, where it is related to the concept of 
intelligent customer (NAO, 2011). Ultimately, the loss of knowledge could affect the 
capacity of government to fulfil its responsibilities in infrastructure delivery and in 
safeguarding environmental quality. A solution is hiring external experts to judge the 
bids, but this increases transaction costs. 
  
Actor Dimension 
With regard to the actor dimension, room for cooperation exists in the construction 
stage of DBFM. Van den Brink (2009) describes how Rijkswaterstaat transforms from an 
inward to an outward-oriented organization: it delegates responsibilities to contractors, 
which requires them to change their roles and attitudes. Private contractors can stand 
out by improving their relationship with the environment, which is also applied in the 
USA and the UK (Ernzen & Woods, 2001; Harding et al., 2007). However, there is a 
common interest in consortia to prevent overoptimistic designs and cost and time 
estimates, as can occur if mainly public actors are involved (Flyvbjerg, 2005), because 
profit and survival of consortia are at stake. In addition, private consortia increasingly 
consist of the same combination of companies, which helps in quickly setting up efficient 
private–private cooperation.  
 
Although there is considerable experience with linking design to construction in 
integrated contracts (see Section 5.2.1), the interviewees indicate that the link requires 
attention to prevent miscommunication and misinterpretation between actors involved in 
design and construction. Private consortia need “time and effort to assemble a team of 
designers and constructors and adjust their methods of working to each other, and to 
the project” (private director tender division). Interviewees from the private parties 
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mention that, in the A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal DBFM project, they have to explain how 
they involve residents and interest groups during the construction and maintenance 
stages. They feel that this attention to the relation with the environment helps in raising 
public awareness and thereby limits the number of complaints. Involved local actors can 
use their expertise to positively influence the project performance. For example, 
“involved municipalities in DBFM projects traditionally put more effort into the 
landscaping as they have to deal with local interests” (public stakeholder manager). 
 
Scope Dimension 
Regarding the scope dimension, DBFM projects differ from traditional construction 
because they include a more flexible construction stage. More room is given to create 
smart, optimized spatial designs for the road and its surroundings, which has proven to 
be one of the most important innovations accomplished in the previous procurement 
stage (Lenferink et al., 2012). More significance is given in designs to landscaping and 
mitigation, which results in more possibilities in the scope dimension of construction. 
Heeres et al. (2012) describe how smart ways to handle the connections of the project 
with the environment are sought through which road infrastructure projects are 
becoming more area-oriented. The interests included in a broader scope can be real 
estate, housing or nature development.  
 
The interviewees regard area-oriented planning as a positive development. In the 
DBFM projects of the A12 between Utrecht and Veenendaal and the A15 between 
Maasvlakte and Vaanplein, for example, this is applied in practice by focusing on 
minimizing nuisance for road users and people living in the vicinity of the project during 
construction. This “stimulates synergies in the project between the included interests” 
(public purchasing manager) and provides private contractors with possibilities to earn 
back investments. A potential issue that is recognized by the interviewees is the created 
interdependencies by the integrated character of DBFM projects. Small problems in one 
part of a project can cause delays in other parts of the project and possibly a 
complete standstill of a project: “such interdependencies in a DBFM contract can make 
a delay cause additional delays” (public stakeholder manager). 
 
Time Dimension 
DBFM contracts include more freedom for contractors in construction. Because only 
outputs are specified, contractors are free to select and choose construction methods, 
materials and planning. Construction can therefore be organized in a manner suited to 
contractors’ qualities and adjusted to earlier and later stages. By doing this, also the 
responsibility for the project is continued after the construction stage. This changes the 
relations between private construction companies and causes the formation of consortia 
(Gruneberg & Hughes, 2006). 
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The interviewees experience the changed character of projects and the lifecycle 
linkages that play a role in construction. In the past, time and costs were most important, 
but now “different considerations play a role in construction, such as constructability, 
maintainability, and environmental quality” (private director tender division). However, 
they feel that the characters and activities of consortium partners currently participating 
in DBFM contracts do not fundamentally change. The awarded DBFM contract is split up 
within consortia in separate parts for construction and maintenance, and distributed to 
the partners that are specialized in these activities. Therefore, life-cycle optimizations 
are mainly generated in design and procurement, and play only a limited role after 
these stages have been completed. 
 
5.5.3 Maintenance & operation 
In DBFM projects, during maintenance the contractor is made responsible for 
maintaining infrastructure for a certain period, usually between 15 and 30 years. The 
activities and investments of the private consortia are compensated for on the basis of 
quality of service, defined as the required availability of the road. The consortium 
borrows money from private financiers to finance construction and maintenance. Over 
the span of the maintenance stage in the contract, government pays availability fees to 
the contractor, the height of which depends on its performance. The fees can be 
adjusted for factors that negatively influence availability, such as time overruns in 
construction or extra lane closures for maintenance. 
 
Linking construction and maintenance is uncommon in Dutch infrastructure planning and 
therefore requires considerable effort. In the past, interests in maintenance were 
subordinate to construction. This led to conflicts between public contracting authority 
and private client involved in construction on the one hand, and the public maintainer on 
the other. However, by integrating the contract and making one consortium responsible 
for construction and maintenance, “interests are aligned and collaboration is 
stimulated” (private project director). Nevertheless, contrasts between large, national 
construction companies and smaller, often local, maintenance companies can be 
observed. 
 
Actor Dimension 
Aforementioned contrasts between maintenance and construction companies can 
provide challenges in the actor dimension. The interaction and data exchange between 
actors from the later stages of management and operation and earlier stages can 
prove to be difficult. For example, the Dutch Ministry of Finance (2010) mentions that 
availability fees require up-front specifications of the services to be delivered and a 
reliable monitoring system. If data to determine these fees is available, it is subject to a 
great margin of uncertainty due to the time span of the contract and the complexity of 
society. As a consequence it is difficult to assess liability under the contract terms, which 
can obstruct inclusion of private actors in operation and maintenance. Therefore, in the 
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DBFM projects for N31 Waldwei and the A59 between Rosmalen and Geffen, issues 
such as slipperiness control and incident management are performed by government 
(Buck Consultants, 2004). 
 
The interviewees feel that expertise could be combined by involving different groups 
from different stages: “existing differences in the working styles of involved private 
parties can even help in keeping parties sharp and alert” (private project director), 
which could possibly lead to better results. However, the public and private actors that 
become involved in maintenance and operation of DBFM projects mention that they 
have to deal with contracts and agreements that were reached in earlier stages. They 
feel that they are “not involved in the actual discussions and negotiations that have laid 
the basis for the contract” (private operations supervisor). The interviewees agree that 
the performance of maintenance is subject to external factors and therefore difficult to 
measure and manage. Examples mentioned by interviewees are the ecological quality 
of verges that has proven to be difficult to measure, and that weather conditions can 
influence the growth of grass between driving lanes and can make it necessary to mow 
them more often. 
 
Scope dimension 
For successful lifecycle optimizations in DBFM projects, it is essential to clearly delimit 
project boundaries by defining an optimal period for the maintenance stage and the 
geographical extension of the network under consideration. Determining the span of the 
contract is essential for the effectiveness of this incentive. Bult-Spiering et al. (2005) 
describe that longer term contracts, with longer maintenance stages, include major 
overhaul maintenance as well as minor, periodical maintenance, and therefore play a 
role in determining the optimal maintenance strategy - introducing a lifecycle 
management approach. However, such longer contracts decrease flexibility as it 
becomes more difficult to switch contractors when new developments require it (Buck 
Consultants, 2004). Currently, however, only relatively small parts of the road network 
are contracted out through DBFM contracts. The small size of the A59 DBFM project, for 
example, limited profitability of maintenance and caused the public party to take 
control of some management tasks (Habets, 2010). 
 
Interviewees from the public organizations indicate that, during maintenance, strategic 
organizational issues will play a role, in which it can be difficult to distinguish between 
temporal tasks to be included in the scope of the project and other tasks that are part 
of the strategic organization of the road network. With increasing application of DBFM 
contracts, more maintenance of parts of the road network is delegated to private 
parties, resulting in a fragmented picture. From an asset management point of view, 
integration over projects stages can be outbalanced by disintegration of network 
management. An interviewee mentions that “[it can be more profitable to] manage the 
complete road network instead of locking-up parts of the network in DBFM contracts, in 
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order to make maintenance optimizations over the whole network” (public contract 
manager). 
 
Time Dimension 
DBFM contracts offer possibilities for applying lifecycle optimizations in construction 
and maintenance, which traditionally had to be laid down in separate warranty 
regulations for construction and for maintenance. As Bult-Spiering et al. (2005) and Van 
Garsse et al. (2009) recognize balancing maintenance and construction costs can lead 
to optimizations over the total project lifecycle. However, DBFM contracts are often set 
up in detail (see Section 5.1) and there are no strong incentives to increase the 
adaptability and resilience of project elements. For public parties, contractual long-
term commitment to a private partner can restrict options for new strategic plan-
making, as for instance also recognized in Belgian DBFM practice (see Van Garsse et 
al., 2009), and can create tensions with operation activities, such as dynamic traffic 
flow management. Different parties are responsible for maintaining (private) and 
operating (public) infrastructure, with different objectives and primary goals. 
 
Interviewees experience tensions between maintenance and operation, partly as a 
result of excluding operation from Dutch DBFM contracts. While maintenance aims at 
quality of infrastructure, operation at quality and quantity of transport. They feel that 
the two tasks need to be continuously coordinated, which lead to detailed regulations 
and contracts that negatively affect the room for flexibility and the possibilities to 
increase sustainability. In addition, changes will occur over time and limitations with 
respect to the scope and adaptability of DBFM contracts will make themselves felt: by 
the end of the maintenance period the infrastructure will differ significantly from the 
project as laid down in the contract. For example, an interviewee mentions that “due to 
rapid developments in the field of electronic installations and dynamic traffic flow 
management, existing techniques might outdate quickly” (public contract manager). 
However, interviewees generally feel that these possible disadvantages can be 
outweighed by advantages of integrating several stages in a contract: “a consortium 
can reduce maintenance costs by adjusting the construction and perform lifecycle 
optimizations in the design” (public technical manager). 
 
5.6 Conclusions and discussion: towards inclusiveness in DBFM contracts 
In the previous section issues in various stages of integrated projects were discussed, 
which can limit or enhance inclusiveness as it becomes clear from the analysis displayed 
in Table 5.2. This table shows how the experiences with regard to inclusiveness 
dimensions of actors, scope and time, can positively or negatively affect the 
sustainability. These positive and negative experiences are grouped according to the 
stages of the DBFM contracts, discussed in the previous section. 
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5.6.1 Conclusions: sustainable life-cycle integration in contracts 
On the basis of the experiences in practice, we can conclude that the extent to which 
DBFM contracts can contribute to more inclusive Dutch road infrastructure projects 
depends on how the stages of DBFM contracts are integrated and how the public and 
private actors involved deal with the three dimensions of inclusiveness (see also Table 
2). With regard to the first research question (‘What are current experiences of public 
and private stakeholders involved in integrated contracts regarding current DBFM 
practice and the inclusiveness of such contracts?’), we find that public and private 
experiences with lifecycle integration in DBFM projects are positive: linkages included in 
the contract enable lifecycle optimization as procurement and design, construction and 
maintenance are adjusted to each other. However, the interviewees also bring forward 
critics and limitations of DBFM projects in the investigated actor, scope and time 
dimensions, which illustrate that there is still considerable room for improvement of 
project management to come to more inclusive infrastructure development. 
 
With regard to the actor dimension, it can be concluded that the integration of stages 
in DBFM contracts improves relations between actors because interests are aligned with 
a shared common goal within the contract and consortium. However, the closed 
character of procurement can obstruct the involvement of public and local government, 
also in later stages. The broader socially relevant award criteria set in procurement can 
help improve inclusiveness in the actor dimension of a project’s design, construction and 
maintenance by facilitating relations between government, market parties and civil 
society. In the scope dimension, DBFM stimulates integrated designs and can help 
achieve sustainable synergies. However, this might be obstructed in practice by 
detailed inflexible procurement, which limits freedom in adjusting scope. Furthermore, in 
later operation and maintenance stages tensions between the tasks and the 
responsibilities included in the project and the wider network oriented asset 
management tasks can emerge. Context-sensitive award criteria, designs and 
maintenance strategies can help strengthen the relation between infrastructure and the 
surrounding environment. Regarding the time dimension, DBFM contracts prove to 
enhance interaction between stages. Integrated DBFM contracts can lead to more 
inclusiveness through lifecycle optimizations, inspired by lifecycle costing in procurement 
and lifecycle management in later stages. However, interviewees bring forward issues 
that arise in defining desired performance rigidly at an early stage and measuring it 
afterwards. In addition, in Dutch integrated DBFM projects, operation is disconnected 
from the other stages, thereby limiting the incentive to perform lifecycle optimizations 
that relate to operation of infrastructure and connect to plan-making and help to deal 
with the interfaces between infrastructure project and infrastructure network. 
 
All-in-all, although this article was limited to a study of the 'growing practice' of 
integrated DBFM contracts in Dutch infrastructure development, it can be concluded that 
integrating stages of road transport infrastructure projects seems a logical step 
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towards sustainable performance in the lifecycle, which can be facilitated by DBFM 
contracts. The framework with three dimensions of inclusiveness provides a relevant 
addition to evaluative research on road infrastructure contracts, which is mainly based 
on project outcomes (see Hodge & Greve, 2009) and technically measurable 
sustainability of delivered products. A drawback of the framework can perhaps be its 
multiple interpretations in practice. However, the inclusiveness dimensions investigated 
allow a broad practical insight in the public and private experiences in DBFM contracts, 
which reflects the broad and multi-faceted concept of sustainability. These insights are 
relevant to project management, as they connect to the discussion on the practice-
oriented turn in project management (see Cicmil et al., 2006; Söderlund, 2002) in which 
processes, experiences and actions in practice receive increased attention. Perhaps the 
most important contribution to this discussion is that the experiences brought forward in 
this article show the essential relation between a project and its environment, be it civil 
society (actor dimension), functions that can contribute to area-oriented and context-
sensitive solutions (scope dimension), or the operating network of which a project is part 
of (time dimension). Project managers should aim at improving the relation with this 
environment, because it can result in more inclusive and sustainable projects. 
  
5.6.2 Recommendations: strategies for improving inclusiveness and sustainability 
Based on the insights provided in this article, we can make several recommendations in 
order to answer the second research question (‘Which avenues for increasing 
inclusiveness and greater sustainability can be recommended from analyzing linkages 
between stages in Dutch DBFM contracts?’). We recommend pursuing three promising 
avenues for project management research to further increase inclusiveness: green 
procurement, strategic asset management and relational contracting. 
 
The first avenue of green procurement relates to the time dimension. Green 
procurement is defined as guaranteeing and encouraging sustainable construction in the 
processes of drawing up contracts (Russel, 1998). By determining sustainable 
qualification, award and contract performance criteria that link the early plan 
development and design activities in public plan-making to the design activities in 
contract implementation, green procurement can provide private market parties with 
public wishes and ambitions for later stages that exceed standard project 
preconditions. Green procurement is applied in several countries: in Canada as green 
procurement (PWGSC, 2006) and in the USA as environmentally preferable purchasing 
or green purchasing (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). Although the 
development and application of MEAT criteria in European project practice can be 
seen as a first step along this avenue, it could be recommended to further investigate 
the relation between green procurement and integrated DBFM contracts in project 
management. Interesting developments along this line are sustainability measurement 
systems such as the CO2 performance ladder, LEED, BREEAM, and CEEQUAL (see for an 
overview Arts & Faith-Ell, 2012). The CO2 performance ladder, originally developed 
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by Dutch railway agency ProRail (ProRail, 2010), assesses the working processes of 
potential contractors and subcontractors. These organizations can become certified at 
certain sustainability levels in order to get a discount on their bids. The instrument is 
comparable to BREEAM and CEEQUAL, applied in the United Kingdom, and the LEED 
system, applied in US construction industry (Arts & Faith-Ell, 2012). 
 
The second avenue relates to the scope dimension and involves a reconsideration of the 
relationship between DBFM contracts, at the project level, and asset management, at 
the network level. Strategic asset management is ‘a business process and a decision-
making framework that covers an extended time horizon, draws from economics as well 
as engineering, and considers a broad range of assets’ (FHWA, 2011). By effectively 
linking back from asset management and traffic management in the maintenance and 
operation stages to the policy-making and plan-making stages, the lifecycle can be 
completed. However, a simple implementation of a neo-liberal agenda of transferring 
tasks and responsibilities from public to private sector will generally not suffice. It can 
be recommended to investigate to what extent applying strategic asset management in 
project management would involve a redefinition of the role of government and market 
parties. 
 
A third avenue relates to the actor dimension and involves the recognition that 
neoclassical discrete contracts, like DBFM, may not sufficiently adapt to changing 
circumstances because they are aimed at completeness (Williamson, 1979). Long-term 
contracts have to account for that by incorporating open-ended terms, which leave a 
margin for variation or complete renegotiation of commitments. Efficient contracting 
must therefore be cooperative and based on trust, not on obligations specified in 
advance (Campbell & Harris, 2005). Introducing relational contracts could make 
project management more adaptive and resilient in order to cope with complexity and 
bridge implementation gaps. Relational contracts enable parties to create unique, 
interdependent relationships between public and private actors, which are suitable for 
complex projects (Cheung et al., 2006; Turner & Simister, 2001), because they help 
improve relationships and smoothen difficulties in the transaction (Rahman & 
Kumaraswamy, 2008). It could be worthwhile to investigate if the introduction of 
arrangements such as partnering, strategic alliancing, project alliancing and joint 
ventures (see Chan et al., 2010) can help to improve project management of 
integrated contracts. 
 
This article has provided more insight into the ‘black box’ of the DBFM contract, which 
could be used to improve its application. Eventually these public and private 
experiences could help provide insight into the processes and practices that contribute 
to the DBFM outputs in terms of risks, costs and quality. This research is limited to Dutch 
DBFM contracts, while in practice, more types of public private arrangements exist that 
can offer inclusiveness and sustainability through lifecycle optimizations, and practice 
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can differ across countries. Such other practices can include other set-ups of DBFM 
contract components (especially the Finance-component differs across countries), other 
types of contracts such as DBFMO or alliances, and other roles and structures for public 
and private parties in infrastructure project management. Further research could be 
aimed to include and compare such experiences with other contracts and from other 
countries, which could possibly help project management practice in the transition 
towards inclusive and more sustainable infrastructure development. 
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Appendix 5.1: Interviewed experts per field of expertise. 
 Management Planning Technical/Financial Legal Total 
Public 3 3 6 3 15 
Private 4 1 1 0 6 
Other 1 1 1 1 4 
Total 8 5 8 4 25 
 
Appendix 5.2: Dutch and international experts interviewed. 
       Function 
Pr
oc
ur
in
g 
ag
en
ci
es
  1 Contract manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
2 Contract manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
3 Manager back office, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
4 Purchasing manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
5 Contract manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
6 Legal advisor, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
7 Planning stakeholder manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
8 Legal advisor, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
9 Planning stakeholder manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 10 Legal advisor, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 11 Contract manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 12 Project director, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 13 Alliance manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 14 Technical manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 15 Planning stakeholder manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
In
du
st
ry
 (c
on
tr
ac
to
rs
) 16 Director Tender Division, large construction firm 
17 Senior project adviser, large construction firm 
18 Project director, large construction consortium 
19 Operations supervisor, large construction firm 
20 Director Tender Division, large construction firm 
21 Director Tender Division, large construction firm 
22 Transport and Traffic advisor, large Dutch engineering firm 
23 Program manager sustainability Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 O
t-
 
 h
er
s 24 Dutch Professor Construction law, Lawyer in construction & procurement law 
25 Associate Professor in Construction Engineering and Management, USA 
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6 Lifecycle driven planning of infrastructure: Public and private experiences 
with more integrated approaches for managing project complexity 
 
Abstract 
Currently, many initiatives are under implementation in the Netherlands to 
integrate the stages of policymaking, plan development, construction, and 
operations and maintenance in the lifecycle of the infrastructure planning 
process by more explicitly involving business organizations. However, generally 
speaking, these integration initiatives stand alone and only connect a maximum 
of two stages at a time. In this article we explore whether and how 
contemporary lifecycle integration initiatives could be combined into a more 
integrated approach to be better able to address infrastructure planning 
complexities. We provide a framework for dealing with project complexity that 
distinguishes internal complexity, defined as the interrelatedness between 
project components, and external complexity, defined as the interaction of the 
project with its context. After assessing public and private experiences in 
combining single integration initiatives in complex settings by means of two 
focus group discussions, we conclude that current initiatives that connect stages 
in the planning process are suitable for addressing internal complexity. 
However, external complexity proves to be more difficult to adequately tackle 
when combining these lifecycle integration initiatives. We therefore recommend 
applying a more dynamic process management approach that stimulates 
continuous public-private interaction throughout the stages of the planning 
lifecycle. This could be facilitated by introducing alliances and cross-functional 
public-private teams.   
 
6.1 Introduction 
Traditionally the approach to infrastructure planning and decision-making is highly 
directive and strongly organized in stages. Such an approach can help progress of a 
project or a process by defining manageable pieces (Cooper, 1972; Prahabkar, 
2008). However, project failures (e.g. budget and time overruns, see Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003) show that government’s traditional directive and staged approaches often are 
inappropriate. This is even more so given the complexity in infrastructure projects which 
is considered to lead to project failure more frequently (Bosch-Rekveldt, 2011; 
Williams, 2002). 
 
The traditional process can lead to implementation gaps (Dunsire, 1978) when stages, 
decisions and their involved actors are disconnected. Staged processes could lead to 
lock-ins (see Arthur, 1989), in the sense that concluding the stages in the process (i.e. the 
decision-making) becomes more important than delivering the end-product (i.e. the 
infrastructure development). By rigidly following the planning process, knowledge and 
experience from the later implementation stages is being shut out, and opportunities to 
better connect to practice are disregarded. Integration of stages could help to 
overcome these implementation gaps. In practice this also implies more intensive 
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interaction between different actors, since government traditionally plays a prominent 
role in plan-making whereas private market parties in many countries are strongly 
involved in later stages of the planning cycle, i.e. construction and maintenance. The 
idea is that by integrating stages and by stimulating interaction between various actors, 
knowledge and expertise can be unlocked. This could provide for more innovation, 
creativity, adaptiveness and control of projects (Arts, 2007); necessary ingredients to 
address project complexity better. Such lifecycle integration relates to theoretical 
developments in institutional planning and systems theory in which institutions, stages 
and systems are connected (see Hall & Taylor, 1996; Checkland, 1981). The 
accompanying increased involvement of actors is also in line with collaborative planning 
and governance concepts, in which the connection of government and other actors is 
sought for more actively (see Innes & Booher, 1999; Martens, 2007). 
 
In this article we specifically focus on lifecycle integration through market party 
involvement. Such private business organizations may include design companies, 
contractors, financial institutions, engineering consultants and legal firms. Market parties 
possess knowledge and expertise from practice: they are what Teisman refers to as 
‘purposeful actors’ (Teisman,2000). By involving them earlier in the process through 
lifecycle integration, their knowledge and expertise can potentially be used to 
strengthen the infrastructure planning process and its outcomes (Lenferink et al., 2008) 
also in the light of project complexities.  
 
In Dutch road infrastructure planning practice, several initiatives for lifecycle integration 
through market involvement have been applied recently. For example, the early 
policymaking and plan development stages in the lifecycle of infrastructure projects are 
integrated by pre-competitive market involvement instruments, such as market scans, 
market consultations and early design contests (Leendertse et al., 2012b). Lifecycle 
integration initiatives connecting the plan development and construction stages include 
the competitive dialogue procurement procedure, which specifically aims to facilitate 
public-private interaction (Lenferink et al., 2011; Hoezen et al., 2012). Integrated 
innovative contracts have also been introduced that include combined design, 
construction and maintenance of infrastructure (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2006), for 
example through Design-Build-Finance-Maintenance contracts (DBFM).  
 
Although lifecycle integration is meant to prevent implementation gaps and unlock 
knowledge and expertise, in practice it seems to remain limited to the ad hoc and 
isolated integration of a maximum of two planning stages at a time, without 
systematically considering the wider potential of combining a greater number of, i.e. 
more than two, integration initiatives. A more overarching approach to lifecycle 
integration, which looks into the possibility and potential added value of tailoring and 
integrating separate initiatives is currently absent. To investigate its potential in 
practice, it is crucial to gain insight into recently obtained experiences of public and 
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private parties with separate integration initiatives. Building on those experiences, first 
insights into the potential of combining and tuning public private initiatives over the 
planning cycle can be explored. In this article, therefore we firstly aim to gain greater 
insight into public and private experiences with various lifecycle integration initiatives in 
practice, and, secondly we aim to explore the potential of integrating these initiatives 
throughout the planning cycle. Thereby, we specifically focus on experiences with 
integration initiatives in projects exhibiting a high degree of complexity, both internal 
and external.  
 
The experiences are retrieved from two focus group sessions with a mix of 
infrastructure planning experts from the public and private sector. The current absence 
of insights into, let alone experiences with, a more overarching approach to lifecycle 
integration left us to choose for focus group discussions, where, through interaction and 
discussion, experts with overlapping and partly complementary knowledge and 
experience were asked to explore the potential and characteristics of a lifecycle 
driven infrastructure planning. Although we base our analysis on experiences in Dutch 
infrastructure planning practice, this article is also relevant to the international debate 
on how to include the results of new public management (Lane, 2000; Pollitt et al., 
2008) and private sector involvement (see Osborne, 2000; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; 
Mosey, 2008) into new modes of governance (De Bruijn et al., 2004; Kickert, 1997; 
Martens, 2007; Teisman et al., 2009). 
  
The outline is as follows. In section 2, we provide a theoretical framework in which we 
elaborate on lifecycle integration, develop a typology of project complexity, and 
formulate four propositions on lifecycle integration. In section 3, the research design, we 
describe how these propositions were discussed in two focus group discussions with a 
mix of public and private sector participants. Subsequently section 4 provides practical 
perspectives from the focus groups on combining lifecycle integration initiatives for 
highly complex projects. In section 5 we discuss and draw conclusions. 
 
6.2 Theoretical framework 
6.2.1 Lifecycle integration and the planning process 
Lifecycle integration revolves around the idea that by involving knowledge and 
experiences and connecting stages, learning loops can be established that provide for 
adaptiveness (see Argyris & Schön, 1978; Forrester, 2009). The learning loops help to 
prevent lock-ins in an overstructured approach with a focus on decision-making to 
conclude stages only. In such instances, the process is not performed to deliver an end-
product, but is a goal in itself. In theory an overarching approach to lifecycle 
integration can help to keep the focus in the planning process, while managing 
interdependencies and differentiation between stages (as described by Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1969; Mintzberg, 1991). Lifecycle integration could help streamline and adjust 
public-private interaction in various stages to each other and distribute knowledge and 
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experiences over the full lifecycle of infrastructure planning (Arts, 2007; Lenferink et 
al., 2008) in an approach that combines the complementary elements of control and 
interaction (see De Bruijn et al., 2004). According to Teisman (2005) and Hertogh and 
Westerveld (2010), these elements of systems and interactive management are 
required in present-day complex environments and should be present in managers’ 
core competences.  
 
Lifecycle integration through market involvement potentially also has some 
disadvantages. The interdependencies created can increase the risk of standstills, which 
decomposition into a phased planning process could prevent (Prahabkar, 2008). 
Lifecycle integration could also increase transaction costs as a result of the prolonged 
involvement of the private sector (NAO, 2007; Solino & Gago de Santos, 2010). In 
addition the integration of stages combined with market involvement could scatter 
public and private roles and result in unclear responsibilities, which can negatively 
affect the democratic legitimacy of planning processes (Bexell & Mörth, 2010).  
 
In order to assess the potential of combining lifecycle integration initiatives in practice, 
it is important to further discuss the stages in the lifecycle, the possible integration of 
these stages, and the potential role of market involvement in this. In line with the formal 
Dutch planning process (Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2011; 
Rijkswaterstaat, 2011a), we distinguish four stages that can also be recognized 
internationally (see Ward & Chapman, 1995): policymaking, plan development, 
construction, and operation and maintenance (see Figure 6.1). The nature of the stages 
in the planning lifecycle are diverse: they can be open or closed, they can have a 
project focus or a network focus, and they can be focused on preparation or on 
implementation. Figure 6.1 identifies four links between these stages including 
integration initiatives which involve business organizations and which are applied by 
Rijkswaterstaat  in Dutch road infrastructure planning (see Rijkswaterstaat, 2011a).  
 
Generally speaking, the planning lifecycle develops from a more open stage of 
political and societal discussions to a more closed plan development stage. Link A 
considers the link between development of project plans and policymaking. Between 
these stages, policy is worked out into technical designs, which involves moving from an 
open stage of external negotiations to a closed stage in which projects are defined 
and the focus is on internal relations. Several models for pre-competitive market 
involvement are present in this link, including market scans, market consultations, early 
design contests and unsolicited proposals (for a detailed discussion of these instruments, 
see Leendertse et al., 2012b; Lenferink et al., 2012b).  
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Figure 6.1: Lifecycle integration links investigated in practice 
 
After plan development, a political decision has to be made and the procurement of a 
solution can start. In procurement the project structure is adopted, which is subsequently 
used to construct the project. Link B visualizes the connection of the construction and plan 
development stages. Between these stages project plans are worked out into 
constructed projects using technical designs from procurement. Both plan development 
and construction focus on the internal coordination of technical and legal issues and aim 
to minimize external influences, as plans are transformed into projects. Two forms of 
lifecycle integration initiatives can be identified. The first initiative is early contractor 
involvement, in which public planning and procurement procedures are combined (see 
Lenferink et al., 2012a). The second initiative is the competitive dialogue procurement 
procedure, in which pre-bid public-private interaction can help address project 
complexity (see Lenferink & Hoezen, 2012).  
 
Once construction is completed, the closed and internal project focus is abandoned 
when the focus gradually shifts during operations and maintenance to managing 
external relationships in a part of the road network. Link C involves the connection of 
the operation and maintenance stage with the construction stage. In the Netherlands, 
integrated Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) contracts are applied to connect 
these stages by combining the design, maintenance and operations activities into a 
single contract (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2006).  
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Finally, in the operation and maintenance stage, political and societal discussions can 
inspire new policymaking. Link D involves this connection between the operations and 
maintenance stage and the policymaking stage. Issues in operating and maintaining a 
part of the network can provide reasons for linking back to policymaking, thereby 
closing the lifecycle. This involves a shift from an internal focus on a project’s 
relationships within a network to a more open focus on policymaking with new cycles of 
negotiations (see Figure 6.1). Connecting the operations and maintenance stage to the 
policymaking stage requires asset management from a network perspective (Mitchell, 
2006; Herder & Wijnia, 2012). Such asset management has a strategic character as it 
involves a long term political choices. 
 
6.2.2 A typology of project complexity 
Harkema (2004) regards the inseparability of individuals and organizations, as 
advocated by the pragmatists Mead (1972) and Giddens (1984), as the foundation of 
complexity science. The coexistence of the determinism of structural functionalism and 
the indeterminism of individual action is central to the relationship between complexity 
and planning theory as displayed in the governance debate (see Portugali, 1999; De 
Roo, 2010). In project management, this coexistence is visible in the emergence of 
adaptive project management (De Bruijn et al., 2003). This type of project 
management is geared towards creating flexibility in projects, as a way to deal with 
the increasing project complexity that is considered to lead to project failure more 
frequently (Bosch-Rekveldt, 2011; Williams, 2002).  
 
Table 6.1: Complexity typology with management strategy.  
 External complexity 
Low High 
Internal 
complexity 
High  Complicated 
(Systems management) 
Complexicated  
(Dynamic management) 
Low Simple 
(Internal/Content-focused 
approach) 
Context-Complex 
(Interactive management) 
Based on Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010. 
 
In relation to complexity in practice, various typologies can be made, such as those 
based on means and ends (Christensen, 1985), on differentiation and interdependency 
(Baccarini, 1996), on ordered and unordered domains (Kurz & Snowden, 2003), on the 
interaction intensity and stability of a system (Edelenbos et al., 2009), on agreement 
and certainty (Stacey, 2002), on spatial integration of the scope and the character of 
the problem (Rijkswaterstaat, 2011), and on detail and dynamic complexity (Senge, 
2006). This article builds upon the distinction between detail and dynamic complexity 
as made by Senge (2006), which is used in project management literature to construct 
a typology of project complexity (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010; see also Table 6.1). 
We apply this typology because it resembles the approach to traditional project 
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management: defining project boundaries in an attempt to separate internal from 
external project complexity. 
 
Internal complexity can be described as the interrelatedness between project 
components within the project scope, in which a high degree of interrelatedness 
corresponds with a high degree of internal complexity. In infrastructure planning this 
can be caused by a combination of technical, financial and legal factors that are 
included in the project scope. Projects with a high degree of internal complexity are 
also referred to as ‘complicated’; the appropriate management strategy to address 
internal complexity is systems management (see Kurtz & Snowden, 2003; Zuidema, 
2011), which allows the exchange of knowledge and experience of the interrelated 
factors. In Dutch practice, a project that can be considered as complicated is the A10 
Second Coentunnel, which involves the construction of a second highway tunnel under 
the North Sea Canal. External complexity can be defined as the interaction of a project 
with its context; i.e. the issues beyond the project scope (see Huys & Van Gils, 2010). 
 
Projects with only high external complexity are referred to as ‘context-complex’. In such 
settings, it is essential to manage the contextual interrelatedness of a project (see Kurz 
& Snowden, 2003) by achieving and increasing interaction in a strategy of interactive 
management (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010). Such a strategy would especially focus on 
intensifying public-public interaction between different government organizations 
capable of acting at different levels, mainly associated with political decision-making 
(see Kingdon, 2002). An example of a context-complex project in Dutch practice is the 
A4 Midden Delftland, which in itself is relatively simple in technical, legal and financial 
terms, but is performed in an externally complex, dynamic environment with continuous 
social and political debates. 
 
Based on the distinction between internal and external complexity, also ‘simple’ projects 
(low internal and low external complexity) can be distinguished for which an internal 
and content-focused approach suffices (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010). In infrastructure 
planning simple projects are smaller projects that are usually developed at the local 
level, where less actors and stakes are involved. At the national level, simple projects 
can be lane extensions and highway upgrades in rural areas, such as in the N31 Zurich-
Harlingen project (see Lenferink et al., 2012a). Intense interaction, be it public-public or 
public-private, is not required to successfully execute a simple project, as traditional 
directive approaches to project management suffice. Government and market parties 
can have strict client-contractor relationships where they traditionally perform their 
project management tasks.  
 
In settings that are both internally and externally complex, interrelatedness results in an 
indeterminist character of limited understanding and predictability and settings we will 
refer to as ‘complexicated’. An example from Dutch infrastructure planning practice is 
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the A2 Maastricht project, which combines the construction of a stacked inner-city tunnel 
with real estate development (see Lenferink et al., 2012a). A combination of interactive 
management and systems management within a dynamic management approach is 
considered an appropriate management strategy (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010). This 
could offer organizational adaption (Levy, 2000) by stimulating creativity and learning 
capacity (Senge, 2006) through involvement of a broad range of actors, e.g. through a 
combination of public-public cooperation and public-private cooperation (see 
Rijkswaterstaat, 2011a). 
 
Despite the structuring function which is provided by the complexity typology described 
above, in practice sharp and strict borders between internal and external complexities 
do not exist. Systems have open boundaries with higher level systems, which they are a 
part of. As a result, these nested systems influence each other and co-evolve (Gerrits et 
al., 2009) in a non-linear way (Portugali, 1999; Huys & Van Gils 2010). In essence, 
when connected to project management practice, project boundaries could be 
regarded as demarcation between internal and external complexity that, through time, 
may change and may cause the internalization of external complexities or the 
externalization of internal complexities. In addition, the nature of the planning process 
changes over time, as is its complexity (in line with Shapira & Laufer, 1993). As 
described in section 6.2.1, for instance, the planning lifecycle develops from a more 
open stage of political and societal discussions, with its related complexities, to a more 
closed plan development stage, where projects are being formulated. After 
construction, the scope may broaden again from a constructed road link towards 
management of a larger infrastructure network, which may come with its own 
uncertainties and complexities.  
 
Integrating initiatives throughout the planning lifecycle is the central topic in this paper. 
Because boundaries between complexities get blurred over time, and both internal and 
external complexities with their potential interrelationships have to be dealt with in 
present-day planning, the focus of this article is on complexicated projects and settings. 
In these settings, new approaches to project planning and management are needed 
most, as the combination of classic, directive project management approaches and high 
complexity increasingly leads to failure (see Bosch-Rekveldt, 2011; Williams, 2002). 
Lifecycle integration in such settings could potentially unlock experience and expertise 
from later stages to establish a more extensive repertoire of actions (Roose, 2002) that 
can serve as a response to complexity.  
 
6.2.3 Investigating combinations of links in the planning lifecycle 
Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to design a comprehensive approach to lifecycle 
integration from scratch, we investigated combinations of separate lifecycle integration 
initiatives (see Figure 6.1). Based on previous research into such integration initiatives, 
we formulated four propositions that helped to structure the focus group discussion 
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meetings and to obtain a broad range of experiences from practice. To fuel 
discussions, these propositions were quite bluntly formulated. The first three propositions 
consider a combination of lifecycle integration initiatives and the fourth proposition 
concerns the complete lifecycle (see Table 6.2). 
 
Proposition 1 considers link A and link B in Figure 6.1: the possibilities for combining 
increased market involvement in the early preparatory stages (pre-competitive 
involvement) with procurement, to connect the policymaking, plan development and 
construction stages. Pre-competitive models all aim to facilitate public-private 
interaction in project plan development and policymaking (Mosey, 2009; Lenferink et 
al., 2012b). These models appeal to the growing awareness that complexity can be 
addressed through public-private interaction in these early stages (Committee 
Elverding, 2008), if proper rewards and incentives are provided (Leendertse et al., 
2012b). The market can bring in knowledge and expertise from later project 
implementation stages to help address complexity and move from the open 
policymaking stage towards a project with a more closed character. As a consequence 
of the precompetitive market involvement, potentially there is less need to facilitate 
extensive discussions between government and market parties in subsequent 
procurement: the complexity has been discussed and addressed in an earlier stage. 
Therefore, in Proposition 1 we suggest a disconnection between these stages, by stating 
that complexity can and should be addressed and controlled for in an open plan 
development stage without explicit private market involvement, before performing a 
traditional closed procurement and construction stage.  
 
Table 6.2: Propositions and combination of links. 
Combination of links 
(see Figure 6.1) 
Proposition 
Links A & B 
 
After pre-competitive market involvement in the plan and policyma-
king stages, the project complexity has been addressed and projects 
can be procured traditionally (= without extensive public-private 
interaction).  
Links B & C 
 
Integrated lifecycle contracts (such as Design-Build-Finance-Maintain 
contracts) are currently too rigid to allow for the complexity of 
projects procured through a competitive dialogue (= with extensive 
public-private interaction). 
Links C & D 
 
The long period and detailed character of DBFM contracts limit the 
opportunities for asset management in a dynamic environment and 
limit plan-making for new or additional infrastructure.  
Links A, B, C & D  
(complete lifecycle) 
Lifecycle integration through market involvement increases the 
complexity of already complex infrastructure planning processes.  
 
Proposition 2 encompasses link B and link C: the subsequent stages of plan 
development, construction, and operation and maintenance. In Dutch infrastructure 
planning practice, the competitive dialogue is the standard procedure for procuring 
complex projects. The competitive dialogue is especially aimed at facilitating public-
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private interaction to openly discuss complex projects (Lenferink et al., 2011; Hoezen, 
2012).The competitive dialogue is the standard procurement procedure for tendering 
DBFM contracts (Nagelkerke et al., 2009). However, the open, interactive character of 
the competitive dialogue seems to be difficult to combine with contracts. DBFM contracts 
stipulate, in detail, design, construction and maintenance activities over a long period 
up to 25 years. Previous research has revealed that the DBFM contracts tendered 
through a competitive dialogue are detailed and require considerable amounts of 
information upfront (Lenferink et al., 2013). This seems to make it difficult to make a 
transition from an open stage of innovative public-private interaction in the competitive 
dialogue to almost closed rigid contracts, as formulated in proposition 2 (see Table 
6.2). 
 
Proposition 3 concerns the combination of links C and D: construction, operations and 
maintenance, and policymaking. Public-private interaction on the connection between 
the construction, operations and maintenance and policymaking stages can potentially 
provide added value. The long fixed DBFM contracts give opportunities for realizing 
efficiencies by adjusting design, construction and maintenance activities at the start of 
the contract. However, at the same time their rigidity may limit possibilities to cope with 
changes such as technological innovations in infrastructure maintenance and operations. 
Moreover, whereas current DBFM contracts often focus on individual road infrastructure 
sections, for optimal operations assets may need to be managed at network level. 
However, research by Lenferink et al. (2013) and Leendertse et al. (2012a) shows that 
by locking up small parts of the road network in closed, internally oriented DBFM 
contracts, opportunities for asset management, and, in the end new policy and plan 
making may be constrained. Proposition 3 addresses this issue and stimulates a 
discussion on how learning in the operational stages could provide input for a new 
policy cycle.  
 
Proposition 4 attempts to bring together the three previous proposition and stimulate a 
discussion on the possibilities of connecting all stages and combining all initiatives. The 
three previous propositions have been posed in order to be able to discuss the 
preconditions, the limitations, the advantages and the disadvantages of an overarching 
approach to lifecycle integration. An implicit focus of the proposition is how to manage 
project complexity in relation to lifecycle integration. In this proposition we purposely 
adopt a critical standpoint towards lifecycle integration, which stimulates discussion of 
its overall added value. 
 
6.3 Research design 
As described in the previous sections, lifecycle integration has only been applied on an 
ad hoc basis in infrastructure planning. As a consequence, there is limited insight into 
what the practical perspectives on an overarching approach to lifecycle integration 
are. The interactive approach of focus group discussions allows us to provide these 
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practical perspectives, or as Fern (2001) describes it, to generate knowledge for 
applied research. Focus group discussions combine interaction, obtained through 
participant observation, with in-depth knowledge of experiences, obtained through in-
depth interviewing (Morgan & Spanish, 1984). The group interaction between the 
public and private experts who took part in the discussions is a necessary part of the 
explorative research conducted into the potential added value of an overarching 
approach to lifecycle integration, which could not be gained by simply combining 
findings from case studies. The experts need group interaction to formulate their 
opinions on lifecycle integration, which is a subject at the border of their expertise and 
at the border of their knowledge. The discussions aimed at providing an overview of 
opinions and issues concerning lifecycle integration, and as such they were not designed 
to achieve information saturation. 
 
We applied two focus group discussions with six participants each. The composition of 
the focus groups is presented in Appendix C. The groups were chosen to be relatively 
small, because larger groups would have caused the discussions to be too cluttered. The 
small size was compensated for by what Fern (1983) describes as the articulateness 
and fluency of the experts that participated in the focus group. In addition, there are 
only a limited number of experts in Dutch practice able to oversee the full planning 
lifecycle and its integration initiatives. The composed focus groups reflected the integral 
perspective of the subject. The participants were carefully chosen from public and 
private bodies. Public participants included policymaking officials, legal experts and 
contract managers. The private participants were part of tender organizations or were 
involved in project construction, project management and the line management of the 
private companies. The participants carefully reflected a range of disciplines, technical, 
legal, financial and organizational, and were involved in different stages of the project 
lifecycle (see Appendix C). 
 
6.4 Experiences with lifecycle integration  
In this section we will present the results of the focus group discussions using quotes from 
the transcripts that reflect the opinions given in the group discussions. We describe the 
public and private experiences of lifecycle integration in relation to project complexity. 
This is done for each combination of link in the planning lifecycle and its respective 
proposition (see Table 6.2), in paragraphs 6.4.1 to 6.4.4.  
 
6.4.1 Links A & B  
Proposition 1: After pre-competitive market involvement in the plan and 
policymaking stages, the project complexity has been addressed and projects 
can be procured traditionally (= without extensive public-private interaction). 
 
The public parties acknowledged that they cannot define and work out complex 
projects fully by themselves. In their opinion, public-private interaction in policymaking, 
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plan development and procurement can help control time, costs and quality and deal 
with internal complexity. A public participant stressed the role of knowledge in the 
decision to apply public-private interaction in procurement: ‘It depends on the type of 
knowledge necessary to make the technical [internal] complexity controllable. If this is 
market knowledge, then do not make things difficult by trying to do it yourself, but ask the 
market’ (public participant). Public participants see, however, that pre-competitive 
interaction in settings with high external complexity has its limitations, as it is not a 
panacea to all complexity issues in policymaking and plan development: ‘pre-
competitive market involvement is regarded as the answer to all of the government’s 
questions. However, in a [external] complex setting, this is impossible’ (public participant). 
Public participants nevertheless stress the importance of early stage interaction for 
complexicated projects, because in procurement, ‘you will merely obtain tactical 
knowledge because of its competitive nature’ (public participant). Therefore, possible 
solutions have to be found before competition becomes dominant in the procurement 
stage: ‘Do not look for the solution in the competition, but arrange something pre-
competitively’ (public participant). Public participants feel that, if disintegrated from 
procurement, such pre-competitive market involvement can provide for innovative ideas 
and concepts to help deal with complex societal and political issues and enable for 
better decision-making.  
 
The private participants stressed the fact that the noncommittal character of pre-
competitive market involvement will not deliver hard results capable of being used to 
reduce internal complexity: ‘We just mention the first things that cross our mind, because 
we are not responsible for our input’ (private participant). Therefore, they suggest to 
include specific financial and legal issues by integrating precompetitive involvement 
and procurement to commit private parties to their input. This prevents government from 
specifying the project in isolation and ‘take all the risks by itself’ (private participant) 
through traditional procurement. Private parties felt that competition in procurement can 
‘result in sharpness, in both price and quality’ (private participant). Integrating the plan 
development stages and procurement can provide early insights into the ideas and 
proposals of private parties: ‘Exactly this insight [in proposed private solutions] is 
extremely useful, even in projects with a less complex character’ (private participant). 
Although the on-going public-private interaction created through lifecycle integration 
will prolong procurement procedures and increase transaction costs, ‘the market is 
willing to make transaction costs if they can earn back their investment’ by showcasing 
their creativity in addressing complexity. However, in cases of settings with high 
degrees of external complexity, the private parties stress that they do not want to 
become involved too early as they do not want to bear the political risks. Without 
political certainty and public-public agreement on a project, it is unclear whether 
precompetitive investments by the private parties will pay off. Public parties need to 
make choices, which the market cannot make for them. The private parties indicate that 
it is impossible to extract complexity from projects through pre-competitive market 
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involvement: ‘The world is ever-changing. After analysing the problem and understanding 
each other, you are never certain that your design is the right solution […]. The feedback 
is essential’ (private participant). Private parties are therefore cautious when it comes to 
early public-private interaction in policy-making and plan development because of 
transaction costs involved, but regard it as essential once public outlines have been set 
and procurement is performed in order to deal with complexity. 
 
In conclusion to Proposition 1, the public and private participants agreed that 
complexity can be addressed and better controlled for by lifecycle integration. 
However, they both feel that internal complexity needs to be tackled through 
interaction in procurement and not at an earlier stage, through pre-competitive market 
involvement, as illustrated by this quote: ‘addressing the complexity in procurement is a 
more logical choice than beforehand in the plan development stages’ (public participant). 
Participants felt that this will prevent unnecessary transaction costs, while offering the 
public and private parties opportunities to interact on concrete project issues in 
procurement that do not exist in traditional procurement. The public participants 
considered interaction to be always necessary for dealing with high external 
complexity. However, private parties suggested to keep a close watch on the 
transaction costs and the added value of the integration, and argued for focusing on 
interaction in procurement (i.e. through the competitive dialogue procurement 
procedure) instead in the precompetitive stages, increasing the chance that their private 
investments will pay off. Therefore, the proposition is not confirmed for settings with a 
high degree of external complexity: public-private interaction is considered necessary, 
especially in the subsequent stage of procurement since complexity cannot be 
effectively tackled beforehand, which excludes performing traditional procurement 
procedures.  
 
6.4.2 Links B & C  
Proposition 2: Integrated lifecycle contracts (such as Design-Build-Finance-
Maintain contracts) are currently too rigid to account for the complexity of 
projects procured through competitive dialogue (= with extensive public-
private interaction). 
 
Public participants acknowledge the rigidity of integrated DBFM contracts mentioned in 
the proposition: ‘After procurement, a DBFM contract is as flexible as a lead door’ (public 
participant). However, they regard integrating the design, construction, and 
maintenance stages in a DBFM contract as logical for settings with high internal 
complexity, because stages can be adjusted to each other resulting in lifecycle 
optimizations. Including a financial component can be an extra check on the adjustment 
of stages in the activities of contractors. The competitive dialogue procedure is used to 
fit to the specified and robust DBFM contracts: it is carried out by the public parties with 
a strong focus on controlling and specifying the outcome, as illustrated by this quote: ‘If 
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you take the Rijkswaterstaat line, nothing is allowed […]. In that case, everything is 
predefined in guidelines’ (public participant). The public participants acknowledge that 
the detailed and rigid interpretation of DBFM contracts and competitive dialogue limits 
the flexibility to deal with settings with high external complexity: ‘you want the solution 
to be robust, because in the implementation of the DBFM contract you do not want to 
carry out changes to the contract’ (public participant). DBFM contracts and competitive 
dialogue are seen as a logical combination of integration initiatives, and especially the 
competitive dialogue procedure is regarded as fitting for dealing with external 
complexity. However, the public participants find it difficult to apply the procedure: 
‘You find that it is difficult to formulate a request for a [dynamic] complex project which is 
fully and immediately understood by the market parties’ (public participant). In the 
experience of public participants, the combination of these integration initiatives in 
practice does not provide sufficient opportunities for interaction and flexibility because 
of the cautious legal interpretation. Therefore, public participants stated that, as 
currently applied, the integration initiatives are not well suited to deal with setting with 
a high degree of external complexity. 
 
The private party participants are certain that DBFM projects can accommodate 
internal complexity, if they are combined with a competitive dialogue procurement 
procedure, which enables to ‘explore the boundaries of a project […] and research the 
rigidity of the contract’ (private participant). The private parties were aware of the 
added value of competitive dialogues for complexicated settings, as indicated by a 
private participant: ‘It is one of the few opportunities within the European guidelines in 
which you have dialogue with each other. That is why it is a good procedure, regardless of 
the type of contract’. However, they experience differences in the way DBFMs and 
competitive dialogues are handled by clients: ‘Some are very rigid and others, which 
could even be part of the same organization but from a different department, are very 
flexible’ (private participant). In addition to the sometimes rigid public attitude, the 
financial institutions involved can also limit public-private interaction in DBFM and 
competitive dialogue. The financial institutions aim to limit risks and uncertainties by 
managing technical, legal and financial factors in setting up and controlling the 
execution of an integrated DBFM contract, which fits the systems management 
approach to dealing with internal complexity. In the view of the private contractors, 
financial institutions lack the entrepreneurial spirit to take risks and thereby negatively 
influence the opportunities for flexibility offered in competitive dialogues to deal with 
external complexity, as illustrated by this quote: ‘We dare to take risks and we see 
chances. Banks need to see everything as well-founded and see risks everywhere. If we 
take risks, banks increase their charges’ (private participant). The private participants 
suggest to increase the adaptiveness by including alliance elements in the DBFM 
contracts, which will enable to share risks and responsibilities and jointly search for 
ways of dealing with complexity. 
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In conclusion, experience is gained with the combination investigated in the second 
proposition, because the competitive dialogue procedure is considered standard for 
procuring internally complex Dutch DBFM projects: ‘If you opt for a DBFM contract […] 
you will always have to perform a competitive dialogue procurement procedure. That is the 
line within the Dutch road infrastructure agency’. Public and private participants feel that 
the combination of DBFM and competitive dialogue integration initiatives contains 
interaction elements that are crucial for dealing with the combination of high internal 
and high external complexity. However, they experience that, as currently applied, 
combining competitive dialogues and DBFMs results in legally cautious conservative 
procedures and over-detailed contracts, which cannot handle high degrees of external 
complexity. The proposition is confirmed by the participants: the inherent focus on legal 
and financial certainties is considered to be particularly obstructive to utilizing 
opportunities to increase adaptiveness and address external complexity.  
 
6.4.3 Links C & D  
Proposition 3: The long period and detailed character of DBFM contracts limit 
the opportunities for asset management in a dynamic environment and limit 
plan-making for new or additional infrastructure. 
 
The public participants felt that a DBFM contract is suitable for optimizing maintenance 
in the asset management of internally complex infrastructure projects. ‘In a contract with 
a longer contract period, market parties will perform effective asset management because 
of the financial incentives in the contract’ (public participant). Public participants felt that 
including a financial element in DBFM contracts can also increase the rigidity of asset 
management too much. The long period of DBFM contracts probably requires contracts 
to be changed during their term, which can have great financial consequences.22 Public 
participants suggest to decrease the length of the contract to increase flexibility, 
‘because when you follow up a contract with a new one, you have the opportunity to make 
changes’ (public participant). However, this could decrease the strength of the incentive 
to adjust design, construction and maintenance activities to each other. A public 
participant mentioned the example of setting the wrong incentives in a DBFM contract, 
which is: ‘not the fault of the contractor or the fault of the DBFM contract as such. That is 
something government is responsible for’. Public participants note, however, that the 
increased rigidity by the longer term of the contract is not always experienced as 
negative: ‘Perhaps that is something you want as a network manager […], it could help 
politicians stick to political agreements and provide insight into the financial consequences 
of earlier political choices’. The public participants regard stimulating process flexibility 
by including partnering arrangements in DBFM contracts as a second option to deal 
with externally complex settings, which fits the strategy of interactive management. 
                                              
 
22 ‘Financial institutions can threaten to pull the plug on a project. Rijkswaterstaat would never do this because of the 
political background it operates in’ (public participant). 
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Such arrangements could provide more flexibility to manage the performance of the 
DBFM contracts at the interfaces in the infrastructure network. 
 
The participating private experts see problems and opportunities in linking the stages 
of maintenance and operation. Private participants found that all involved parties focus 
on limiting uncertainties in the construction and maintenance stages, as expressed by a 
private participant: ‘The public parties still have the impression that if they specify 
requirements at the nuts and bolts level, it will provide certainty, while this is the perfect 
recipe for 20 years of misery […]. The contractor involves a private technical advisor, who 
thinks the same way: certainties come first’. Although the long maintenance component 
can give balance to DBFMs,23 private participants expressed the difficulties for public 
parties in adjusting local DBFM projects to the asset management strategy of the 
national road infrastructure network. Especially defining maintenance and operation 
criteria in procurement is difficult as it leads to problems in the management of the 
interfaces between DBFM contracts at a higher road network level.24 The private 
participants indicated that this also affects their relation with the financial institutions 
involved: ‘they want to know everything upfront and are a much harder client to satisfy 
than the public parties are’ (private participant). The private participants felt that these 
attitudes do not suit settings with high degrees of external complexity and recognize 
two options for dealing with this. The first involves dealing with each other differently 
through a different reward system, because currently ‘in DBFM contracts, it is always 
first penalties and then rewards’ (private participant). Private participants felt that 
‘cooperation is what you should reward’ (private participant). The second is to formulate 
requirements at two levels: traditional project requirements and requirements at a 
higher network level.25 They acknowledged that formulating such requirements in 
externally complex settings in a resilient fashion is difficult. The requirements must 
function on the long-term and also enable to link forward to possible new planning 
cycles. The participants indicate that a step in this direction could be the introduction of 
DBFMO contracts, which internalize operation activities and enable its adjustment with 
other stages in the planning lifecycle. 
 
In conclusion to Proposition 3, participants felt that the internal complexity of a project 
can be accommodated in DBFM contracts and that, through control of financial actors, 
quality in operations and maintenance improves. However, all participants agree the 
high costs of changing contracts can result in decreased political freedom because 
DBFM contracts lock up larger parts of the network for longer periods. In addition, the 
interfaces between DBFM contracts within the road network can cause difficulties in 
                                              
 
23‘I think that the long periods of maintenance and operation included makes the contract balanced’ (private 
participant). 
24'Rijkswaterstaat must regard asset management from a more functional perspective’ (private participant). 
25 As also proposed in the concept of dynamic contracting, see Volker et al. (2011). 
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external complex settings. Because an asset management vision at the road network 
level is currently missing,26 it is difficult to deal with interfaces between operation and 
maintenance stages and to connect to the dynamic stage of policymaking. Suggested 
solutions also include increasing flexibility through process agreements that reward 
cooperation. This way, as a public participant notes, interaction in the competitive 
dialogue ‘can be continued into the construction and maintenance stages, which would 
make the approach similar to alliances’. 
 
6.4.4 Links A, B, C & D  
Proposition 4: Lifecycle integration through market involvement increases the 
complexity of already complex infrastructure planning processes. 
 
The public participants noticed tendencies within the public organization to increase 
control over internal complexity in projects, which corresponds to a systems 
management approach that aims ‘to go from external complex projects to simple 
projects as quickly as possible’ (public participant). Public parties felt that lifecycle 
integration through pre-competitive market involvement can help streamline 
procurement and limit its transaction costs by stimulating the government to ‘think about 
which elements you want to interact about in procurement and on which elements you want 
competition’ (public participant). However, in order to better deal with high degrees of 
external complexity, public participants felt that a private partner should be contracted 
earlier, in order to jointly develop project plans27, possibly in an alliance or partnering 
model, and saw possibilities for including such alliance elements in less rigid 
combinations of competitive dialogues and DBFM contracts. Public parties felt that 
lifecycle integration in later construction and operational stages can provide the 
necessary control to address internal complexity. However, alliances are not common 
practice so far in the Netherlands, which according to the public participants is caused 
by a political fear of commitment: ‘Fear of choosing one partner, fear of a lack of 
competition’ (public participant). Politicians also do not prove to be reliable partners on 
the basis of whom a private partner can be selected early, as illustrated by an 
understatement of a public participant: ‘Plan development is enormously politically 
driven, where a sudden mood change can determine the outcome’. 
 
Private participants found the lifecycle integration initiatives of competitive dialogues 
and DBFM contracts quite rigidly applied, which makes dealing with complexicated 
settings difficult. They suggest extending integration through increased systems 
management by increasing the spatial scope of contracts, which decreases the number 
                                              
 
26 Such a road network management vision is currently in preparation as part of the implementation of the 
Rijkswaterstaat business plan: ‘Ondernemingsplan 2015’ (Rijkswaterstaat, 2011b). 
27‘We will work together in a partnering or alliance model with the private party who turned out to be the best’ 
(public participant). 
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of contracts and interfaces that can cause problems in asset management: ‘If you 
increase the area and part of the network included in a DBFM […] you have fewer 
problems than with small DBFMs’ (private participant). This would integrate external 
factors in the system and therefore become a matter of internal complexity In line with 
this, private participants suggested specifying availability in contracts at higher, 
network levels. Such network level DBFM contracts also increase the systems 
management boundaries to include operation, into a DBFMO contract.. Besides systems 
management solutions, private participants also recognised the added value of 
alliances and, as a private participant noted, ‘alliance systems are reward systems’. 
Another private participant relates to experiences with alliances in the rail 
infrastructure sector in which: ‘Everyone was optimizing their performance, and we all 
became rich: government, business and citizens. It was a DBFM with a different payment 
system’. However, private participants saw two main limitations to forging alliances. The 
first is that ‘in politics the market is still approached by dictating what needs to happen’ 
(private participant). Secondly, financial institutions could obstruct alliances through 
their control-oriented and certainty-driven attitudes. 
 
In conclusion to Proposition 4, participants felt that combining lifecycle integration 
initiatives does not necessarily lead to additional complexity, but can provide added 
value in dealing with internal complexity. However current combinations of lifecycle 
integration initiatives, and especially the way these are applied in Dutch practice, seem 
to be not suitable for complexicated settings with high external complexity. Competitive 
dialogues and DBFM contracts, for example, can effectively be combined to align 
public-private interaction and deal with internal complexity. In order to deal with 
external complexity, it is suggested to apply competitive dialogues less rigidly and 
introduce more flexibility by including alliance elements in the detailed and systems 
control-oriented DBFM contracts. This would ensure, as a public participant noted, that 
‘we would think about plans, construction, maintenance and operation and the market 
would do so as well […]. Problems that occur along the way would be tackled at once and 
in an integrated way’. However, participants agreed that control-oriented attitudes can 
make it difficult to achieve this in complexicated settings. 
 
6.5 Discussion: towards more integrated approaches for managing project 
complexity? 
In this article we aimed to first gather public and private experiences with separate 
lifecycle integration initiatives in Dutch road infrastructure planning practice. Secondly 
we aimed to explore the potential of integrating these initiatives through the planning 
lifecycle, because at the moment, there is only limited experience with combining 
lifecycle integration initiatives. These limited experiences only pertain to combining a 
maximum of two initiatives at a time. We applied focus group discussions to gain 
deeper insight in the role of internal and external complexity, and the interrelations 
between these, by investigating settings that are highly complex: so called 
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‘complexicated’ projects. New approaches to project planning and management are 
needed in such settings, because in present-day planning the boundaries between 
complexities blur over time and both internal and external complexities have to be 
dealt with more often in the current dynamic society.  
 
Many factors contribute to project complexity and these factors can diverge or 
contradict the interests of parties involved (Leijten et al., 2010), which can make it 
difficult to classify and bracket projects under a relatively simple typology. The 
distinction between internal and external complexity, simplifies a project management 
practice which is much more diverse. For example, combining integration initiatives can 
be difficult due to the diverse characters of the lifecycle stages (e.g. legal, financial or 
technical) throughout which the focus differs (i.e. a predominantly internal project level 
focus or a more external network level focus). Also certain attitudes can dominate over 
others in certain stages as numerous small differences between the market involvement 
instruments are to be recognized (see Rijkswaterstaat, 2011a). For example, the 
competitive dialogue is dominated by competition (Hoezen, 2012; Lenferink & Hoezen, 
2011), which can cause strategic behaviour and conservative attitudes in procurement 
(Mu et al., 2010). Moreover, projects can evolve in character and focus over time, 
thereby changing in typology. For example, simple projects can evolve into context-
complex and even complexicated ones, because of increased political pressure. 
However projects can also evolve from complexicated through complicated to simple, 
by providing for clear project outlines and planning processes in decision-making.  
 
The experiences with lifecycle integration illustrate that the initiatives can assist in 
addressing complexity by unlocking expertise and innovative ideas from the market 
parties about the project and the process to be followed, which can subsequently 
improve project management and decision-making  Participants felt that rigidly 
applying the current lifecycle integration initiatives, such as the competitive dialogue 
and the DBFM contracts, can provide control to address internal complexity. In the focus 
group discussions, participants specifically stressed the role of involving financiers to 
increase control and to reduce risks, and suggested to internalize the operations in 
integrated DBFMO contracts to increase control over complex settings. Combining 
contemporary lifecycle integration initiatives in the Dutch planning process can, 
according to the participants in the focus group discussions, result in added value for 
dealing with internal complexity. However, from the perspective of the participants, it 
can be concluded that current lifecycle integration initiatives and their possible 
combinations cannot easily deal with settings of high external complexity. The detailed 
nature of the DBFM contract and the rigid application of the competitive dialogue, for 
example, makes the current approach more directly aimed at control, which is 
increased by the risk-limiting behaviour of involved financial institutions. As a result, the 
opportunities for stimulating flexibility and interaction between involved public and 
private parties, which are provided by the precompetitive involvement instruments and 
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the competitive dialogue, are not seized. It appears to be necessary to find a more 
open approach to market involvement in lifecycle integration, which combines control 
with interaction in order to address external complexity through more continuous public-
private interaction. For example, participants share the urge to combine precompetitive 
market involvement to generate flexible and adaptive solutions with more open 
interaction in the competitive dialogue procedures. However, market parties are not 
willing and able to bear the high political risks in early stages, and also the transaction 
costs involved in integrating the policymaking and plan development stages, currently 
restrict a combination of such integration initiatives in practice.  
 
An important point that emerges from this study is to investigate whether and how the 
approach of decomposition of the planning process into stages, which is common in 
current project management and the starting point of this article, can be supplemented 
by more lifecycle-driven instruments. Two specific research directions were provided by 
the focus group participants. First alliances could provide continuous public-private 
interaction to address external complexity throughout the planning life cycle, because, 
as stated by Forrester (2009, p. 327), “while we often have (relatively) complete 
technical knowledge of the engineering processes we lack understanding of the social 
processes involved”. Such understanding is especially relevant because the external 
project context becomes more important in an increasingly complex network society 
(Castells, 2002) in which the boundaries between public and private are becoming 
blurred (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). The participants proposed to stimulate the 
inclusion of alliance elements in the current rigid DBFM contracts. Although alliances 
have been around for years in other parts of the world (see Love et al., 2010; Regan 
et al., 2011), application in the Netherlands has been scarce to date. Participants 
indicated that the strong financial focus on limiting uncertainties, the public 
organizations’ fear of committing to a single private party and a political tendency to 
prescribe products, limit the application of alliances in Dutch planning practice. 
 
A second research direction, provided by the focus group participants, is to further 
investigate the possible added value of setting-up cross-functional teams (see Denison 
et al., 1996). In such teams, public-private interaction can be performed from an 
integrated lifecycle perspective by including all relevant functions and public and 
private actors, without limiting competition, and involve them throughout the planning 
process. Potentially, cross functional teams could combine Lindblom’s concepts of 
incremental change (1959) and mutual partisan adjustment (1965) with learning loops 
(Forrester, 2009) to fit dynamic, interactive processes (Klijn, 2008; Verhees, 2013). 
They could especially help to improve the connection of infrastructure projects (and 
their operational contracts) with the more strategic asset management in the road 
network, and thereby link the lifecycle back to the initial policymaking stage.  
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By exploring these two research directions of alliances and cross-functional teams 
further, the divide between traditional decomposed and directive project management 
and the dynamic challenges offered by complexity can be bridged by instruments that 
adopt a more integrated lifecycle perspective. These instruments can stimulate a 
continuous public-private interaction across the lifecycle that can increase the flexibility 
and adaptiveness, while simultaneously control can still be provided. This could help in 
coming to an approach in which lifecycle integration can help to manage both internal 
and external project complexity. 
 
References 
Argyris, C., & Schön, D.A. (1978). Organizational learning: a theory of action perspective. 
Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 
Arthur, W.B. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical 
events, The Economic Journal, 99(394), 116–131. 
Arts, J. (2007). Nieuwe Wegen? Planningsbenaderingen voor Duurzame Infrastructuur, Inaugural 
Speech Environmental and Infrastructure Planning Chair. Groningen/Delft: University of 
Groningen/Rijkswaterstaat. 
Baccarini, D. (1996). The concept of project complexity – a review. International Journal of 
Project Management, 14(4), 201-204. 
Bosch-Rekveldt, M. (2011). Managing project complexity. Delft: Delft Centre for Project 
Management. 
Bult-Spiering, M., & Dewulf, G. (2006). Strategic Issues in Public-Private Partnerships: An 
International Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Castells, M. (2000). The rise of the network society; The information age: economy, society and 
culture. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Checkland, P. (1981). Systems thinking, systems practice. Chichester: Wiley. 
Christensen, K.S. (1985). Coping with uncertainty in planning. Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 51(1), 63-73. 
Committee Elverding. (2008). Sneller En Beter. The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Transport. 
Cooper, R.G. (1972). Stage-Gate Systems: A New Tool for Managing New Products. Business 
Horizons, 33(3), 44-54. 
De Bruijn, J. A., Ten Heuvelhof, E. F., & In 't Veld, R. J. (2003). Why Project Management Fails in 
Complex Decision Making Processes. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
De Bruijn, J.A., Teisman, G.R., Edelenbos, J., & Veeneman, W. (2004). Meervoudig 
ruimtegebruik en het management van meerstemmige processen. Utrecht: Lemma. 
De Roo, G. (2010). Being or Becoming? That is the Question! Confronting Complexity with 
Contemporary Planning Theory. In: G. De Roo, & E. A. Silva (Eds.) A planner’s encounter with 
complexity (pp. 19-40). Famham: Ashgate Publishing,. 
Denison, D.R., Hart, S.L. & Kahn, J.A. (1996).From Chimneys to Cross-Functional Teams: 
Developing and Validating a Diagnostic Model. Academy of Management Journal, 39(4), 
1005-1023. 
Dunsire, A. (1978). Implementation in a Bureaucracy. Oxford: Oxford Publishing. 
174  Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle 
 
Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (2011). Spelregels van het 
Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport. The Hague: Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment. 
Edelenbos, J., Klijn, E-H., & Kort, M. (2009). Managing complex process systems. In G.R. 
Teisman,  A. Van Buuren, & L. Gerrits, (Eds.) Managing complex governance systems (pp. 
172-192). New York: Routledge ,. 
Fern, E.F. (1983). Focus groups: a review of some contradictory evidence, implications, and 
suggestions for future research. In: R.P. Bagozzi, & A.M. Tybout (Eds.), Advances in Consumer 
Research Volume 10 (pp. 121-126). Ann Arbor: Association for Consumer Research,  
Fern, E.F. (2001). Advanced focus group research. Thousand Oaks: SAGE publications. 
Forrester, J. (2009). Improved partnership working for local authority transport planning. 
EJTIR, 9(3), 314-330. 
Gerrits, L., Marks, P. & Van Buuren, A. (2009). Coevolution: a constant in non linearity. In: G.R. 
Teisman, A. van Buuren, & L. Gerrits (Eds.) Managing complex governance systems: dynamics, 
self-organization and coevolution in public investments (pp. 134-153). New York: Routledge. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration. Cambridge: 
Polity press. 
Goldsmith, S., & Eggers, W.D. (2004). Governing by Network: The New Shape of the Public 
Sector. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Hall, P.A.,& Taylor, R.C.R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. Political 
Studies, 44(4), 936-957.  
Harkema, S.J.M. (2004). Complexity and emergent learning in innovation projects – An 
application of complex adaptive systems theory. Veenendaal: Universal Press. 
Herder, P.M. & Wijnia, Y. (2012). A Systems View on Infrastructure Asset Management. In: T. 
van der Lei, P.M. Herder, & Y. Wijnia (Eds.) Asset Management (pp. 31-46). Dordrecht: 
Springer.  
Hertogh, M., & Westerveld, E. (2010). Playing with complexity – Management and organisation 
of large infrastructure projects. Rotterdam: Erasmus University. 
Hoezen, M.E.L. (2012). Competitive Dialogue procedure: negotiations and commitment in inter-
organisational construction projects. Enschede: University of Twente. 
Hoezen, M.E.L., Voordijk, J.T. & Dewulf, G.P.M.R. (2012). Formal and informal contracting 
processes in the competitive dialogue procedure: a multiple case-study. Engineering project 
organization journal, 2(3), 145-15 
Huys, M., & Van Gils, M. (2010). Spatial Planning Processes: Applying a Dynamic Complex 
Systems Perspective. In: G. De Roo, & E.A. Silva (Eds.) A Planner’s Encounter with Complexity 
(pp. 139-153), Farnham: Ashgate Publishing. 
Innes, J.E., & Booher, D.E. (1999). Consensus building and complex adaptive systems: A 
framework for evaluating collaborative planning. Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 65(4), 412-423. 
Kickert, W.J.M. (1997). Public governance in the Netherlands: An alternative to Anglo-
American ‘managerialism. Public Administration, 75(4), 731–752. 
Kingdon, J.W. (2002). Agendas, alternatives and public policies. New York: Longman. 
Klijn, E.-H. (2008). Complexity Theory and Public Administration: What’s New? Public 
Management Review, 10(3), 299-317. 
 Chapter 6 – Lifecycle driven planning of infrastructure  175 
 
 
Kurz, C.F., & Snowden, D.J. (2003). The new dynamics of strategy, sense making in a complex, 
complicated world. IBM Systems Journal, 42(3), 462-483. 
Lane, J.-E. (2000). New Public Management. Routledge, New York. 
Lawrence, P.R., & Lorsch, J.W. (1969). Organisation and Environment: Managing differentiation 
and integration. Boston: Harvard University. 
Leendertse, W., Arts, J., & de Ridder, H. (2012a). How can procurement contribute to network 
performance? Streamlining network, project and procurement objectives. Procedia – Social 
and Behavioral Sciences, 48 (2012), 2950-2966. 
Leendertse, W., Lenferink S. & Arts, J. (2012b). Public-private collaboration: How private 
involvement can contribute to network performance. Procedia – Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, 48(2012), 2917-2929. 
Leijten, M., Koppenjan, J., Ten Heuvelhof, E., Veeneman, W., & Van der Voort, H. (2010). 
Dealing with Competing Project Management Values under Uncertainty: the Case of 
RandstadRail. EJTIR, 10(1), 63-76. 
Lenferink, S., & Hoezen, M.E.L. (2011). The interplay between public procuring authority and 
private competitors: experiences with the competitive dialogue. In H. Wamelink, R. 
Geraedts, & L. Volker, (Eds.), MISBE 2011 – Proceedings of the international Conference on 
Management and Innovation for a Sustainable Built Environment, 19-23 June 2011, 
Amsterdam.  
Lenferink, S., Arts J., & Tillema, T. (2011). Ongoing Public-Private Interaction in Infrastructure 
Planning: An Evaluation of Dutch Competitive Dialogue Projects. In: K.V. Thai (Ed.), Towards 
new horizons in public procurement (pp. 236-272). Boca Raton: PrAcademics Press. 
Lenferink, S., Arts, J., Tillema, T., Van Valkenburg, M., & Nijsten, R. (2012a). Early contractor 
involvement in Dutch infrastructure development: initial experiences with parallel procedures 
for planning and procurement. Journal of Public Procurement, 12(1), 1-42. 
Lenferink, S., Leendertse, W., Arts, J. & Tillema, T. (2012b). Public-private plan development: 
Can early private involvement strengthen infrastructure planning? European Planning Studies.  
DOI:10.1080/09654313.2012.741569 
Lenferink, S., Tillema, T., & Arts, J. (2008). The potential of a life-cycle approach for improving 
road infrastructure planning in the Netherlands. In: Colloquium Vervoersplanologisch 
Speurwerk, Vroeger was de toekomst beter, Delft. 
Lenferink, S., Tillema, T., & Arts, J. (2013). Towards sustainable infrastructure development 
through integrated contracts: Dutch experiences in DBFM projects. International Journal of 
Project Management, 31(4), 615-627. 
Levy, D.L. (2000). Applications, limitations of complexity theory in organization theory and 
strategy. In: J. Rabin , G.J. Miller, G.J. & W.B. Hildreth (Eds.), Handbook of Strategic 
Management, (second edition) (pp. 67-87). New York: Marcel Dekker. 
Lindblom, C.E. (1959). The science of muddling through. Public administration, 19,  79-88. 
Lindblom, C.E. (1965). The intelligence of democracy: Decision making through mutual 
adjustment. London: Free press. 
Love, P.E.D., Davis, P.R., & Misty, D. (2010). Price competitive alliance projects: identification of 
success factors for public clients. ASCE Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 
136, 947-956. 
176  Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle 
 
Martens, K. (2007). Actors in a fuzzy governance environment. In: G.De Roo, & G. Porter (Eds.), 
Fuzzy Planning: The role of actors in a Fuzzy Governance Environment (pp. 43-65). Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Mead, G.H. (1972). The philosophy of the act. Chicago: Chicago university press. 
Mintzberg, H. (1991). The Structuring of Organisations. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Morgan, D.L., & Spanish, M.T. (1984). Focus groups: a new tool for qualitative research. 
Qualitative sociology, 7(3), 253-270. 
Mosey, D. (2009). Early Contractor Involvement in Building Procurement: Contracts, Partnering 
and Project Management. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Mu, R., De Jong, M. & Ten Heuvelhof, E. (2010). A Typology of Strategic Behaviour in PPPs for 
Expressways: Lessons from China and Implications for Europe. EJTIR, 10(1), 42-62. 
Nagelkerke M., Oehler J., Muntz-Beekhuis J., & Van der Staay, D. (2009). The Competitive 
Dialogue: a guide based on the current experience of Rijksgebouwendienst, Rijkswaterstaat 
and the Ministry of Defence. The Hague: Rijksoverheid. 
Osborne, S.P. (Ed.) (2000). Public-private partnerships; theory and practice in international 
perspective. London: Routledge. 
Pollitt, C., Van Thiel, S., & Homburg, V. (2007). New public management in Europe: adaptation 
and alternatives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Portugali, J. (1999). Self-organization and the city. Berlin: Springer-verlag. 
Prahabkar, G.K. (2008). Projects and Their Management: A Literature Review. International 
Journal of Business and Management, 3(8), 3-9 
Regan, M., Smith, J., & Love, P.E.D. (2011). Impact of the capital market collapse on public-
private partnership infrastructure projects. ASCE Journal of Construction, Engineering and 
Management, 137, 6-16. 
Rijkswaterstaat. (2011a). Handreiking MIRT en markt. Hoe kan het Rijk sneller en beter de markt 
betrekken. The Hague: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. 
Rijkswaterstaat. (2011b). Ondernemingsplan 2015. Eén Rijkswaterstaat, elke dag beter! The 
Hague: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. 
Roose, H. (2002). Managen van een netwerkorganisatie. Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Garant. 
Senge, P. (2006). The fifth discipline. New York: Currency Doubleday. 
Shapira, A., & Laufer, A. (1993). Evolution of involvement and effort in construction planning 
throughout project life. International journal of project management, 11(3), 155-164. 
Stacey, R.D. (2002). Strategic management and organisational dynamics: the challenge of 
complexity (third edition). Harlow: Prentice Hall. 
Teisman, G. R. (2000). Models for research into decision-making processes. Public 
Administration, 78(4), 937-956. 
Teisman, G.R. (2005). Publiek management op de grens van chaos en orde: over leidinggeven en 
organiseren in complexiteit. Den Haag: Academic Service. 
Teisman, G.R., Van Buuren, A.,  & Gerrits, L. (eds.) (2009). Managing complex governance 
systems: dynamics, self-organization and coevolution in public investments. New York: 
Routledge. 
Thomas, J., & Mengel, T. (2008). Preparing project managers to deal with complexity – 
Advanced project management education. International Journal of Project Management, 26, 
304-315. 
 Chapter 6 – Lifecycle driven planning of infrastructure  177 
 
 
Verhees, F. (2013). Publiek-private Samenwerking: Adaptieve planning in theorie en praktijk. 
Groningen: University of Groningen.  
Volker, L., Altamirano, M., Herder, P., & Van der Lei, T. (2011). The impact of innovative 
contracting on asset management of public infrastructure networks. In: Proceedings of the 
Sixth Annual World Congress on Engineering Asset Management (WCEAM 2011), October 
2nd-4th 2011, Cincinnati, pp. 1-6.  
Ward, S.C., & Chapman, C.B. (1995). Risk-management perspective on the project lifecycle, 
International journal of project management,13(3), 145-149. 
Williams, T.M. (2002). Modelling Complex Projects. London: John Wiley & Sons. 
Zuidema, C. (2011). Stimulating local environmental policy. Groningen: University of Groningen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle  178 
 
 
  
  
 
  
Chapter 7 
 
Conclusions and 
recommendations 
 Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle  180 
 
 
181 
 
7 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the planning of road infrastructure, lifecycle integration takes place throughout the 
planning process. Several lifecycle integration initiatives are implemented to help deal 
with complexity by connecting planning stages. This study specifically examined the 
lifecycle integration in the planning process of road infrastructure. In this integration, the 
focus is on the connection of stages through involvement of market parties. These market 
parties are business organizations such as construction companies, technical engineering 
consultants, landscape architects and financial institutions. In this chapter, the separate 
analyses of lifecycle integration initiatives (as discussed in Chapters 2 to 5) and the 
analysis of combining such initiatives in a more integrated approach (see Chapter 6) 
will be brought together in order to meet this study’s aim, which is to provide insight into 
the relevance and applicability of lifecycle integration throughout the Dutch 
infrastructure planning process in order to provide directions for the design of an 
overarching full lifecycle approach in infrastructure planning. By specifically exploring 
the public and private experiences with lifecycle integration, lessons are provided for 
improving instruments and initiatives of lifecycle integration in particular and assessing 
lifecycle integration in the infrastructure planning process in general.  
 
The conclusions and recommendations of this study will be provided in this chapter. In 
Section 7.2, answers will be provided to the four empirical research questions that were 
formulated in Chapter 1. Subsequently, Section 7.3 will provide an answer to the fifth 
research question, which deals with the possible combination of lifecycle integration 
initiatives in settings that differ in complexity. This includes a further elaboration on the 
institutional conditions and governance strategies that play a role in a possible 
approach to market involvement throughout the planning lifecycle. In Section 7.4, these 
insights are used as the basis for a discussion and reflection on lifecycle integration in 
planning theory and planning practice, which are related to the five challenges for 
planning identified in Chapter 1. Finally, Section 7.5 concludes this chapter with 
recommendations. The first part of the recommendations focuses on providing directions 
for further research and includes a discussion of the limitations of this study. In the 
second part of Section 7.5, recommendations for infrastructure planning practice are 
provided. 
 
7.2 Lifecycle integration initiatives 
In Chapter 1, four stages in the planning process have been identified which were then 
taken as the basis of this research: policymaking, project plan development, 
construction, and operation and maintenance. Although other subdivisions of the 
planning lifecycle could have been made (see Ward & Chapman, 1995), for example 
by including procurement as a separate stage, the four stages identified generally 
function as the essential components of the planning lifecycle. Four lifecycle integration 
182  Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle 
 
 
which take place between the stages were selected, because these initiatives 
incorporate increased market involvement to integrate stages in the lifecycle and, 
although they are new, have been increasingly applied in Dutch practice over the last 
years. In Chapter 1, four empirical research questions were defined, each considering 
the integration of two subsequent stages in the planning lifecycle in practice through 
one of these lifecycle integration initiatives. The investigated initiatives are early 
private involvement between policy-making and project plan development (see 
Chapter 2), early contractor involvement (see Chapter 3) and the competitive dialogue 
procurement procedure (see Chapter 4) between project plan development and 
construction, and integrated Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) contracts between 
the construction stage and the stage of maintenance and operation (see Chapter 5).  
 
The first empirical question regards the relation between the lifecycle stages of 
policymaking and project plan development. This question was discussed in the second 
chapter of this study, which focused on early market involvement instruments in Dutch 
infrastructure planning:  
 
(1) What is the potential of market involvement in early strategic plan- and 
policymaking and how can this potential be unlocked in order to strengthen the 
connection between strategic policymaking and plan development?  
 
Early market involvement can provide added value to the early strategic plan and 
policymaking stages of a planning process. Private parties can bring in a more 
businesslike perspective on proposed projects, paying more attention to technical and 
financial feasibility. In addition, business organizations can stimulate innovation; 
especially process innovation. However, the potential of early market involvement is 
limited by private parties’ focus on competition, which prevents public-private 
cooperation in improving proposed solutions. Furthermore, the potential of early market 
involvement is limited because public parties experience difficulties in structuring and 
combining the public planning process with early market involvement; one reason being 
that in early policymaking and project plan development stages, public parties cannot 
easily make substantial political or financial commitments. 
  
Unlocking the potential of market involvement in the early stages therefore depends on 
the way public commitment and clarity on the structure of future planning processes is 
provided, including the way in which the early market involvement instrument fits this 
process. For the private parties, the relation of the early market involvement initiative 
with possible future procurement procedures is especially important. The private parties 
generally regard early market involvement as an opportunity to prepare for a future 
procurement procedure. However, since a direct connection between initiatives of early 
market involvement and procurement can seldom be made in practice, rewarding 
private parties for their early market involvement becomes important: it determines 
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private parties’ decision to participate and, subsequently, their effort. Offering 
financial compensation for the private parties’ effort proves to be difficult: partly 
because public parties experience difficulties estimating private parties’ expenses as a 
result of the early involvement, and partly because private parties disregard the size 
of the compensation offered and spare no expense to gain a possible advantage in 
procurement. In addition to financial compensation, agreements on co-development can 
be offered as a reward. However, in the investigated initiatives the public parties 
tended to be late in setting up proper intellectual property rights regulations. The 
experiences with early market involvement show that the connection between strategic 
policymaking and project plan development could be strengthened by increased 
public-public interaction over the wishes, ambitions and expectations of the involved 
government actors as expressed in policy. This could result in more consistency in the 
government’s attitude towards potential projects and could help to provide clarity in 
public commitment in a potential project. In addition, the early market involvement 
instruments could be fine-tuned to better suit the nature of the projects by adjusting the 
application of the instruments to the problems and opportunities a potential project and 
its context can provide. The approach should set incentives for delivering creative and 
innovative market input and simultaneously properly reward this input from the private 
sector and provide the necessary consistent political commitment. 
 
In the second and third questions, the relation between the lifecycle stages of project 
plan development and construction is discussed. The second question is focused on 
applying early contractor involvement by combining public planning and procurement 
procedures for Dutch infrastructure projects, as investigated in the third chapter of this 
study:  
 
(2) What are the lessons learned from applying early contractor involvement in road 
infrastructure planning and what are the added values and risks involved in 
connecting public planning and procurement through early contractor involvement?  
  
Several lessons can be learned from applying early contractor involvement in Dutch 
infrastructure planning practice, as discussed in Chapter 3. One of the most important 
lessons is that the approach to early contractor involvement should suit the 
characteristics and goals of the project at hand. Two approaches to early contractor 
involvement are recognized in practice. The first, parallelization of procurement and 
public planning procedures, suits projects in which time gains and project control are the 
main project goals. The added value of parallelization consists of a check on feasibility 
of proposed solutions and of realizing time gains as a result of an earlier start of the 
procurement procedure. The second, more intense approach, the interweaving of 
procurement and public planning procedures, involves interaction between the two 
procedures. Interweaving seems to fit projects in which the main goal is to increase 
project quality. Its added value lies in the more active role of private parties. This role 
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is not limited to checking the feasibility of solutions generated by the public parties, but 
includes the opportunity to generate innovative solutions themselves. 
 
The major risks in applying early contractor involvement relate to procedural 
dependencies being created. By connecting public planning and procurement 
procedures, a delay in one procedure can cause delays in the other as well. Also, the 
dependencies add to the complexity of the overall planning process. This could result in 
higher costs, because in the longer period of private involvement, additional risks and 
increased transaction costs have to be accounted for in the private bids. Therefore, it is 
questionable whether connecting the public planning procedure and the procurement 
procedure results in enough added value (e.g. in terms of increased project quality, 
project control or time gains) to weigh up against increased risks and costs for private 
and public parties. Increased experience with early contractor involvement can increase 
the efficiency with which early contractor involvement is applied. However, the decision 
to apply early contractor involvement must also be based on the opportunities and 
limitations that are provided by a project. The character and complexity of a project 
determine to a large extent the possible added value and risks of early contractor 
involvement, as will be further discussed in Section 7.3.  
 
As indicated above, the third question also regards the relation between the lifecycle 
stages of project plan development and construction. It is focused on the public-private 
interaction in competitive dialogue procurement procedures in Dutch infrastructure 
planning, discussed in the fourth chapter of this study: 
 
(3) What are the public and private experiences with the competitive dialogue 
procurement procedure and how is public-private interaction in this procedure 
influenced by external factors?  
  
Public and private actors perceive the competitive dialogue as a suitable instrument for 
discussing technical, legal and financial complexities in infrastructure projects. However, 
the interaction is dominated by the influence of competition, which generally makes 
private parties refrain from open interaction with government. Together with the 
control-driven coordination of the public procuring authorities, competition also causes 
public parties to assume a cautious attitude towards legal procedures, which is 
particularly noticeable in a strong focus on carefully and conservatively maintaining the 
level playing field. Public parties are afraid that an overly intense dialogue with a 
private party may disrupt the level playing field, and are therefore reserved in 
discussing their wishes and ambitions. In addition, organizational issues such as rapid 
personnel changes and problems with information management and distribution can 
limit the efficiency of a competitive dialogue (see also Lenferink et al., 2011).  
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Several external factors influence the way governance strategies are applied in the 
public-private interaction in competitive dialogue procedures. Interaction is especially 
limited by inexperience with the legal complexity of competitive dialogue procedure, 
because it fuels cautious public and private attitudes, as discussed previously with 
regard to the level playing field. Financial complexity is caused by the involvement of 
the risk-avoiding financial institutions, which both government and contractors are not 
used to interact with. The technical complexity present in the character of current day 
projects and their awarding criteria offer the best opportunities to improve public-
private interaction and cooperation. It can inspire public-private collaboration and help 
bring about competition based on delivering quality. In order to improve the 
application of the competitive dialogue, opportunities for discussing complexity in the 
dialogue need to be used. At the instrumental level, this can be realized by gaining 
more experience with applying the competitive dialogue procedure in order to 
increase its efficiency. Most importantly, however, the conservative attitudes need to be 
abandoned by stimulating public and private parties to search for opportunities in 
open dialogues on perceived problems and possible solutions. In order to do so, the 
application of the competitive dialogue needs to be tuned to the character and 
complexity of a project, as will be discussed in Section 7.3. 
 
The fourth question regards the relation between the lifecycle stages of construction 
and operation and maintenance, and is focused on the role of sustainable management 
in Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) contracts. The contract includes the most far-
reaching integration combining the design and construction activities in Design & 
Construct (D&C) contracts with performance maintenance and a private financing 
component. This leads to one integrated contract with private design, financing, 
construction and maintenance activities. At the moment, these DBFM contracts are the 
most commonly applied type of integrated contract in Dutch road infrastructure 
planning at the national level. Lifecycle integration in such contracts was therefore 
assessed and described in Chapter 5, which dealt with the fourth research question: 
 
(4) What are the experiences and issues relating to integrating stages in DBFM contracts 
and how can these help to come to more sustainable infrastructure development?  
 
Integrating the stages of design, construction and maintenance is perceived as a logical 
step in the development towards lifecycle contracts. Although public and private 
experiences are generally positive about the lifecycle perspective of the contract, some 
issues remain. An important issue, as experienced by the public and private parties 
involved in DBFM contracts, is the detailed character of such contracts. DBFM contracts 
are procured as a neoclassical and rigid contract, aiming to be complete by stipulating 
all possible scenarios. This limits the flexibility of the contracts, especially in the long 
maintenance period included in DBMF contracts. Setting up a detailed contract requires 
large amounts of information and considerable effort from the actors and organizations 
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involved in maintenance and operation of the infrastructure, raising transaction costs. It 
proves difficult to effectively involve public and private parties from these later stages 
in order to obtain this information upfront. A final major issue has to do with the 
interfaces between DBFM contracts in a road network. In order to define availability 
requirements for road sections in DBFM contracts, a strategy on asset management at 
the infrastructure network level needs to be in place. Such a strategy could help to 
better adjust the incentives for maintenance and operation in different DBFM contracts 
to each other, but is currently missing.  
 
With regard to sustainability, it can be stated that DBFM contracts as they are currently 
applied include an incentive to perform lifecycle optimizations by adjusting the design 
to the construction and maintenance activities. Looking at experiences with setting up 
and implementing a DBFM contract, enhancing the inclusive character of DBFM 
contracts, in terms of time, scope and actors, can help to stimulate sustainability. This 
inclusive character is manifested in the broader range of actors involved, the broader 
scope of the projects, and the strengthened links between activities of design, 
construction and maintenance over time. Although the DBFM projects demonstrate a 
more inclusive character essential to the concept of sustainability, several avenues for 
improvement can be recognized. The first is to apply green procurement to stimulate 
the incorporation of process and product elements of sustainability in infrastructure 
projects. This can be achieved through sustainable qualification, award and contract 
performance criteria that link early plan making and design activities in the project 
plan development stage to the design activities in contract implementation, for example 
as applied in green procurement (Russel, 1998; Arts & Faith-Ell, 2012). This way 
private market parties are provided with public wishes and ambitions for later stages 
that exceed standard project preconditions. Second, relational contracting could 
replace the detailed neoclassical contracts and provide for more adaptiveness (Turner 
& Simister, 2001). Relational contracts are set up around an adaptive relationship 
between the client and the contractor, and, as such, do not aim to be complete. And 
last, strategic asset management could help to manage interfaces between DBFM 
contracts and come to a strategy at the infrastructure network level for sustainable 
infrastructure planning. 
 
7.3 Combining integration initiatives: towards a lifecycle approach for 
infrastructure projects 
Once the relevance and applicability, and the lessons learned in applying several 
initiatives for lifecycle integration have been described (see Section 7.2 and Chapters 
2 to 5), the focus is shifted to the possibilities of combining lifecycle integration 
initiatives. A provisional investigation of possible combinations of lifecycle integration 
initiatives has been provided in Chapter 6. In this Section, the findings from these 
integration initiatives are brought together and the combinations of lifecycle initiatives 
for settings that differ in complexity are assessed. This is done in order to provide an 
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answer to the fifth question, which regards the relation between the lifecycle stages of 
policymaking, project plan development, construction and operation and maintenance: 
 
(5) How do lifecycle integration initiatives relate to each other and can the combination 
of such initiatives lead to added value for dealing with project complexity? 
  
It proves to be difficult to combine lifecycle integration initiatives in practice, because 
of the diverse characters of the stages (e.g. legal, financial or technical) in which the 
focus differs (i.e. a more internal focus on the project level or a more external focus on 
the infrastructure network level). Also, the integration initiatives have only recently been 
introduced, and the initial experience gained remains isolated. For example the early, 
precompetitive, market involvement initiatives have only recently been introduced in the 
Netherlands and the strategy to connect this involvement to other initiatives and other 
stages of the lifecycle in the Netherlands is still underdeveloped (see Chapter 2), 
although the first efforts have been made (Rijkswaterstaat, 2011). Moreover, the 
character and focus of projects can also change over time. The innovative character of 
the lifecycle integration initiatives did not allow the formulation of a detailed design of 
an overarching lifecycle approach, but some ideas and possible combinations for a 
more integrated approach were provided in Chapter 6. In this Section, the implications 
for infrastructure planning practice will be elaborated upon. 
 
In Chapter 1, the assumption was formulated that stages could be better linked to 
overcome the fragmented nature of current planning processes and the cost and time 
overruns in infrastructure planning practice. It can be concluded that combining the 
investigated initiatives of lifecycle integration in a more integrated lifecycle approach 
seems to be possible. For instance, market consultation, interweaving and competitive 
dialogue have been combined in the A2 Maastricht project. Although at the moment 
there is no project in progress that integrates the full lifecycle, there is growing 
experience with linking project plan development, construction and maintenance through 
combining competitive dialogues and DBFM contracts in Dutch planning practice. The 
incentives included in the competitive dialogue procedures for procuring DBFM contracts 
help to come to more inclusive infrastructure projects, in which design, construction and 
maintenance are better adjusted to each other. This leads to the conclusion that the 
assumption posed in Chapter 1 seems to be correct for Dutch infrastructure planning 
practice: linking stages through lifecycle integration can help to overcome the 
fragmented nature of planning processes. However, in contrast to the connections 
between plan development, construction and maintenance through competitive dialogue 
procedures and DBFM contracts, the connection of these stages to policy-making is 
somewhat underdeveloped. Even more underdeveloped is the link of the maintenance 
and operation stages back to the policy-making stage (i.e. closing the lifecycle). 
Applying asset management at the infrastructure network level could help to strengthen 
this link and subsequently could help to develop a strategy for stimulating lifecycle 
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integration through early private involvement between the stages of policy-making and 
project plan development. This strategy could assist in guiding the market involvement, 
because currently, in practice, the market parties are involved differently in each 
initiative: different parties are involved, different products need to be delivered, 
different rewards and triggers are provided and different goals are set and questions 
are formulated to the market.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Typology for project complexity. Adapted from Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010. 
 
Lifecycle integration through market involvement is not easily done, as not all 
combinations are suitable for application. A strategy for assessing the applicability of 
integration initiatives seems to be missing. In such a strategy, the potential added value 
of lifecycle integration through market involvement can be related to the characteristics 
of the potential project. As discussed in Chapter 6, project characteristics are shaped 
by the degree of internal and external project complexity. Internal complexity can be 
defined as the complexity resulting from the interaction between internal project 
components, while external complexity is a result of interaction with the external project 
context (see Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010). In Chapter 6, four types of projects were 
distinguished, which differ in the degree of internal and external complexity: simple, 
context-complex, complicated and complexicated projects (see Table 6.1 in Section 
6.2, and Figure 7.1). In the following sections, a first attempt is made to describe 
possible ways in which lifecycle integration initiatives relate to these four types of 
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projects, by describing the four categories of institutional conditions identified in 
Chapter 1: legal conditions, financial-economic conditions, technical-qualitative 
conditions and organizational conditions. Besides these ‘hard’ outlines of a system 
perspective on lifecycle integration, the intensity of the public-private interaction needs 
to be adjusted to the internal and external complexity for each project setting. This 
means that the institutional conditions need to be supplemented with a proper mix of 
‘soft’ governance strategies: coordination, competition and cooperation (see Chapters 1 
and 4). In addition to the institutional conditions and the governance strategies, the 
market involvement initiatives will also be framed in a process perspective on lifecycle 
integration, provided for the four types of projects below. 
 
7.3.1 Simple projects 
In simple projects, both the internal and external complexity are low. Projects that could 
be regarded as simple occur mainly at the local level, where less actors and stakes are 
involved. At the national level, simple projects can be lane extensions and highway 
upgrades in rural areas, such as in the N31 Zurich-Harlingen project, discussed in 
Chapter 3. Simple projects require only limited coordination. Coordination is limited to 
ensuring that projects are performed within the existing policy frameworks at the 
strategic level. The strategy of competition can be optimized: strong competition can be 
facilitated by government in which market parties compete on price. Public-private 
cooperation can only result in limited gains. These gains will most likely not outweigh the 
higher transaction cost of increasing the public-private interaction (see Chapter 6). The 
institutional conditions reflect the mix of governance strategies. In order to keep things 
simple, the financial risks and responsibilities should be taken by either government or 
market. In the organization of the planning process the focus should be on optimizing 
time and costs of the project. The simple projects’ strong governance focus on 
competition is reflected in the technical-qualitative institutional conditions. Appropriate 
in simple projects is to award the lowest bid that sufficiently meets the predetermined 
quality (see Table 7.1).  
 
Based on these governance strategies and institutional conditions, a proposed 
approach to market involvement throughout the planning process of simple projects is 
as follows: Because there is no strong political dynamics or uncertainty over the 
ambition, preconditions or proposed solutions in an early stage of simple projects, early 
market involvement can be limited to performing a market consultation (Chapter 2). 
Afterwards, government can prepare a functional specification of the desired 
preconditions for the solution, and start procurement in a straightforward open or 
restricted procedure (see Chapter 3 and 4). This procedure should be concluded by 
closing a detailed and specified contract. Contract types that fit simple projects are the 
190  Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle 
 
 
fully specified Dutch RAW contract or the Engineering and Construct contract (E&C),28 in 
which only limited engineering responsibilities are transferred to the private parties 
(see Chapter 5). Design and Construct (D&C) contracts could also be applied in simple 
project. In addition, after completion, a separate maintenance contract can be drawn 
up. (see Table 7.1).  
 
Table 7.1: A lifecycle approach through market involvement for simple projects. 
Project complexity Low Low internal and low external complexity 
Governance 
strategies 
Coordination Only strategic coordination 
Competition Strong 
Cooperation Limited relevance 
Institutional 
conditions 
 
Financial –economic Distribute risks and responsibilities to either 
government or market 
Legal Problem, solution and contract can be 
specified 
Organizational  Optimize for time and costs in planning 
process 
Technical-qualitative  Award on price for predetermined quality 
Market 
involvement 
Project plan development Market consultation 
Planning and  
procurement procedure 
Parallelisation 
Open or restricted procedure 
Construction contract RAW, E&C, or D&C 
Maintenance contract Separate maintenance contract 
 
7.3.2 Context-complex projects 
‘Context-complex’ projects include a high degree of external complexity and a low 
degree of internal complexity. An example of a context-complex project in Dutch 
practice is the A4 Midden Delftland. This context-complex project can be characterized 
by the dynamic environments in which social and political debates and struggles take 
place, while the project itself can be regarded as relatively simple in technical, legal 
and financial terms. In context-complex projects, public-private interaction is less 
relevant because of the market’s inability to manage the external contextual 
relationships associated with political decision-making, while the opportunities for using 
their input are limited as a result of low internal complexity. Therefore the governance 
is strongly focused on coordination of public values and ambitions and cooperation 
between public actors. There are only limited possibilities for competition, and as a 
result, private market parties mainly play a more traditional role as contractors who 
                                              
 
28 In a RAW contract (‘Regeling Aanbesteding Werken’, which translates in Regulation for Procurement of Works), 
Rijkswaterstaat works out the desired solution in detail: a specification including a detailed technical design with 
underlying preliminary calculation of materials needed and construction time. Based on this estimate, contractors 
could calculate their bids and the lowest bidder was awarded the construction contract. The RAW contract is 
similar to what is known in the USA and the United Kingdom as a Design-Bid-Build (DBB) contract. In Engineering 
and Construct (E&C) contracts, contractors are made responsible for working out technical design specifications. 
These E&C contracts incorporate more freedom for contractors to bring in their expertise in the design of a 
project. After completing construction of a RAW or E&C project, maintenance is performed by public road districts 
or contracted out in separate maintenance contracts (see also Chapter 5). 
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perform parts of a ‘context-complex’ project. Although market parties cannot take over 
the complexity of external political decision-making, they can help the public parties in 
addressing the external complexities and their implications on a project. With regard 
to the institutional conditions, context-complex projects require shared public financial-
economic responsibilities in order to manage the dynamic external context. It may be 
difficult to agree on legal conditions, although they are specifiable once political 
decisions have been made. In context-complex projects, the organizational conditions 
should be aimed at achieving project control: establishing public-public agreement over 
a project. The technical-qualitative conditions in planning procurement and contract 
management should be geared towards providing flexibility on both price and quality 
within a specified range of politically negotiated possibilities (see Table 7.2).  
 
Table 7.2: A lifecycle approach through market involvement for context-complex projects. 
Project complexity  Moderate Low internal and high external complexity 
Governance 
strategies 
Coordination Strong 
Competition Little possibilities 
Cooperation Strong public-public, limited relevance of 
public-private  
Institutional 
conditions 
 
Financial-economic Shared responsibilities (mainly public) 
Legal Problem, solution and contract can be 
specified but not agreed upon 
Organizational  Optimize for project control 
Technical-qualitative  Award on adaptiveness within price and 
quality 
Market 
involvement 
Project plan development Unsolicited Proposal 
Planning and  
procurement procedure 
Interweaving (late) or Parallelization (plus) 
Open or restricted procedure / negotiated 
procedure or competitive dialogue procedure 
Construction contract RAW, E&C, D&C or DBFM / Alliance 
Maintenance contract Can be included in construction contract 
 
The application of lifecycle integration initiatives should be geared towards stimulating 
public-public interaction and towards facilitating public parties to gain insight into their 
wishes and ambitions. Although market involvement in the early project plan 
development stage will probably not provide added value, unsolicited proposals might 
spark creative ideas and help initiate the public planning process. Interweaving the 
public planning and procurement procedure could provide insight into the private 
parties’ ideas and preferences, but will only provide added value if some degree of 
public-public agreement is reached over the project. Therefore, preferably, late 
interweaving is applied in context-complex projects, but parallelization can also be 
opted for if the complex political decision-making process cannot be interwoven with 
the procurement procedure. Both the procurement procedure and the type of 
construction and maintenance contract will depend on the ability of public-public 
negotiations and the political decision-making to address the external complexity. If the 
external complexity is effectively dealt with, a straightforward procurement procedure 
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can be applied, such as the open or closed procurement procedures, and a specified 
neoclassical contract can be closed: RAW, E&C, or D&C. A DBFM contract might also be 
closed, if the external complexity can be successfully addressed (see also Section 7.5). 
If the external dynamics cannot be addressed properly in a procurement procedure, 
establishing more open and adaptive alliance contracts through negotiated or 
competitive dialogue procedures could be more effective (in line with the approach to 
complexicated projects) (see Table 7.2).  
 
7.3.3 Complicated projects 
In complicated projects, the overall project complexity can be characterized as 
moderate. In complicated projects, this means that the internal complexity is high, 
whereas the external complexity is low (see Chapter 6). In practice, projects that can 
be considered as complicated are the Renewal Steel Bridges (discussed in Chapter 2), 
the A4 Steenbergen project (discussed in Chapter 3), and the projects A12 Utrecht-
Veenendaal and A10 Second Coentunnel (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). The 
governance in such settings should be aimed at facilitating all three strategies, with a 
special emphasis on competition. In complicated settings, relations between internal 
project components are complicated and should therefore be adjusted. This requires 
both coordination by government and cooperation between government and the 
market parties. However, because external complexity is low, a relatively safe and 
closed environment can be created in which competition can be facilitated effectively. 
With regard to the institutional conditions, the possibilities for competition include that 
risks and responsibilities can best be transferred to the market parties as they possess 
the technical knowledge required to deal with internal project complexity (relation 
between financial, technical and legal components). The organization of the planning 
process should be optimized for providing project control. This is a matter of managing 
the financial, legal, technical and organizational project components that make up the 
internal complexity. A balance between price and quality needs to be found in the bids 
of the private parties, which can be achieved by applying most economically 
advantageous tender (MEAT) awarding criteria (see Table 7.3) that fit the concept of 
best value procurement, as applied by Rijkswaterstaat (Andersson Elffers Felix, 2012).  
 
The approach to market involvement in complicated settings could start with early 
market involvement in the project plan development stage through re-active 
involvement in a market consultation or active involvement in an early design contest. 
This would enable government to obtain input on the planning process and the private 
parties’ concerns regarding the preconditions, the contract, etcetera. The procurement 
can be performed through a competitive dialogue, because government cannot specify 
the desired solution beforehand. In complicated cases, parallelization can be applied, 
but it may prove to be worthwhile to also consider a hybrid of interweaving and 
parallelization called parallel plus, which is applied in the case of the A12 Utrecht - 
Veenendaal. In such a hybrid, the time gains of parallelization are combined with 
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technical-qualitative improvements and innovation opportunities of interweaving of the 
public planning and procurement procedures (see Arts et al., 2012). Afterwards a D&C 
contract can be closed to adjust design and construction activities to each other. 
Alternatively a DBFM contract can be closed, which effectively combines market 
knowledge of design, construction and maintenance in order to deal with the 
complexities involved in the relation between the two, and provide incentives to the 
market to perform lifecycle optimizations. In Dutch practice, especially the combination 
of competitive dialogues and integrated DBFM contracts is already being successfully 
applied to help address internal complexity in ‘complicated’ settings through public-
private interaction (see Table 7.3). 
 
Table 7.3: A lifecycle approach through market involvement for complicated projects. 
Project complexity  Moderate High internal and low external complexity 
Governance 
strategies 
Coordination Necessary 
Competition Strong 
Cooperation Necessary 
Institutional 
conditions 
 
Financial –economic Distribute risks and responsibilities to market 
Legal Specification of solution is difficult, but 
problem and contract can be specified 
Organizational  Optimize for project control in planning 
process 
Technical-qualitative  Award on price and quality, through MEAT 
Market 
involvement 
Project plan development Market consultation / Early design contest 
Planning and  
procurement procedure 
Parallelisation (or Parallel Plus) 
Competitive dialogue 
Construction contract D&C or DBFM 
Maintenance contract Included in construction contract 
 
7.3.4 Complexicated projects 
‘Complexicated’ projects include a high degree of internal and external complexity 
(see Chapter 6). Examples from Dutch infrastructure planning practice are the Afsluitdijk 
Renewal (discussed in Chapter 2), the A2 Maastricht project (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and 
the A15 Maasvlakte Vaanplein project (Chapters 4 and 5). In such projects, 
cooperation is the essential governance strategy. The government seeks out 
partnerships with the private sector to cope with the complexity. A challenge that needs 
to be accounted for is the fact that market parties perceive early market involvement in 
the project plan development stage and in procurement as dominated by competition, 
while government is looking for a cooperative relationship and an open dialogue in 
project plan development and procurement. Government is aiming to let go of the 
directive way of steering, and tries to introduce cooperation and competition to the 
lifecycle, which proves to be difficult to realize in practice. The market responds to the 
opportunities that the government provides, but is more susceptible to competition than 
to cooperation. So in addition to cooperation, government should provide the necessary 
coordination and terms of reference, especially on the relation with future procurement 
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and the intellectual property rights regulation to facilitate the cooperation. The 
financial-economic institutional conditions should be aimed at stimulating cooperation by 
sharing risks and responsibilities between public and private parties. This is necessary 
because it proves to be impossible to specify problems, solutions and contracts in detail 
in order to cope with complexity. In complexicated settings, the aim should therefore be 
on optimizing project quality and flexibility in planning processes. This could be 
stimulated by awarding bids on their quality through MEAT criteria in best value 
procurement, and possibly also by taking the competences of the bidding party into 
account in the procurement (see Table 7.4). 
 
Table 7.4: A lifecycle approach through market involvement for complexicated projects. 
Project complexity  High High internal and high external complexity 
Governance 
strategies 
Coordination Only strategic coordination 
Competition Desirable 
Cooperation Crucial 
Institutional 
conditions 
 
Financial –economic Shared risks and responsibilities 
Legal Specification of problem, solution and contract 
is difficult 
Organizational  Optimize for project quality and flexibility in 
planning process (through MEAT) 
Technical-qualitative  Award on quality (including competences) 
Market 
involvement 
Project plan development Market reconnaissance / Early design contest 
/ Unsolicited proposals 
Planning and  
procurement procedure 
Interweaving (early) 
Competitive dialogue 
Construction contract Alliances 
Maintenance contract Can be included in the construction contract 
 
Market involvement throughout the planning lifecycle should be aimed at facilitating 
room for flexibility and creativity to develop adaptive processes and solutions (in line 
with Holling & Gunderson, 2002). In the initial policymaking and project plan 
development stages, political dynamics play an important role. In order to strengthen 
the connection between policy and plan-making and project development, commitment 
on projects and clarity on the process to be followed are needed from the government. 
Only when these preconditions are present, the market is willing to be open and 
provide added value to the early stages of the planning process. This added value can 
be obtained through market reconnaissances, early design contests and unsolicited 
proposals, as long as opportunities for creativity and proper rewards and incentives 
are provided. Early interweaving of public planning and procurement procedures can 
also help to recognize and facilitate these opportunities. In procurement, the 
competitive dialogue is a suitable procedure to address and discuss complexity through 
public-private interaction. However, the parties involved must take care to keep options 
open and limit current public control reflexes and private risk avoidance, which both 
aim at providing certainties. In complexicated settings, such behaviour will only result in 
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failure because detailed contracts cannot cope with the dynamics of high external 
complexity: Aiming for control and risk avoidance in over-specified contracts will result 
in insufficient flexibility for dealing with rapidly changing circumstances. Therefore, it 
seems suitable to apply more flexible alliances, which include shared responsibilities, 
risks and rewards. Although the long and intense involvement of private parties may 
increase the transaction costs and although personal commitment of project officials to 
alliances may result in inefficient contracts (Reuer & Ariño, 2002), the added value in 
terms of more flexibility and chances to apply innovative solutions can help to deal 
effectively with internal and external complexity (see Table 7.4). 
 
It must be noted that applying a categorization related to project complexity is not as 
straightforward in practice. For the sake of discussion, the developed framework has 
been simplified to a certain extent in this section. In practice, various combinations and 
gradations of complexity can occur, in which internal and external relations play a role 
but may be impossible to disentangle. Determining the type of complexity, the degree 
of complexity or even the type of project may prove to be difficult. This is partly 
because complexity remains in the eye of the beholder, a rather abstract concept that 
is difficult to operationalize. To an experienced practitioner, projects may appear less 
complex than to a novice in the field. Gaining experience and learning can help to 
better address complexity. Another cause is that projects may change over time and 
develop throughout the stages of the planning lifecycle. As a consequence, the type 
and degree of complexity in a project also change. Decisions regarding design, project 
scope and alternatives can lower the external and internal complexity. On the other 
hand, over time new issues can occur that may increase complexity, for example 
relating to amount of political pressure on a project.  
 
Another limitation of the lifecycle approaches described above is that these are 
composed of combinations of lifecycle integration initiatives. As such, the approaches 
are still founded on a traditional decomposition approach to planning that involves 
defining stages and subsequently integration initiatives. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the 
complexity of the projects and the different natures of the initiatives makes it 
questionable whether one can simply add up these initiatives towards a new lifecycle 
approach. Therefore, approaches and integration initiatives could be supplemented by 
instruments that can incorporate a full lifecycle perspective, such as the alliances and 
cross-functional teams (see Chapter 6). Nevertheless, although the changing complexity 
of projects potentially limits the applicability of the complexity framework described 
above, practice shows that it does provide added value to distinguish between projects 
based on project complexity. It can provide insight into the contingencies: the choices 
that are available to a planner from the start of a project. Distinguishing on project 
complexity is necessary because a generic approach cannot make use of the specific 
characteristics of project settings, and will therefore lead to suboptimal processes and 
suboptimal solutions. Drawing up context-specific frameworks and approaches is an 
196  Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle 
 
 
essential part of planning, projects and project management. All these concepts involve 
that, to a certain degree, boundaries are set and systems are defined, similar to usual 
practice in project management. By making the distinction between project and context, 
an approach can be formulated that can help to better plan, manage or control 
developments.  
 
7.4 Lifecycle integration in infrastructure planning  
After discussing the relevance and applicability of lifecycle integration initiatives and 
possible combinations for several project complexities, the current strengths and 
weaknesses of lifecycle integration and lifecycle approaches to infrastructure planning 
are explored. The findings and issues raised in the previous chapters on the separate 
integration initiatives in Dutch infrastructure planning practice (Chapters 2 to 5) and the 
possible combinations of these integration initiatives (Chapter 6) are discussed in a 
broader context. This discussion will reflect upon the challenges in infrastructure 
planning distinguished and discussed in Chapter 1: bridging the implementation gap, 
the top down focus of the planning process, the limits to government dominance, the 
need for learning in planning, and the search for sustainable development as an 
overarching goal in planning. During the course of the research additional issues 
emerged. For example, starting in 2008, the financial-economic crisis has put additional 
emphasis on limiting the transaction costs in the infrastructure planning process and 
finding new revenue models. Therefore, the discussion will neither be restricted to 
individually discussing these challenges nor to the five initial challenges only. First, the 
benefits and costs of public-private interaction in the planning lifecycle are discussed. 
Subsequently, the actors and their behaviour are discussed, specifically focusing on the 
conservatism of involved actors in infrastructure planning. This section concludes with a 
discussion on learning to address complexity and improve sustainability in infrastructure 
planning. 
 
7.4.1 Benefits and costs of interaction 
Through lifecycle integration stages, actors and values can be better connected. It can 
be concluded that lifecycle integration helps to deal with the first challenge of bridging 
the implementation gap and can provide an alternative to the top-down and directive 
planning approach, which is the second challenge brought forward in Chapter 1. By 
including private parties early, the focus in the early planning stages is shifted to a 
lifecycle perspective that includes a stronger role for the construction and maintenance 
components. Designs and plan-making are better tuned to construction and maintenance 
activities taking place at a later stage, by the early insight in technical, legal, financial 
and organizational feasibility of projects that is provided by the involvement of market 
parties (see Chapters 2 and 3). Issues in construction and maintenance activities can be 
discussed more open and up front, for example through competitive dialogues (see 
Chapter 4). This helps to clarify the consequences of plan- and decision-making in later 
stages and can create an understanding between the worlds of planning and 
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implementation, which are often divided by implementation gaps (see Dunsire, 1978; 
Section 1.2.1). Currently, this integration of stages in the lifecycle is perhaps most 
clearly visible in the integrated DBFM contracts (see Chapter 5). These contracts 
specifically adopt a lifecycle perspective in which incentives for adjusting activities in 
design, construction and maintenance to each other are included. DBFM contracts also 
provide an active role for private financiers, which helps to develop further the revenue 
model of infrastructure planning.  
 
However, for now, practice shows that there are limits to lifecycle integration. Lifecycle 
integration is not yet being applied between all the stages in the planning process. At 
the moment it proves to be difficult to translate the maintenance activities, as included 
in DBFM contracts, into an asset management strategy at the road network level (see 
Chapter 5). Such a strategy could potentially complete the infrastructure planning 
lifecycle by reaching out and connecting to policy and plan formation processes (see 
Chapter 6), but has not yet been developed in infrastructure planning practice. Besides 
the fact that not all stages have been integrated, costs are attached to lifecycle 
integration. Initiatives of integration, such as the early market involvement models 
(Chapter 2), interweaving (Chapter 3), the competitive dialogue (Chapter 4) and DBFM 
contracts (Chapter 5), require considerable time and effort from public parties in order 
to set up the initiatives and gain experience with facilitating public-private interaction 
effectively. In addition, lifecycle integration initiatives require additional private efforts 
before, in, or parallel to the procurement procedures. For example, the private tender 
organizations need to be kept together for a longer period and efforts need to be 
made to involve the private financiers. Therefore, the transaction costs in the early 
planning stages for both public and private parties will rise (in line with findings of 
NAO, 2007; Solino & Gago de Santos, 2010). Whether these costs outweigh the 
added value of market involvement in terms of increased quality of the planning 
process and its delivered products remains to be seen. Often, the added value does not 
become clear until projects are several years into their maintenance and operation 
stages. Therefore, further research on these issues is needed in the future. A solution for 
decreasing the transaction costs is to gain more experience. This can be achieved by 
increasing the deal flow. By applying the investigated private involvement initiatives 
more often, the parties involved will learn how to apply them effectively and 
efficiently. This will lower the transaction costs, as for example can be noticed in the 
experiences with the competitive dialogue (see Chapter 4). 
 
7.4.2 Dealing with conservatism when involving market and civil society 
The success of lifecycle integration depends on which actors are involved and how they 
behave. In order to deal with the challenge of the limits to government dominance in 
planning, several instruments that facilitate the search for a new role for government 
and market parties can be applied. By facilitating cooperative public-private 
interaction, in early private involvement (see Chapter 2), in interweaving (see Chapter 
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3) and in competitive dialogues (see Chapter 4), public and private experiences are 
exchanged, which can help in establishing public-private partnerships. In practice, this 
results in the development of new types of partnerships: from D&C and DBFM contracts 
to innovative concession, alliance and co-development arrangements (see Chapter 5). 
Experiences in projects prove that market parties can provide added value by looking 
over government sectoral boundaries and can, in competition, effectively combine 
several sectoral values in integral solutions (see the Afsluitdijk market reconnaissance in 
Chapter 2, and the interweaving and competitive dialogue applied in the case of the 
A2 Maastricht in Chapters 3 and 4). Also, the involvement of private financial 
institutions has sparked further discussion on new revenue models for infrastructure 
planning (see rewarding on availability as applied in DBFM contracts, described in 
Chapter 5). Public-private interaction helps involved parties to better understand each 
other, which could potentially result in creating and stimulating a ‘healthy’ market. The 
integration initiatives include the possibility to openly discuss wishes, ambitions, 
perceived problems and potential solutions. The competitive dialogue in particular 
seems to provide opportunities for this. 
 
However, there are also limits to the responsibilities that government can transfer to the 
private sector and limits to what market parties can do. It proves to be difficult for 
public parties to abandon their dominant positions and provide freedom to private 
parties to develop (unsolicited) proposals and plans or, at a later stage, design, 
construct and maintain infrastructure projects as they would like. Public parties display 
a reflex to control the planning process by coordination and specifying detailed 
outputs, which can be illustrated by detailed competitive dialogue procedures and 
detailed DBFM contracts (see Chapters 4 and 5). A cause for this control reflex can be 
found in the fact that the public parties, i.e. the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment and its executive agency Rijkswaterstaat, remain politically accountable 
and responsible for the main road infrastructure. Political control leads to public 
parties’ risk minimizing behaviour and additionally poses limits to responsibilities that 
can be transferred to the private sector. The risk minimization by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment and Rijkswaterstaat is further strengthened by the 
traditional attitude in the organization, which was always accustomed to controlling 
planning in detail (see Van den Brink, 2009). 
 
Private parties also display conservative behaviour. They cannot and will not make an 
effort to bring in knowledge and expertise without proper terms of reference and 
political and financial commitment. Instead they will behave strategically, keeping 
possible solutions to themselves, in order to use these later in procurement. This is 
illustrated by the experiences in early market involvement (see Chapter 2), where 
guidelines, commitment and a reward for private parties are essential for effectively 
unlocking private parties’ potential. In this respect, the risk minimizing and risk avoiding 
behaviour of the private parties and especially the private financiers also does not 
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help in keeping opportunities for innovation open. The challenge of control-oriented 
and risk-minimizing behaviour can be dealt with by gaining more experience with 
public-private interaction. The public and private parties’ involved personnel could be 
trained better and encouraged more to jointly search and exploit the opportunities for 
public-private interaction, for example provided by interweaving (see Chapter 3) and 
the competitive dialogue (see Chapter 4), in order to provide added value to the 
infrastructure planning process.  
 
Besides the conservative behaviour, another limitation of current lifecycle integration 
initiatives is that they are primarily aimed at involving the private sector, and that the 
involvement of civil society through public-public interaction is somewhat 
underdeveloped. These parties in civil society include civil groups, community 
organizations, NGOs, and other parties that are not involved in the infrastructure 
planning process either as clients or as contractors. Although they can play a role in 
guaranteeing broad public support by public insight in the decisions made throughout 
the infrastructure planning process, their involvement is limited throughout the stages of 
the infrastructure planning lifecycle. By involving civil society in a more intense and 
structured way, the neoliberal development to increase market involvement in 
infrastructure planning can be combined with the communicative and collaborative 
planning approaches (see Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 1998) that have been 
popular in planning in general for the last decade. At the moment, in the lifecycle 
integration initiatives, for the first time various attempts are being made to connect 
government and market parties with the broader society, which for example can be 
seen in the market reconnaissance model (in the Afsluitdijk market reconnaissance, 
NGOS were included in the consortia) and the unsolicited proposal model for early 
private involvement (see Chapter 2). The connection with civil society can also be 
stimulated by incorporating incentives in most economically advantageous tender 
(MEAT) awarding criteria (for example in the A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal case, see 
Chapters 4 and 5), or by including civil society in the appraisal committee that judges 
private bids in a competitive dialogue (for example in the A2 Maastricht and the A12 
Utrecht-Veenendaal cases, see Chapters 3 and 4). Although involving civil society may 
introduce another group of potentially risk-avoiding actors and may stimulate the 
conservative behaviour of public and private parties involved, civil society can also 
help to generate and maintain broader public support. In addition, civil society 
involvement can provide another stimulus for improving the process, instruments and 
products in road infrastructure planning, and provide for more adaptive infrastructure 
planning (see also Verhees, 2013, and see Section 7.5). 
 
7.4.3 Learning and innovation to address challenges of complexity and sustainability 
Lifecycle integration can only be successfully applied in current society if it is able to 
provide the adaptiveness necessary to address complexity. For this to happen, learning 
must be incorporated in the planning process as discussed in the fourth challenge in 
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Chapter 1, in order to come to more inclusive and more sustainable infrastructure 
planning (the fifth challenge). Practice shows that involving market parties can lead to 
innovation. However, the control-oriented nature of government and the risk-avoidance 
of private parties discussed above, create a preference for proven solutions , 
therefore, innovation mainly concerns process innovations: smart ways of speeding up 
the planning, construction and maintenance processes. The relatively limited number of 
product innovations are mainly smart combinations of existing techniques and materials. 
This is demonstrated in the lifecycle optimizations realized in DBFM projects and the 
solutions acquired through early design contests and market reconnaissance. One 
exception may be the link between construction logistics and spatial configurations that 
often seems to be an important driver, see for example the innovative double tunnel in 
the A2 Maastricht case (see Chapter 3). It must be noted here that, although product 
innovation may be limited, there has been a strong development of incentives for 
consideration of sustainability throughout the planning lifecycle. This is shown in the 
creative integral combinations in the connection of exploration and project plan 
development stages (see Chapter 2), the constructability focus in the connection of 
project plan development and construction (see Chapters 3 and 4), and the 
maintainability and lifecycle-cost focus in the integration of the construction and 
operation stages (see Chapter 5). All these elements make planning processes more 
inclusive in their scope and more inclusive over time by linking effectively to later 
stages, and make more effective inclusion of market parties possible.  
 
Innovation is essential in relation to creating a healthy construction market. The 
traditional market dynamics in the civil construction industry are driven by price 
competition. Such dynamics will eventually result in insufficient margins for the private 
sector because of product commoditization (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). It would 
be better for a healthy and dynamic market to focus on creating unique customer value 
(Porter 1998), which is only possible if the market knows its customer(s) and its 
processes. A whole line of tools has been developed in the manufacturing industry to 
accommodate for this, such as co-development and empathic design (Prahalad & 
Ramaswamy, 2004; Leonard & Rayport 1997), and partnering and alliances (Arts & 
Faith-Ell, 2012; Child et al., 2005). Early market involvement, early contractor 
involvement, interweaving and competitive dialogues offer additional tools to create 
unique customer value for the road infrastructure construction sector. By means of these 
instruments, government offers market parties opportunities to get to know their 
customer and possible future projects during a stage when options are still open. By 
offering such opportunities, continuous innovation can be achieved which prevents that 
private parties will gradually develop homogeneous products and price competition 
will prevail (see also Leendertse et al., 2012; Porter, 1998). 
 
The increasing complexity provides challenges that can be tackled and opportunities 
that can be taken by open public-private interaction in the planning process. This can 
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provide the government and the market with means for adapting to the changing 
circumstances and for promoting sustainability. The achieved process innovation relates 
to a ’softer’ perspective on sustainability that is aimed at promoting inclusiveness in 
planning processes (see Chapter 5). The investigated integration initiatives incorporate 
several of these process-related innovations that can foster the development of more 
sustainable infrastructure planning. The application of these innovations depends on the 
complexity of the project setting, as displayed in Table 7.5.  
 
Table 7.5: Sustainability strategies and instruments for simple, context-complex, complicated and 
complexicated projects. 
 Degree of 
Complexity 
Sustainability  
Strategy towards 
market 
Instrument Example of 
instrument 
Simple Low Prescribe methods Sustainability rating for 
materials and equipment 
DuboCalc 
Context-
complex & 
Complicated 
Moderate Prescribe 
preconditions 
Sustainability process 
and project certification 
tools  
CO2 performance 
ladder; BREEAM 
Complexicated High Prescribe 
ambitions 
Sustainability context-
specific awarding 
criteria  
MEAT criteria; Best 
Value Procurement 
 
In simple projects, a more straightforward strategy towards sustainability can be 
adopted. Sustainable methods for the predefined solutions (see also Table 1) can be 
prescribed. In order to do this, quality marks for materials and equipment can be 
introduced. One such mark is the DuboCalc instrument, currently applied by 
Rijkswaterstaat, which rates the sustainability of materials used in construction of a 
project (Rijkswaterstaat, 2012b). In moderate complex settings, which include projects 
with a complicated and context-complex character, prescribing methods will not 
provide enough adaptiveness. Instead, preconditions for solutions can be prescribed. 
Such preconditions offer some guidance on what needs to be developed for a project 
and how, but leave enough opportunities for private parties to introduce innovative 
solutions. An instrument that fits this setting is the CO2 performance ladder, first 
developed by the Dutch railways network manager ProRail, which was introduced to 
Dutch road infrastructure projects by Rijkswaterstaat in 2012 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2012a, 
see also Chapter 5). Through this instrument, bidding parties may qualify for a discount 
on their bid if they meet certain prescribed criteria for sustainable development. These 
criteria are related to the sustainability of internal business management processes and 
therefore do not directly relate to the bid or the project to be developed. Other 
process certification tools include the BREEAM and LEED rating systems29, commonly 
                                              
 
29 BREEAM stands for Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method. Originally it was a 
method for assessing the sustainability of building design, construction and operation, and awarding BREEAM 
certifications to buildings in the United Kingdom on the basis of this assessment. The method has been adapted for 
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applied in the United States and the United Kingdom (see also Arts & Faith-Ell, 2012). 
These systems were originally applied in the construction of real estate, but are now 
being adjusted to be applied in Dutch road infrastructure projects as well (DGBC, 
2011). In complexicated settings, preconditions on solutions or on methods can limit the 
adaptiveness too much to effectively deal with the complexity. Therefore, a strategy to 
introduce sustainability considerations in such settings is to prescribe public ambitions 
only. Introducing most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) criteria and Best 
value procurement (see Andersson Elffers Felix, 2012) fits this strategy (see Chapters 4 
and 5). These criteria can be defined and rewarded in a way that fits the project 
context, with involvement of public parties, market parties and civil society. MEAT-
criteria incorporate flexibility for public authority to award the quality of the private 
bids, while they provide private parties with an incentive to optimize sustainability in 
their proposed process and solution.  
 
In addition to sustainable process and product innovations in infrastructure projects, 
lifecycle integration also stimulates learning with regard to the interaction between 
public and private parties. The public and private parties involved in lifecycle 
integration initiatives have indicated that trust and understanding are stimulated. Such 
learning is essential in order to facilitate successful public-private partnerships, and 
therefore is an essential added value of early contractor involvement through 
interweaving (see Chapter 3), in the competitive dialogue (see Chapter 4) and in the 
early private involvement instruments (see Chapter 5). It can help stimulate and guide 
the ongoing, developing practice of lifecycle integration, in which integration initiatives 
are improved through single-loop learning: lessons learned are shared between public 
and private actors. However, learning currently tends to be restricted to single-loop 
learning in individual integration initiatives (see Chapter 6). More fundamental and 
system-oriented double-loop learning on the way separate initiatives relate to each 
other in the planning system proves difficult to achieve. Such learning is required in 
order to attain the structural change of the system that can lead to more sustainable 
development (Gunder, 2006) and to an approach in which public and private parties 
can deal with the challenges posed by the complexity of current society.  
 
7.5 Recommendations for lifecycle integration of the planning process 
In this study, the public and private experiences with these lifecycle integration 
initiatives were explored in Dutch practice by applying qualitative research methods, 
                                                                                                                                             
 
application in the Netherlands by the Dutch Green Building Council (DGBC), which resulted in several BREEAM-NL 
labels, for example for area development, infrastructure and real estate development (see DGBC, 2011). LEED is 
a similar rating system, which was first applied in the USA in 1998. LEED stands for Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design. The LEED rating system also assesses the sustainability of design, construction, operations 
and maintenance of buildings. Besides that, it also includes the possibility for individuals to be accredited for their 
knowledge of LEED (see USGBC, 2013). LEED is currently increasingly applied in the Netherlands, but, for now, 
this application seems to be limited to buildings. 
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including interviews, workshops and focus group discussions. These methods reflect the 
explorative aim of the research and the limited but growing experience with lifecycle 
integration in practice (see also Section 1.6). The applied qualitative research methods 
helped to gain a deeper understanding of social processes that fuel public-private 
interaction in lifecycle integration initiatives. As such, the study provides a first overview 
and interpretation of early practical insights in ongoing developments with increased 
market involvement. The applied methods incorporated the flexibility to address issues 
and explore specifics in detail. The explorative character of the research and the 
broad focus on lifecycle integration by market involvement throughout the planning 
process makes this research stand out in relation to other studies that have a more 
specific character and are focused on a single lifecycle integration initiative. By 
conducting a broader, explorative research, the findings from the different links in the 
planning lifecycle and their initiatives could be assessed in relation to each other, 
providing insights in the working of the planning process as a whole, and deepening the 
understanding of the role of public and private parties in road infrastructure planning. 
Reflecting on this study into lifecycle integration in the infrastructure planning process, 
several recommendations can be made. First, some implications and recommendations 
for planning research are provided, including suggestions for future research. Second, 
recommendations for planning practice are discussed by formulating lessons for 
applying lifecycle integration in infrastructure planning practice. 
 
7.5.1 Implications and suggestions for further research 
Based on this study, several suggestions for further research can be identified. Five 
suggestions for further research will be discussed below: 
1. Comparative research: international and cross-sectoral; 
2. Ex-post evaluation of infrastructure projects; 
3. Exploring other integration initiatives and involvement concepts; 
4. Closing the lifecycle: towards strategic asset management of the network; and 
5. Exploring complexity and combinations of integration initiatives. 
 
1. Comparative research: international and cross-sectoral 
In this research, lifecycle integration in the planning process of Dutch road infrastructure 
projects was investigated, focusing on Dutch initiatives in road infrastructure projects at 
the national level, as explained in Chapter 1. Road infrastructure planning in the 
Netherlands is traditionally performed in a top-down directive approach supported by 
a strong legal framework and carried out by the powerful Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment and its executive agency Rijkswaterstaat. Within the context of 
Dutch road infrastructure planning, this study examined the potential of market 
involvement in the planning process. This focus on Dutch practice with special attention 
to the relation between Rijkswaterstaat and market parties can be seen as a limitation 
of this research. However, in order to link the integration initiatives to international 
planning practice, previous chapters haven taken care to elaborate on the specifics of 
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the Dutch planning process, allowing an international audience to easily relate to the 
experiences described. In addition, many countries around the world are dealing with 
developments such as neoliberalism and new public management, increasing complexity 
and the search for sustainability; challenges and developments that stand at the basis 
of this research. The generated insight in practical experience in innovative contracts, 
procurement and ways to combine market involvement with project plan development 
can therefore undoubtedly be useful to an international audience. A first 
recommendation would be to further explore if the findings of this study can also be 
verified in other countries: It would be worthwhile to investigate if the strategies and 
solutions formulated for dealing with the issues are also similar or if other approaches 
have been developed. This research can provide a relevant basis for performing 
research into lifecycle integration in an international context. In addition, comparative 
research could also be carried out for other infrastructure sectors (railways, waterways, 
electricity, etcetera) and in other planning fields (housing, nature development, 
etcetera), both nationally and internationally.  
 
2. Ex-post evaluation of infrastructure projects 
Traditionally, planning is strongly focused on government, be it government at the local, 
the regional or the national level, and its relation with civil society, in the form of 
civilians, action groups, stakeholders and community representatives. In this planning 
tradition, the role of and interaction with market parties (see Thompson et al., 1991) 
usually receives less attention in literature. In this study, the added value of market 
involvement for the infrastructure planning process has been explored: business 
organizations that traditionally perform construction and maintenance possess 
developmental power, innovative power, knowledge and expertise that can strengthen 
the infrastructure planning process. The focus of this qualitative research was primarily 
on the planning process; the character and (quantitative) outcomes of the developed 
projects only played a secondary role. This approach was chosen because of the long 
time span of the infrastructure projects and the recent character of increased market 
involvement, making it difficult to research. A recommendation for further research 
would be to investigate over time whether the apparent added value of market 
involvement to the planning process found in this study also leads to significant 
improvements in the quality of delivered projects. Given the integral character of the 
contracts applied, such evaluative, and possibly quantitative, research can only be 
carried out ex post, at the end of project contract periods. The evaluation studies of the 
procurement of infrastructure projects, as customary commissioned by Rijkswaterstaat 
after the procurement procedure has been completed, can provide a useful basis for 
such ex post research. The outcomes of such evaluative studies can be compared to the 
project outcomes after the project contract period has ended. 
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3.  Exploring other integration initiatives and involvement concepts 
This research focused on investigating lifecycle integration initiatives that link stages in 
the infrastructure planning process. These initiatives focus on the involvement of market 
parties, and were explored through interviews, document analyses, workshops, and 
focus group discussions. By limiting the study to one initiative per link in the planning 
stage, in-depth knowledge of the public and private experience with the initiatives was 
gained, and an extensive overview of Dutch market involvement in the infrastructure 
planning process could be provided. This overview provides insight into the relations 
between the initiatives in the complete lifecycle of infrastructure planning. The 
investigated initiatives and concepts could help to deal with complexity, by providing 
other forms of governance including private business organizations. The approach to 
infrastructure planning can become more sustainable if these business organizations are 
involved properly: at the right moment in the infrastructure planning lifecycle, with 
appropriate roles and responsibilities fitting for the project setting. This research 
provides some suggestions and considerations for this involvement in planning practice 
(see also Sections 7.3 and 7.5.2). The experiences with market involvement and 
lifecycle integration presented in this study justify further exploration of other initiatives 
in future research. A first recommendation is therefore to investigate these. Alliances 
could, for example, improve the connection between the construction stage and the 
stage of maintenance and operation (see Chapter 5). Also, other existing procurement 
procedures, such as the negotiated procedure (see Chapter 4), may be able to connect 
the policymaking, project plan development and construction stages. Secondly, future 
research could be conducted from a broader perspective which more explicitly includes 
civil society actors as well. Concepts such as participative and collective design 
(Brabham, 2009), co-development and co-ownership arrangements (Dorée, 2001; 
Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004), and continuous evaluation and adjustment by cross-
functional teams (McDonough, 2000) can provide inspiration to develop alternative 
approaches to involve and connect government, market and civil society in a way that 
reflects the interconnected and complex character of current society. Finally, other 
initiatives such as tiering of impact assessment (Arts et al., 2011) and lifecycle 
monitoring, costing and auditing instruments could play a role throughout the planning 
lifecycle in assessing the added value of lifecycle integration through market 
involvement, especially in the implementation stages (see also the previous 
recommendation on ex-post evaluations). Further research could investigate whether 
such other initiatives for lifecycle integration may complement the initiatives 
investigated in this research. 
 
4. Closing the lifecycle: towards strategic asset management of the network 
In this research, the lifecycle of infrastructure planning has been discussed thus: starting 
with policy-making, proceeding with project plan development, and bringing projects 
into practice by subsequent construction, maintenance and operation. However, the 
decision to start at policy-making is debatable. In Western society infrastructure 
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planning practice, focus is increasingly shifting to redevelopment and brownfield 
development instead of development of additional infrastructure. As a consequence, 
planning starts from problem definition in maintenance and operation, and only after 
this has taken place, policies and plans can be developed (i.e. closing the lifecycle). 
Besides the planning lifecycle’s starting point, the premise that stages are performed 
subsequently in a linear process is also debatable. Planning is an iterative process, in 
which stages are never fully completed and processes can go back or skip steps (see 
Teisman, 2000): each separate stage in the infrastructure planning lifecycle can have a 
cyclical nature. This is clear from the ongoing political discussion, which can make early 
public commitment on plans and projects difficult to obtain (see Chapter 2). The 
iterative character and the changing starting point of the planning lifecycle do, 
however, strengthen the need for lifecycle integration initiatives. This research shows 
that lifecycle initiatives could help to facilitate the ongoing discussions between 
government, market and civil society throughout the planning stages. In order to 
strengthen the ongoing discussions further, future research could be performed from a 
stronger redevelopment perspective in which maintenance and operation are the 
starting point, i.e. from a classical ‘Plan-Do-Check-Act control cycle (Deming, 1986) to a 
“Check-Act-Plan-Do” perspective (see Lee & Dale, 1998; Arts & Tillema, 2012). In 
practice, research could be oriented more specifically towards asset management and 
infrastructure network management as the central concepts for planning (see also 
Chapter 6 and specifically Figure 6.1). Such research could result in alternative business 
and revenue models, in which growth as a driver is replaced by a focus on maintenance 
or, ultimately, a focus on planning for decline. 
 
5. Exploring complexity and combinations of integration initiatives 
A final avenue deserving further research is the notion of project complexity. By 
distinguishing between internal and external complexity, this research has attempted to 
increase understanding of the planning approaches in various infrastructure projects. It 
has become clear that project complexity can change over time (see also Section 7.3). 
For example, external political and societal developments can increase external 
complexity of projects and technological developments can cause internal complexity to 
increase. In addition, in infrastructure planning practice, distinguishing between 
complexities proves difficult. For example, external complexity can be internalized by 
an increase in projects’ institutional and geographical scope. The distinction between 
internal and external complexity proves to be somewhat hypothetical and theoretical in 
nature, making the different types of project complexity hard to distinguish in practice. 
Therefore, further research could aim to deepen understanding of the characteristics of 
project complexity and its relation to lifecycle integration initiatives. Combinations of 
lifecycle integration initiatives could be tested in practice for settings differing in type 
and degree of complexity. Such research could provide insight into how the learning 
experiences of actors involved can help to make incremental change (see Lindblom, 
1959) and optimize current initiatives of lifecycle integration for effectively addressing 
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complexity. In addition, other tools and approaches need to be developed and specific 
attention needs to be paid to how government, market and civil society can effectively 
collaborate in infrastructure planning, as discussed above.  
 
7.5.2 Recommendations for planning practice 
Based on this research, several lessons for planning practice can be formulated. The 
following ten lessons on lifecycle integration through market involvement are considered 
the most important:  
1. Adjust market involvement to fit project goal and character; 
2. Provide for early public planning outlines; 
3. Abandon conservative behaviour: dare to interact; 
4. Prevent the ‘black box’: involve the public; 
5. Provide for flexibility in contracts: promote ongoing interaction; 
6. Develop network-based planning strategies; 
7. Balance market involvement’s added value and transaction costs; 
8. Facilitate for learning in teams throughout the lifecycle; 
9. Foster market initiatives for change; and 
10. Enhance planning system’s sustainability. 
 
These lessons are arranged to roughly follow the order of the planning process and the 
outline of this study, starting with lessons for policymaking and project plan 
development, followed by construction and maintenance and operation 
recommendations and finally recommendations on the complete planning lifecycle.  
 
1. Adjust market involvement to fit project goal and character  
In order to make efficient use of market involvement, it needs to be adjusted to fit the 
goal and scope of a project (a new intersection, a lane extension, a tunnel, etcetera), 
the aim of a planning process (time gains, project quality, project control; see also 
Chapter 3) and the complexity and character of a project and its context (simple, 
complicated, context-complex, complexicated; see also Section 7.3). This means that 
public officials need to clearly identify the subject on which market involvement and 
public-private interaction is needed. Closely related to this, the input of the market and 
the potential product it needs to deliver need to be defined as well. By defining such 
processes and product boundaries, the desired creative input of market parties will 
become clear and the expectations of the market parties can be better managed. For 
simple projects this would mean that market involvement can be limited to consultation, 
while for more complex projects a more active role of the market is required. In 
addition to the process and products to be delivered, the rewards and incentives for 
market involvement should be made explicit at an early stage as well. This could 
include compensation for market efforts in the form of a prize (sum of money), 
protection of intellectual property rights and co-development arrangements, and 
facilitating for publicity (PR exposure; see also Chapter 2). 
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2. Provide for early public planning outlines  
Related to the first recommendation for planning practice, strategy and vision on the 
role of public-private interaction throughout the planning lifecycle need to be in place 
as well in order for market involvement to work. Such a strategy could help to relate 
and adjust the market involvement and lifecycle integration initiatives, strategies, 
policies and instruments to each other in a ‘process architecture’ (see De Bruijn et al., 
2010). In this architecture, current assessment instruments for market involvement, such 
as the market scan, the public-private comparator and the public sector comparator 
need to be situated as well. Connecting integration initiatives and the planning process 
can help to provide an outline of the planning process that may guide and direct the 
market input (and help to manage market parties’ expectation, see previous 
recommendation). An important prerequisite for providing public planning outlines is 
public-public agreement between national, regional and local government on the 
project at hand. Such an agreement requires political commitment, which can prove to 
be difficult to acquire. Therefore, for market involvement to work, continuous effort 
should be put in ensuring recurring interaction between government levels and 
interaction of planning officials and political decision-makers.  
 
3. Abandon conservative behaviour: dare to interact 
To make lifecycle integration through market involvement a success, it is necessary that 
the attitudes of the actors involved and the opportunities provided to these actors 
better reflect the changed roles in infrastructure development. This study shows that 
government in traditional infrastructure sectors can suffer from a controllability reflex, 
due to loss of expertise and the tendency to hang on to directive project plan 
development routines. Market parties can display risk-minimizing behaviour, which fuels 
juridification of the planning process. Together, this limits the opportunities for dealing 
with complexity, especially in procurement, as room for adaptive solutions is being 
limited in detailed negotiations, plans and contracts. For this to change, employees in 
the public and private organizations need to learn how to interact with each other and 
use public-private interaction to the fullest of its potential. This learning could be 
stimulated in broad road infrastructure practice communities, where public and private 
actors share their project experiences and examine the added value and the 
boundaries of public-private interaction for lifecycle integration. 
 
4. Prevent the ‘black box’: involve the public 
When procurement starts, road infrastructure projects tend to become a ‘black box’ as 
far as the general public is concerned. The involvement of civil society is limited as a 
result of the risk-minimizing, conservative behaviour in procurement. This can potentially 
put a project at risk because of the possible decrease of public support. In addition, the 
increased distribution of responsibilities to the private sector in public-private 
partnerships can pose problems. It can result in scattered roles and responsibilities, 
which affect the democratic legitimacy (Bexell & Mörth, 2010). Therefore, participation 
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of civil society in procurement must be actively stimulated by involving public societal 
organizations and interest groups. Government can help by facilitating discussions 
between market parties and civil groups. This will help stimulate the project to remain 
transparent and can foster public support and understanding. The general public then 
may play a role as ‘adapters’ in the planning process and help to align the project with 
the changing context (see Verhees, 2013). In practice, there is considerable experience 
with involving civil society in early policymaking and project plan development stages. 
It is relevant to continue this involvement in later procurement and construction stages. 
For example, local communities could be actively involved in the juries that judge the 
private bids. In order for involvement of civil society to work, the planning process 
needs to be transparent and it must be made clear in what way the input of the public 
is going to be used in the planning process.  
 
5. Provide for flexibility in contracts: promote ongoing interaction 
Current long-term contracts tend to limit flexibility by their over-detailed nature. Partly 
this is a consequence of the conservative nature of procurement negotiations (see the 
previous recommendation). However, it is also caused by the focus on reaching a 
decision and the lack of flexibility in this decision that is laid down in a contract. It 
seems that these contracts assume that negotiations can deal with complexity and arrive 
at a commonly agreed fixed end-state in which all future developments can be taken 
into account. However, as illustrated by this study, planning does not stop once a 
(project) plan is being developed. Changes occur over time as society develops. 
Implementation gaps are prevalent in all sectors and all levels, and between all stages 
of planning, including construction, maintenance and operation. Therefore, efforts 
should be undertaken to bridge the gaps by connecting stages, connecting people and 
connecting values in these later stages. In later stages of procurement, this means that 
construction and operation options should remain open for public-private dialogue. In 
order to make this possible, a transition from neoclassical DBFM contracts towards more 
adaptive relational contracts, such as partnering and alliance arrangements, is 
necessary. Only then can public and private parties continue to learn from each other, 
and improve planning throughout the lifecycle.  
 
6. Develop network-based planning strategies  
The investigated lifecycle integration initiatives cover a large part of the planning 
lifecycle. However, this study has shown that it is essential to improve the link between 
the operation and maintenance stage on the one hand and that of plan- and 
policymaking stages on the other. Both government and market parties involved in 
construction and maintenance are usually not involved in these policymaking and project 
plan development stages. In order to improve this link, the project-centred way of 
planning infrastructure should be reassessed. Infrastructure network-based management 
strategies, such as strategic asset management (Herder & Wijnia, 2012), should be 
developed further and used as the departure point for infrastructure planning 
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processes. This means that from the perspective of government as a road infrastructure 
network manager, constraints and bottlenecks in the road infrastructure network should 
be identified (for example in terms of traffic flows), which potentially could then result 
in new policies and eventually new projects to be formulated. In order for this to work, 
political policymakers need to adopt this network perspective and provide 
opportunities to the road asset management organization to use the road infrastructure 
network as the basis for determining a fitting project development strategy (see 
Leendertse et al., 2012). A first step towards such a strategy is to acknowledge that 
the project-driven style of planning leads to lock-ins in decision-making (see Flyvbjerg 
et al., 2003) and to consider other organizational forms in planning for road 
infrastructure, i.e. programmes, that can be applied from a network perspective.  
 
7. Balance market involvement’s added value and transaction costs 
In order for market involvement to work, insight in the added value is required. The 
assessment instruments could provide this insight, but are only aimed at one element in 
the lifecycle. For example, the instrument will examine the type of contract to be 
considered (in the public-private comparator) or the type of early market involvement 
to be applied (in the market scan). The insight in the added value could be created by 
extending the instrument to incorporate a more comprehensive lifecycle perspective. In 
doing so, it is also essential to provide insight into the degree to which transaction costs 
increase as a result of market involvement. Currently, the assessment instruments for 
market involvement applied in Dutch practice, such as the public-private comparator, 
the public sector comparator and the market scan, only take into account the possible 
outcomes in projects in terms of cost savings and time gains (see also Eversdijk, 2013). 
The more process-related transaction costs are not structurally assessed. In order for a 
combined assessment of transaction costs and added value to be possible, a balance 
should also be found between project-specific processes and designs which offer for 
flexibility and tailor-made solutions, and the use of cheaper and often more cost-
effective standardized procedures. Finding such a balance involves focusing the 
interaction on issues where market parties can provide added value and applying 
lifecycle integration initiatives only if they fit the project character (see the first 
recommendation in this section). In practice, this could mean that lifecycle integration 
initiatives are to be applied based on the type and degree of complexity of a project, 
see Section 7.3.  
 
8. Facilitate for learning in teams throughout the lifecycle  
An important recommendation for lifecycle integration through market involvement is to 
improve learning. Currently, experience and knowledge are lost over the course of the 
planning process due to rapid personnel changes, changes in organizations involved in 
the planning stages and the lack of sharing gained experiences. Learning can be 
improved by providing more continuity in personnel and better distribution of 
knowledge and experiences. A recommended solution would be to introduce cross-
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functional teams (McDonough, 2000), consisting of representatives of all actors involved 
in infrastructure planning: public and private experts from the stages of policymaking, 
project plan development, procurement, construction and maintenance and operation. 
Cross-functional teams could take the roles of supervisor and observer throughout the 
complete planning lifecycle and could assist in the detection and distribution of lessons 
learned. More importantly, cross-functional teams could help to use experiences to 
improve the initiatives for lifecycle integration and the instruments for market 
involvement. This could contribute to the improvement of the public-private interaction 
(see also third recommendation in this Section) and, in doing so, they could help to 
incorporate the incremental changes in the initiatives effectively into an overarching 
strategy for lifecycle integration through market involvement.  
 
9. Foster market initiatives for change 
The investigated lifecycle integration initiatives in this research all take government as 
the initiating actor responsible for proper policy-making and project plan development, 
and responsible for maintaining fair competition in procurement and setting up cost and 
time efficient projects that deliver value for money. With the notable exception of 
unsolicited proposals, the initiative and responsibilities lie with the government. The LEED 
and BREEAM systems include incentives for market parties to change, but are in 
essentially government-led initiatives for change. In order to achieve structural change, 
market initiatives should also be fostered. Market parties feel the urge to prove to the 
public that they themselves also feel the need for change. Currently, business 
organizations tend to pay significant attention to corporate social responsibility and to 
developing their activities accordingly. In line with this, initiatives for regulation are 
being jointly developed by government and market parties, see for example the 
sector-wide agreements on sustainability ratings of materials and equipment. Such joint 
initiatives could prove to be efficient ways of structuring the infrastructure planning 
system and coming to improvements in the complete sector.  
 
10. Enhance planning system’s sustainability  
Initiatives for lifecycle integration have a central place in this research. Although these 
initiatives can help to realize incremental change and help to develop a more 
sustainable lifecycle perspective on infrastructure planning, they do not tell the whole 
story. A system is more than its separate links. This means that in order for infrastructure 
planning to change towards more inclusive planning, the whole system may have to be 
revised. In order to do so, changing the institutional setting and the attitudes and 
behaviour of the involved actors is crucial (see the previous recommendations for these 
suggested changes) if a structural, lasting effect on the approach to infrastructure 
planning is to be achieved. The public and private experiences discussed in this study 
could help to guide evolving approaches that increasingly display inclusivity with 
regard to the actors involved, the scope of an infrastructure project and the connection 
of stages over time. Studying these experiences gained in practice can help to come to 
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learning processes that assist in determining suitable mixes of governance strategies 
combined with sets of institutional conditions; combinations that provide proper 
incentives for stimulating the inclusiveness of the planning process and thereby foster 
sustainability. In order to identify these combinations and the limits of approaches to 
infrastructure planning, the final recommendation is to apply continuous public-private 
interaction. As discussed, such interaction can help develop an overall lifecycle 
perspective, which can be used to stimulate inclusiveness during all planning stages. By 
establishing such a lifecycle perspective, the knowledge and experience of both 
government and market parties, as well as civil society, will help to increase the 
adaptiveness required to deal with complexity and to come to more sustainable road 
infrastructure.  
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Summary 
 
The planning of infrastructure is a complex task in which the limits of traditional 
directive approaches to planning become clear. In Dutch road infrastructure planning, 
the scarcity of available land, the increased influence of European and regional levels 
of government, increased public participation and increased privatization of public 
services are developments that question the role of the dominant Dutch Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment in such directive approaches. Rijkswaterstaat, the 
executive agency of this Ministry, is searching for new approaches to road 
infrastructure planning. This study describes and assesses initiatives for changing these 
approaches, especially pertaining to the involvement of private market parties - i.e. 
business organizations involved in design, engineering, financing, construction, operating 
and maintaining road infrastructure - throughout the road infrastructure planning 
process, i.e. policymaking, project plan development, construction, and operation and 
maintenance.  
 
The planning process of road infrastructure is confronted with several challenges. In this 
study, five challenges relating to the character of the planning process are discussed:  
the first challenged is posed by implementation gaps which disconnect the strategic 
stages of policymaking and project plan-development from the more operational 
project implementation in the construction and operation and maintenance stages.  
Second, strong forward and top-down focus results in a directive, hedged planning 
process in which opportunities to adapt to changing circumstances are limited. A third 
challenge is posed by the limits to the dominant position of national government 
dominance in planning. In planning, national government increasingly retreats to a 
strategic policy position, leaving opportunities for private market parties to increase 
their activities in plan development, (technical) design, construction and maintenance of 
road infrastructure. Fourth, the habitual planning process for road infrastructure, 
involving the usual actors through a standard approach, increasingly needs to 
incorporate learning in order to come to a more flexible approach that could lead to 
more adaptive solutions. The fifth and final challenge is to effectively incorporate the 
concept of sustainability in the planning process, in such a way that sets it as a long-
term overarching goal. 
 
A satisfactory approach for dealing with these challenges throughout the planning 
process is yet to be found.  Currently, several initiatives for linking stages are being 
undertaken. Potentially, knowledge and expertise of actors involved in other stages 
may be unlocked through these initiatives for lifecycle integration, providing better 
adjustment between the stages in the planning lifecycle. This study explores several of 
such lifecycle integration initiatives. The selection of initiatives was limited to only 
include  initiatives that include innovative ways of involving the market. These initiatives 
are: early market involvement linking the policymaking and project plan development 
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stages, the initiatives of early contractor involvement and the competitive dialogue 
procurement procedure linking the project plan development and construction stages, 
and integrated Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) contracts, which link the 
construction and the operation and maintenance stages.  
 
However, these lifecycle integration initiatives are new to infrastructure planning and 
their effects on the planning process, in terms of time, costs and quality, are as yet 
unclear. Also, these initiatives are currently applied separately and whether they can 
be combined and effectively incorporated into an more integrated approach for the 
road infrastructure planning process remains unclear. Because the effects in the 
delivered end products will only become clear after the contract period has ended, this 
study examines the public and private experiences with applying lifecycle integration 
in evolving approaches to infrastructure planning. It explores the mix of ‘hard’ 
institutional conditions (i.e. financial, legal, technical-qualitative and organization 
conditions) and ‘soft’ governance strategies (i.e. co-ordination, competition and co-
operation) that can make up a balanced lifecycle approach to infrastructure planning. 
In short, this study aims to 
provide insight into the relevance and applicability of lifecycle integration 
throughout the Dutch infrastructure planning process in order to provide 
directions for the design of an overarching full lifecycle approach in 
infrastructure planning.  
 
In addition this study provides an overview of the initiatives and insight in the first 
experiences with applying the initiatives in practice. The evolving character of the 
approaches for lifecycle integration and market involvement in road infrastructure 
planning makes such an overview of experiences relevant. Scientifically, this study’s 
relevance lies in clarifying the relation between institutional conditions and governance 
strategies in planning for complex infrastructure projects. In order to bring forward 
experiences from practice, the analyses of the separate lifecycle initiatives which are 
described in Chapters 2 to 5 are centred around lifecycle integration initiatives in 
several large Dutch road infrastructure planning projects. These case studies were 
investigated by conducting in-depth interviews with public and private actors directly 
involved in applying the lifecycle integration initiatives. Their experiences from practice 
are supplemented by substantive analyses of documents (mainly policy documents), 
Rijkswaterstaat guidelines and project evaluation studies.  
 
In Chapter 2, the experiences with early market involvement in the explorative 
policymaking and project plan development are discussed. In Dutch practice, four 
instruments for the precompetitive involvement of private market parties are applied: 
market consultations, early design contests, market reconnaissances, and unsolicited 
proposals. These instruments aim to unlock the private parties’ knowledge and expertise 
to strengthen plan development. In this chapter, the instruments ‘potential for 
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strengthening plan development is analyzed by investigating four cases in Dutch 
infrastructure planning practice for potential risks and added values of early market 
involvement. These potential added values include detailed and committed information 
on feasibility, lifecycle perspective, professionalization of the planning process and 
conceptual creativity; the potential risks include hampered competition, increased 
complexity of the planning process, limitation of political freedom of choice, and 
opportunistic behaviour. In practice, the instruments’ potential for unlocking private 
parties’ knowledge and expertise and strengthen plan development varies. The market 
consultation is used to consult private parties on government ideas and intended 
processes. The transaction costs are low, but the added value to the planning process is 
also restricted: the private parties have a passive role and have only limited 
possibilities for bringing in ideas. The early design contest is used to generate private 
ideas to specific, worked-out problems. Although the instrument encourages active 
private involvement, its potential is limited as the competitive element does not allow 
for public-private collaboration between private competitors and government. The 
market reconnaissance is applied to generate conceptual solutions through an extensive 
public-private dialogue. Its transaction costs are high, but the added value can also be 
high because of the active involvement and commitment of both government and 
private market parties. Through unsolicited proposals, private parties provide 
government with ideas and worked-out solutions without government having predefined 
a problem. The proactive role of private parties can stimulate creative proposals, but 
they can prove to be difficult for public parties to accommodate in their planning 
processes. From the application of the precompetitive market involvement models in 
practice can be concluded that in order to unlock their potential, government needs to 
incorporate incentives for creativity, to reward private involvement and strike a 
balance in the setup of the investigated models between conceptual freedom for 
private solutions and transparent public guidance in preconditions and regulations. 
Early private involvement could, thus, provide opportunities for conceptual creativity 
and innovation and opportunities for public–private collaboration, which can strengthen 
plan development. 
 
In Chapter 3, early contractor involvement of public planning procedures and the 
procurement procedure is investigated for the Dutch infrastructure planning practice. 
Through such involvement, the expertise and knowledge of the construction stage can 
be used in the earlier stage of project plan development. Two types of early contractor 
involvement can be distinguished, based on the opportunities for public-private 
interaction. In parallelization, the public planning procedures and the procurement 
procedure, traditionally performed in sequence, are performed parallel to each other. 
This can lead to time gains in the infrastructure planning process, without significantly 
increased risk. In interweaving, the public planning procedure and the procurement 
procedures take place simultaneously and can influence each other. This way, input 
from private market parties in the procurement procedure can be used to improve the 
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public planning procedure. This could help to stimulate the project control over costs and 
timeframes, and also to increase project quality by stimulating innovation. However, 
interweaving is more risky: it requires more effort in the preparation of planning and 
procurement procedures. Experiences and lessons learned in Dutch practice show that in 
order to optimize both types of early contractor involvement, the differences between 
the competitive procurement procedures and the open, cooperative public planning 
procedures need to be bridged. In addition, in order for early contractor involvement 
to succeed, both public and private parties must recognize its added value and 
subsequently make an extra effort in the simultaneously performed procurement and 
public planning procedures. 
 
In Chapter 4, the link between the stages of plan development and construction is 
examined also by specifically focusing on the experiences with the competitive 
dialogue procurement procedure. Such procedures enable for structured interaction in a 
dialogue between a public procuring authority and private candidates. The procedure 
includes the governance strategies of coordination, cooperation, and competition: a 
coordinated dialogue procedure to the cooperative public-private interaction for the 
competitive procurement of a contract. The mix of these strategies in the competitive 
dialogue of several Dutch road infrastructure projects can differ between projects, as 
each dialogue is set up and carried out context and project specific. In practice, 
organizational issues such as time pressure and personnel changes affect the public-
private interaction in the competitive dialogue, as well as factors of technical, legal and 
financial complexity. Together, these factors cause the public parties to focus on 
coordination by strictly maintaining the level playing field. In addition, detailed 
contracts are set up, in a reflex to control the complexity of the process, the project and 
the outcomes. As a result of the strong competition in the competitive dialogue and the 
involvement of private financiers, the private consortia display a tendency to minimize 
risks. Together, public coordination and private competition limited cooperation in the 
public-private interaction in the competitive dialogue. However, the experiences in 
practice also show that learning occurs. By applying the competitive dialogue 
procedure more often, the insecurity that fuels the dominance of coordination can be 
decreased. Discussions in the community of practice could assist in this. A second 
learning effect pertains to the opportunities present in the procedure to address 
complexity by more cooperation. Such opportunities exist in the form of MEAT 
awarding criteria and best value procurement, but are currently not grasped. This 
leads to the conclusion that the competitive dialogue is a promising tool that can unlock 
private party experiences in an earlier stage, if applied to its full potential. 
 
In Chapter 5, the link between construction and maintenance stages is investigated by 
looking at the role and impact of the introduction of integrated Design-Build-Finance-
Maintain (DBFM) contracts in Dutch road infrastructure planning practice. This includes 
the connection and adjustment of the maintenance stage to the construction stage, and 
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eventually, also to the design and procurement of road infrastructure.  The 
sustainability of DBFM contracts is assessed by investigating three dimensions of 
inclusiveness: actors, time and scope. The actor dimension shows shared common goals 
within the contract and the consortia as a result of DBFM contracts, but closed 
procedures with limited civil society involvement. The scope dimension shows possibilities 
for sustainable integrated designs, but difficulties arise too, a result of inflexible project 
scopes in detailed procurement and tensions between the project tasks and the asset 
management tasks in the network. The time dimensions shows that DBFM contracts 
include incentives for stimulating the inclusiveness through lifecycle optimizations, 
through lifecycle costing and lifecycle management. However, rigid performance 
criteria prove to be difficult to define up front, and, furthermore, operation is not 
included in integrated contracts, limiting the optimizations regarding operation and the 
possibilities to connect to plan development stages. Three avenues towards more 
sustainable infrastructure development can be recommended on the basis of the 
assessment of DBFM contracts: green procurement by determining sustainable 
qualification, award and contract performance criteria; strategic asset management by 
effectively linking back from traffic and asset management in the maintenance and 
operation stages to plan preparation in the explorative and plan development stages; 
and finally, relational contracting to create unique interdependent relationships to 
provide for more resilient and adaptive arrangements to better deal with complexity. 
 
In Chapter 6, the public and private experiences with lifecycle integration are brought 
together. This chapter has a different methodological basis. It centres around focus 
group discussions in which several propositions, derived from the findings in Chapters 2 
to 5, are discussed by a mix of public and private participants. These participants can 
be considered experts from practice when it comes to applying lifecycle integration 
initiatives in different stages of the planning process. The focus group discussions 
enabled them to use their expertise and experiences from practice to reflect on 
whether and how lifecycle integration initiatives can be combined into a more 
integrated approach to deal with project complexity. Project complexity is discussed 
using two components: internal complexity, which is the interrelatedness between project 
components, and external complexity, which is defined as the interaction between the 
project and its context. The focus group discussions showed that internal complexity can 
be managed well through the existing integration initiatives of precompetitive market 
involvement, early contractor involvement, competitive dialogues and DBFM contracts. 
External project complexity is more difficult to address by combining current integration 
initiatives. The initiatives seem to be applied rigidly and allow for only limited 
interaction and flexibility for coping with political and social uncertainties resulting from 
external complexity. The conclusion of this chapter is that it seems that the initiatives 
have potential for dealing with internal and external project complexity, but that in 
their application in practice, opportunities for dealing with project complexity are not 
used to their full potential. Recommendations are to increase learning and knowledge 
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sharing by a more dynamic process management approach, and to stimulate interaction 
throughout the planning lifecycle by introducing cross-functional public-private teams. In 
addition, new adaptive elements based on partnering could be included in the planning 
process. The incorporation of alliance components seems especially helpful in better 
dealing with external complexity in the rigid DBFM contracts. 
 
In Chapter 7, this study’s conclusions are provided. These conclusions are based on an 
exploration of the public and private experiences with initiatives for lifecycle 
integration, thereby providing insight in the relevance and applicability of lifecycle 
integration throughout the Dutch infrastructure planning process. It can be concluded 
that lifecycle integration is possible and can provide added value if applied in a 
suitable context and an appropriate manner. Early market involvement, early 
contractor involvement, competitive dialogue and DBFM contracts can unlock market 
knowledge and expertise, stimulate constructive public-private dialogues and facilitate 
lifecycle optimizations by connecting the policymaking, plan development, construction 
and maintenance and operation stages. It is important that the benefits of applying 
initiatives and the potential costs, for example in terms of increased transaction costs, 
are assessed beforehand. 
 
In order for market involvement throughout the planning lifecycle to work, the approach 
to lifecycle integration needs to be adjusted to the complexity of the project and its 
context. Although in practice, it can prove hard to determine the degree and type of 
complexity (internal or external), and the complexity can differ over time during the 
planning process, four types of project settings are explored for possible combinations 
of lifecycle integration initiatives in order to provide directions for the design of an 
overarching full lifecycle approach in infrastructure planning. In simple projects (low 
internal and external complexity) the focus can be on the governance strategy of 
competition, and relatively straightforward planning procedures, procurement 
procedures and contracts can be applied. This helps to keep transaction costs low. For 
complicated projects (high internal and low external complexity), all three governance 
strategies can play a role: coordination and cooperation are necessary and 
competition can be stimulated to deal with internal complexity. Early market 
involvement through market consultation and early design contest, early contractor 
involvement through parallelisation, the competitive dialogue and DBFM contracts all fit 
this project setting. For context-complex projects (low internal and high external 
complexity) the focus in governance should be on cooperation and coordination, and 
the integration initiatives that can stimulate public-public cooperation are suitable. In 
particular, early market involvement in the policymaking and plan development stages 
could help public parties to address external complexity. In complexicated projects 
especially, cooperation is essential to enable the exchange of knowledge and 
expertise for dealing with both high internal and high external complexity. Initiatives 
 Summary  221 
 
 
that fit this governance strategy and project setting are market reconnaissances, early 
interweaving, competitive dialogues, and alliances respectively. 
 
Some theoretical implications for market involvement throughout the planning lifecycle 
can be formulated based on this study, in which the experiences with lifecycle 
integration through market involvement for Dutch road infrastructure planning are 
provided. The first recommendation is that further international and cross-sectoral 
comparative research be performed to provide insight in experiences in other countries 
and in adjacent sectors. Secondly, ex-post evaluation of infrastructure projects could be 
performed to complement this study’s assessment of developing practice with lifecycle 
integration. Thirdly, the exploration of other lifecycle integration initiatives and market 
involvement concepts could prove worthwhile. Fourthly, additional research in relation 
to project and network management strategies could be performed, which could assist 
in closing the planning lifecycle by linking the stage of maintenance and operation back 
to the policymaking stage. Finally, to complement and explore the findings of this study, 
further research could be aimed towards further exploring the relation between 
complexity and combinations of lifecycle integration initiatives. Besides theoretical 
implications, several recommendations for road infrastructure planning practice can also 
be formulated, which pertain to lifecycle integration through market involvement and 
the potential for optimization of the integration initiatives. As indicated before, it is 
important to adjust market involvement to the project complexity, but also to the project 
goal and character, in which added value and transaction costs for integration 
initiatives need to be balanced. Early public outlines for planning also need to be 
provided, for which network based planning strategies can provide relevant input. 
Furthermore, it is essential to establish open and ongoing interaction, to involve the civil 
society in this interaction, to stimulate innovation and learning in teams, and to foster 
market initiatives for change. This can enable adaptive ways to deal with complexity 
and achieve sustainability in road infrastructure planning.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Bij het plannen van weginfrastructuur wordt duidelijk dat traditionele directieve 
planningsbenaderingen slechts beperkt in staat zijn om de complexiteit in planning het 
hoofd te bieden. In Nederland zorgen de schaarste in beschikbare ruimte, de 
versterkte invloed van zowel de Europese als de provinciale overheden, de actievere 
betrokkenheid van de maatschappij en de verdere privatisering van overheidsdiensten 
er voor dat de traditioneel dominante rol van het Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu 
in directieve benaderingen onder druk komt te staan. Rijkswaterstaat, het uitvoerende 
agentschap van dit Ministerie, zoekt naar nieuwe benaderingen voor de planning van 
weginfrastructuur, waarbij wordt gekeken naar andere vormen om marktpartijen te 
betrekken gedurende de plancyclus van weginfrastructuur: de beleidsvorming, de 
planvorming, de aanleg en het beheer en onderhoud. Deze studie beschrijft de 
ervaringen met verschillende initiatieven voor het anders betrekken van marktpartijen, 
om daarmee de fasen in de plancyclus van weginfrastructuur beter op elkaar te laten 
koppelen en het planproces te versterken.  
 
Het plannen van wegen staat voor verschillende uitdagingen: vijf van deze uitdagingen 
worden in deze studie verder beschreven. De eerste uitdaging wordt gevormd door de 
implementation gap in het planproces tussen de meer strategische voorbereiding in de 
fasen van verkenning en planuitwerking en de meer operationele implementatie fasen 
van aanleg en beheer en onderhoud. Ten tweede zorgen de sturing van bovenaf en de 
sterke voorwaartse focus voor een directief en sterk afgeschermd planproces met 
slechts beperkte mogelijkheden om adaptief met veranderende omstandigheden om te 
gaan. Een derde uitdaging wordt gesteld door de grenzen aan de dominante positie 
van de nationale overheid in infrastructuurplanning. De nationale overheid trekt zich 
steeds verder terug naar een strategische, beleidsvormende positie, waardoor 
marktpartijen de kans krijgen om hun activiteiten in de planontwikkeling, het (technisch) 
ontwerp, de aanleg en het beheer en onderhoud van weginfrastructuur uit te breiden. 
De vierde uitdaging die in deze studie wordt beschreven is de noodzaak om 
leerervaringen beter op te nemen in het planproces. Door leerervaringen te gebruiken 
kan de standaard planningsbenadering met de gebruikelijke actoren worden 
omgevormd in een meer flexibele benadering die kan leiden tot meer adaptieve 
oplossingen. De vijfde en laatste uitdaging is het concept duurzaamheid effectief 
opnemen in het planproces, zodanig dat duurzaamheid als lange termijn doel beter is 
verankerd. 
 
Een perfect passende benadering om in verschillende fasen gedurende het gehele 
planproces met deze uitdagingen om te gaan is nog niet gevonden. Sinds kort worden 
echter verschillende initiatieven ondernomen om fasen in het planproces sterker aan 
elkaar koppelen door levenscyclusintegratie. In potentie kunnen dergelijke integratie 
initiatieven zorgen voor een verbeterde uitwisseling van kennis en ervaring tussen de 
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betrokken partijen. Zoals hierboven beschreven richt deze studie zich op het verkennen 
van de ervaringen met enkele van deze levenscyclus-integratie initiatieven, die zich 
richten op het innovatief betrekken van marktpartijen. Vier initiatieven zijn geselecteerd 
en nader onderzocht in de Nederlandse praktijk van weginfrastructuurplanning. Het 
eerste initiatief is vroege marktbetrokkenheid, dat in potentie de eerste fasen van 
beleidsvorming en planvorming beter met elkaar kan verbinden. De verbinding van de 
planvorming en de aanlegfasen is de focus van de volgende twee onderzochte 
initiatieven: vervlechting en parallellisatie van plan- en aanbestedingsprocedures en de 
concurrentiegerichte dialoog als specifieke aanbestedingsprocedure. Het laatste 
onderzochte initiatief is Design-Build-Finance-Maintain contracten (DBFM; in het 
Nederlands: Ontwerp-Aanleg-Financiering-Onderhoud). Dit initiatief legt onder andere 
de verbinding tussen de fasen van de aanleg en het beheer en onderhoud. 
 
Deze initiatieven zijn nieuw binnen de weginfrastructuurplanning en als gevolg daarvan 
is hun uitwerking op het planproces nog onbekend. Daarnaast worden de initiatieven 
tot op heden afzonderlijk toegepast, en is het daarom onduidelijk of, en hoe, ze kunnen 
worden gecombineerd in een meer geïntegreerde levenscyclusbenadering voor de 
planning van weginfrastructuur. Omdat de uitwerking van de initiatieven in de praktijk 
pas echt duidelijk wordt nadat de contractperiodes van het beheer en onderhoud zijn 
afgelopen en deze initiatieven nog maar zeer recent zijn ingevoerd, beperkt deze 
studie zich tot het verkennen van de publieke en private ervaringen met het toepassen 
van de integratie initiatieven in de veranderende benadering voor 
weginfrastructuurplanning. Het richt zich op het verkennen van de mix van ‘harde’ 
institutionele condities (financieel, juridisch, technisch-kwalitatief en organisatorisch) en 
‘zachte’ governance strategieën (coördinatie, competitie en coöperatie) die tezamen 
een gebalanceerde levenscyclusbenadering voor de weginfrastructuurplanning kunnen 
vormen. Het doel van de studie is: 
inzicht verschaffen in de relevantie en de toepasbaarheid van 
levenscyclusintegratie in het Nederlandse planproces voor infrastructuur en 
richtingen te identificeren voor het ontwerp van een meer omvattende 
levenscyclusbenadering voor de planning van weginfrastructuur.  
 
Daarnaast biedt deze studie ook een overzicht van de integratie initiatieven en de 
eerste ervaringen met deze initiatieven in de praktijk. Dit overzicht van ervaringen is 
maatschappelijk relevant omdat de benadering voor marktbetrokkenheid en 
levenscyclusintegratie zich nog voortdurend verder ontwikkelt in de praktijk. De 
wetenschappelijke relevantie van de studie ligt in het verduidelijken van de relatie 
tussen institutionele condities en governance strategieën in de planning van complexe 
infrastructuurprojecten. Om de ervaringen uit de praktijk inzichtelijk te maken zijn 
levenscyclusintegratie initiatieven afzonderlijk geanalyseerd, zoals beschreven in de 
hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5, bij hun toepassing in verschillende Nederlandse 
snelweginfrastructuur projecten. Dit inzicht is verkregen door diepte-interviews af te 
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nemen met publieke en private actoren betrokken bij de toepassing van de initiatieven 
voor levenscyclusintegratie. De resultaten hiervan zijn aangevuld met uitkomsten van 
een documentenanalyse van voornamelijk beleidsdocumenten, richtlijnen van 
Rijkswaterstaat en projectevaluaties. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 2 worden de ervaringen met vroege marktbetrokkenheid in de 
verkennende en strategische fases van plan- en beleidsvorming besproken. In de 
Nederlandse praktijk worden vier instrumenten voor dergelijk pre-competitieve 
marktbetrokkenheid toegepast: marktconsultaties, ontwerpwedstrijden, eigen 
initiatieven en marktverkenningen. Deze instrumenten richten zich op het ontsluiten van 
private kennis en ervaring voor het versterken van het planproces. In dit hoofdstuk is de 
potentie van de instrumenten voor het versterken van het planproces geanalyseerd 
door bij vier toepassingen in de Nederlandse praktijk van infrastructuurplanning de 
risico’s en meerwaarde te onderzoeken. Verschillende potentiële factoren van 
meerwaarde zijn onderscheiden: het leveren van gedetailleerde en gecommitteerde 
informatie over de haalbaarheid, het stimuleren van een levenscyclus perspectief, de 
professionalisering van het planproces en het versterken van de conceptuele 
creativiteit. De potentiële risico’s van vroege marktbetrokkenheid zijn: belemmerde 
concurrentie, vergrote complexiteit van het planproces, beperking van de politieke 
keuzeruimte en opportunistisch gedrag. In de praktijk verschilt de mate waarin 
instrumenten private kennis en ervaring kunnen ontsluiten en daarmee het planproces 
versterken. De marktconsultatie wordt gebruikt om marktpartijen te consulteren over 
voorstellen van de overheid. De transactiekosten van dit instrument zijn laag en de 
meerwaarde is ook beperkt: de marktpartijen hebben een passieve rol waarin ze 
beperkt kennis en ervaring kunnen inbrengen. De ontwerpwedstrijd wordt gebruikt om 
private ideeën te genereren op een specifiek en uitgewerkt probleem. Hoewel het 
instrument marktbetrokkenheid aanmoedigt, wordt de potentie beperkt doordat het 
wedstrijdelement samenwerking tussen private deelnemers en de publieke overheid in 
de weg staat. De marktverkenning wordt toegepast om conceptuele oplossingen te 
genereren door een intensieve publiek-private dialoog. De transactiekosten zijn hoog 
en de meerwaarde kan groot zijn door de actieve en gecommitteerde rol van de 
marktpartijen en de overheid. Door eigen initiatieven kunnen private partijen de 
overheid voorzien van conceptuele ideeën tot gedetailleerde ontwerpen, zonder dat 
de overheid een probleem heeft benoemd. De proactieve rol van de marktpartijen kan 
de creativiteit van de initiatieven stimuleren. Publieke partijen ervaren moeilijkheden bij 
het accommoderen van de eigen initiatieven in hun lopende planprocessen. Uit de 
toepassing van de verschillende initiatieven voor vroege marktbetrokkenheid in de 
praktijk kan geconcludeerd worden dat kennis en ervaring van private partijen kan 
worden ontsloten door vroege marktbetrokkenheid als de juiste stimulansen voor 
creativiteit worden opgenomen, de marktbetrokkenheid passend beloond wordt en een 
balans wordt gevonden tussen het bieden van vrijheid voor creatieve en innovatieve 
oplossingen en transparante sturing en inkadering in publieke randvoorwaarden en 
226  Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle 
 
 
regulering. Zo kan vroege marktbetrokkenheid mogelijkheden bieden voor innovatie, 
conceptuele creativiteit en publiek-private samenwerking om daarmee het planproces 
te versterken. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt de vroege betrokkenheid van marktpartijen onderzocht in het 
gelijktijdig uitvoeren van publieke planprocedures en aanbestedingsprocedures voor 
Nederlandse weginfrastructuurplanning. Door een dergelijke betrokkenheid zou de 
kennis en ervaring van marktpartijen uit de aanbesteding kunnen worden gebruikt om 
de planontwikkeling in de publieke planprocedure te versterken. Daarmee verbindt dit 
initiatief de actoren, de kennis en de ervaring uit de aanlegfase met die van de fase 
van planvorming. Op basis van de mogelijkheden voor publiek-private interactie 
kunnen twee typen van dergelijke gelijktijdig uitvoeren van de planprocedure en de 
aanbestedingsprocedure worden onderscheiden: parallellisatie en vervlechting. Bij 
parallellisatie worden de publieke planprocedure en de aanbestedingsprocedure 
gelijktijdig uitgevoerd, zonder interactie tussen de twee. Dit kan leiden tot tijdswinsten 
in het planproces, zonder dat grote risico’s worden genomen. Bij vervlechting worden 
aanbesteding en publieke planprocedure gelijktijdig uitgevoerd en is er daarbij 
sprake van interactie tussen de twee procedures. Hierdoor kan kennis en ervaring die 
door marktpartijen wordt ingebracht in de aanbesteding gebruikt worden om de 
publieke planvorming te versterken. Dit kan leiden tot versterkte controle over de 
kosten en de duur van een project en daarnaast kan de kwaliteit van een project 
verbeterd worden doordat innovatie wordt gestimuleerd. Vervlechting brengt echter 
risico’s met zich mee: er moet meer geïnvesteerd worden in de voorbereiding van de 
publieke planprocedure en de aanbestedingsprocedure. Om parallellisatie en 
vervlechting te verbeteren laat ervaring uit de Nederlandse praktijk zien dat de 
verschillen tussen de gesloten, privaatrechtelijke aanbestedingsprocedures en de open 
publiekrechtelijke planprocedures overbrugt dienen te worden. Daarnaast dienen 
zowel de publieke als de private partijen de meerwaarde te herkennen om vervolgens 
beide een extra inspanning leveren in de gelijktijdig uitgevoerde publieke 
planprocedure en aanbestedingsprocedure. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 richt zich, door de ervaringen in de praktijk met de concurrentiegerichte 
dialoog te onderzoeken, net als hoofdstuk 3 op de relatie tussen de planvormingsfase 
en de aanlegfase. De concurrentiegerichte dialoog is een aanbestedingsprocedure een 
gestructureerde interactie tussen publieke aanbestedende partijen en private 
gegadigden mogelijk maakt. De procedure herbergt de governance strategieën 
coördinatie, competitie en coöperatie: het is een gecoördineerde procedure met 
coöperatieve publiek-private interactie in een dialoog, waarmee private partijen in 
competitie een contract proberen te bemachtigen. De mix van deze drie strategieën in 
de concurrentiegerichte dialoog bij Nederlandse weginfrastructuurplanning verschilt 
per project, omdat elke dialoog een context- en project-specifieke invulling kan krijgen. 
Organisatorische factoren, zoals tijdsdruk en veranderingen in personeel, en technische, 
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juridische en financiële complexiteitsfactoren kunnen de publiek-private interactie en de 
mix van governance strategieën in de concurrentiegericht dialoog beïnvloeden. Deze 
factoren zorgen er samen voor dat publieke partijen zich sterk richten op het 
coördineren en beheersen van de aanbestedingsprocedure en daarbij vooral een 
eerlijk speelveld met gelijke kansen voor de markt strikt willen garanderen. Een ander 
gevolg is dat sterk gedetailleerde contracten worden opgesteld in een beheersreflex:  
de publieke partij wil, ondanks de complexiteit, door coördinatie controle blijven 
uitoefenen op het proces, het project en het resultaat. Door de sterke rol van competitie 
en de betrokkenheid van private financiers en investeerders in de concurrentiegerichte 
dialoog vertonen de deelnemende private partijen risicomijdend gedrag. De publieke 
focus op coördinatie en de private focus op competitie zorgt er voor dat de coöperatie 
beperkt blijft in de concurrentiegericht dialoog. De praktijk laat echter ook zien dat er 
leerervaringen worden opgedaan. Allereerst, door de concurrentiegerichte dialoog 
vaker toe te passen kan een deel van de onzekerheid die de dominantie van de 
coördinatie-strategie voedt worden weggenomen. Het delen van ervaringen tussen 
betrokken partijen kan hierbij helpen. Een tweede leereffect wordt gevormd door de 
mogelijkheden om complexiteit te kunnen adresseren door meer coöperatie in de 
procedure. Dergelijke mogelijkheden dienen zich aan in de vorm van economisch meest 
voordelige inschrijving (EMVI) gunningscriteria en best value procurement (in het 
Nederlands: gunnen op waarde), maar deze mogelijkheden worden op dit moment niet 
volledig benut. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat de concurrentiegerichte dialoog een 
veelbelovend instrument is om private kennis en ervaring in een vroeg stadium te 
ontsluiten, mits het instrument op de juiste wijze wordt gebruikt. 
  
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt de verbinding tussen de aanlegfase en de fase van beheer en 
onderhoud onderzocht door de rol en de invloed van geïntegreerde DBFM contracten 
in de Nederlandse praktijk van weginfrastructuurplanning te onderzoeken. Naast de 
verbinding tussen de aanlegfase en de beheer en onderhoudsfase behelst deze 
contractvorm ook een verbinding met eerdere activiteiten in (plan)ontwerp van 
weginfrastructuur. In het hoofdstuk wordt de duurzaamheid van DBFM contracten 
geanalyseerd door drie dimensies van inclusiviteit nader te onderzoeken: actoren, 
ruimte en tijd. De actordimensie laat zien dat gedeelde belangen en doelen in het 
contract en tussen de consortiumpartijen kunnen ontstaan als gevolg van DBFM 
contracten, maar dat de gesloten aanbestedingsprocedure de betrokkenheid van de 
maatschappij belemmerd. De ruimtedimensie laat zien dat er door DBFM contracten 
mogelijkheden worden gecreëerd om geïntegreerde duurzame ontwerpen te 
realiseren, maar dat er problemen kunnen ontstaan door niet flexibele projectkaders in 
gedetailleerde aanbestedingsprocedures en door spanningen op het raakvlak van 
projecttaken binnen het contract en management van het infrastructuurnetwerk 
daarbuiten. De tijdsdimensie laat zien dat stimulansen voor het verbeteren van de 
inclusiviteit over de tijd in een DBFM contracten kunnen leiden tot levenscyclus 
optimalisaties, in de vorm van kostenbeheersing in de levenscyclus en verbeterde 
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levenscyclus management. Het blijkt echter moeilijk om vooraf, in de aanbesteding, 
robuuste prestatiecriteria te formuleren. Daarnaast is de exploitatie van de snelwegen 
niet opgenomen in de geïntegreerde contracten, waardoor optimalisaties met 
exploitatie niet plaatsvinden en de verbinding met de eerste fasen in de plancyclus 
(beleidsvorming en planvorming) bemoeilijkt wordt. Op basis van de analyse van de 
DBFM contracten wroden drie strategieën richting een meer duurzame ontwikkeling van 
weginfrastructuur aanbevolen Ten eerste kan green procurement (in het Nederlands: 
duurzame aanbesteding) helpen om duurzame selectieciteria, gunningcriteria en 
prestatiecriteria op te stellen. Ten tweede kan door strategisch asset management (in 
het Nederlands: beheer van de netwerkobjecten en middelen) de verbinding van 
verkeersmanagement en onderhoudsmanagement naar strategische planvoorbereiding 
in de beleids- en planvormingsfasen beter gelegd worden. Tenslotte kan relational 
contracting (in het Nederlands: relationele contractering) unieke, afhankelijke relaties 
creëren die door hun adaptieve karakter beter kunnen omgaan met complexiteit. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 6 worden publieke en private ervaringen met levenscyclusintegratie bij 
elkaar gebracht. In tegenstelling tot de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5, die hoofdzakelijk 
op basis van case studies zijn geschreven, vormen focusgroep discussies de 
methodologische basis van dit hoofdstuk. Voor de discussies zijn verschillende stellingen 
geformuleerd op basis van de bevindingen in eerdere hoofdstukken, die vervolgens 
door een mix van publieke en private deelnemers zijn bediscussieerd. Deze deelnemers 
zijn experts uit de praktijk wanneer het gaat om het toepassen van de initiatieven voor 
levenscyclusintegratie in verschillende fasen van het planproces. De focusgroep 
discussies stelden hen in staat om op basis van hun kennis en ervaring uit de praktijk te 
gebruiken om te reflecteren op de mogelijkheden voor het combineren van 
verschillende integratie initiatieven in een meer geïntegreerde levenscyclusbenadering, 
welke beter om zou kunnen gaan met projectcomplexiteit. Twee componenten van 
projectcomplexiteit werden gebruikt in deze discussies: interne projectcomplexiteit - de 
mate van verbondenheid tussen de projectcomponenten - en externe complexiteit - de 
mate van interactie van een project met haar omgeving. Uit de discussies is gebleken 
dat huidige integratie initiatieven, vroege marktbetrokkenheid, vervlechting en 
parallellisatie, concurrentiegerichte dialoog en DBFM contracten, en combinaties 
daarvan, goed om kunnen gaan met interne projectcomplexiteit. Combinaties van 
huidige initiatieven blijken moeilijker om te kunnen gaan met externe 
projectcomplexiteit: de initiatieven worden te rigide toegepast en laten te weinig 
interactie en flexibiliteit toe om de politieke en maatschappelijke onzekerheden te 
kunnen adresseren die geassocieerd worden met externe projectcomplexiteit. De 
conclusie van dit hoofdstuk is dat integratie initiatieven in potentie zowel interne als 
externe projectcomplexiteit het hoofd kunnen bieden, maar dat in de toepassing in de 
praktijk de mogelijkheden niet optimaal worden benut. Op basis van dit hoofdstuk 
wordt aanbevolen om leerervaringen en kennisdeling te stimuleren door meer 
dynamische procesmanagement. Daarnaast zou interactie gedurende de levenscyclus 
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van planning verder kunnen worden gestimuleerd, bijvoorbeeld door cross-functional (in 
het Nederlands: functie-overschrijdende) publiek-private teams te introduceren. Ook 
nieuwe, meer adaptieve, alliantievormen zouden in het planproces kunnen worden 
opgenomen, voornamelijk om beter om te kunnen gaan met de externe complexiteit in 
de rigide DBFM contracten. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 7 zijn de conclusies van deze studie gegeven, gebaseerd op de publieke 
en private ervaringen met initiatieven voor levenscyclusintegratie. Deze ervaringen 
verschaffen inzicht in de relevantie en de toepasbaarheid van levenscyclusintegratie 
gedurende het Nederlandse planproces voor weginfrastructuur. Geconcludeerd kan 
worden dat levenscyclusintegratie mogelijk is en dat het meerwaarde kan opleveren 
voor het planproces, mits het binnen de juiste context op een passende manier wordt 
toegepast. Vroege marktbetrokkenheid, vervlechting en parallellisatie, de 
concurrentiegerichte dialoog en DBFM contracten kunnen private kennis en ervaring 
ontsluiten, een constructieve publiek-private dialoog stimuleren en kunnen 
levenscyclusoptimalisaties faciliteren door de fasen van beleidsvorming, planvorming, 
aanleg en beheer en onderhoud beter te verbinden. Het is belangrijk om de potentiële 
kosten van toepassing, bijvoorbeeld de stijgende transactiekosten, af te wegen ten 
opzichte van de potentiële meerwaarde van het toepassen van integratie initiatieven. 
 
Om gedurende het planproces de potentie van marktbetrokkenheid effectief te kunnen 
gebruiken moet deze in alle fasen van de levenscyclus worden afgestemd op de 
complexiteit van een project en haar context. Het kan in de praktijk moeilijk blijken om 
de mate en het type van complexiteit (intern en/of extern) vast te stellen. Daarnaast 
kan complexiteit verschillen over de tijd gedurende het planproces. Om de bijdrage 
van levenscyclusintegratie aan projectmanagement te kunnen schetsen zijn vier typen 
projectomstandigheden verkend op mogelijke combinaties van initiatieven van 
levenscyclusintegratie in een meer geïntegreerde levenscyclusbenadering. In simpele 
projecten, met een lage interne en een externe projectcomplexiteit, kan de focus 
gelegd worden op competitie als governance strategie en kunnen relatief eenvoudige 
planprocedures, aanbestedingsprocedures en contracten worden toegepast. Dit helpt 
om de transactiekosten laag te houden. Voor gecompliceerde projecten, met een hoge 
interne en een lage externe projectcomplexiteit, spelen alle drie de governance 
strategieën een relatief gelijkwaardige rol: coördinatie, competitie en coöperatie lijken 
noodzakelijk om de interne projectcomplexiteit het hoofd te bieden. Vroege 
marktbetrokkenheid door marktconsultaties en ontwerpwedstrijden, parallellisatie van 
publieke plan- en aanbestedingsprocedures, de concurrentiegerichte dialoog en DBFM 
contracten zijn integratie initiatieven die passen bij dit type projectomstandigheden. 
Voor context-complexe projecten, met een lage interne en een hoge externe 
projectcomplexiteit, kan de focus van de governance strategieën liggen op coöperatie 
en coördinatie. De integratie initiatieven die zich expliciet richten op het stimuleren van 
publiek-publieke coöperatie zijn in zulke projectomstandigheden geschikt. Vooral 
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vroege marktbetrokkenheid in de beleids- en planvormingsfase kan de publieke 
partijen helpen om externe complexiteit te adresseren. In “gecomplexiceerde” 
projecten, met een hoge interne èn een hoge externe projectcomplexiteit, is met name 
coöperatie als governance strategie essentieel om de uitwisseling van kennis en 
ervaring mogelijk te maken zodat met hoge interne en hoge externe 
projectcomplexiteit kan worden omgegaan. Initiatieven die bij deze governance 
strategie en de projectcomplexiteit passen zijn marktverkenningen, vervlechting, de 
concurrentiegerichte dialoog en allianties.  
 
Op basis van deze studie naar de ervaringen met levenscyclusintegratie door 
marktbetrokkenheid in de Nederlandse weginfrastructuurplanning kunnen enkele 
aanbevelingen voor onderzoek worden geformuleerd. De eerste aanbeveling is om 
verder internationaal en sector-overstijgend vergelijkend onderzoek uit te voeren om 
inzicht te verkrijgen in de ervaringen in andere landen en in andere vergelijkbare 
sectoren. Ten tweede kan ter aanvulling van deze studie naar de ontwikkelende 
praktijk met marktbetrokkenheid, ex-post evaluatie van infrastructuurprojecten worden 
uitgevoerd. Ten derde kunnen andere initiatieven voor levenscyclusintegratie en voor 
marktbetrokkenheid verkend worden. Een vierde aanbeveling is om extra onderzoek 
uit te voeren naar de relatie tussen projectmanagement en netwerkmanagement 
strategieën en instrumenten. Dit zou kunnen helpen om de levenscyclus van planning te 
sluiten door de verbinding te leggen tussen de fase van beheer en onderhoud en die 
van beleidsvorming. Een laatste aanbeveling voor verder onderzoek is om de relaties 
tussen complexiteit en de verschillende combinaties van onderzochte initiatieven verder 
te verkennen, vanwege de zich steeds verder ontwikkelende praktijk. Naast deze vijf 
aanbevelingen voor verder onderzoek kunnen ook enkele aanbevelingen worden 
gedaan voor de praktijk van weginfrastructuurplanning. Zoals hierboven al is 
aangegeven is het van belang om de marktbetrokkenheid aan te passen op de 
projectcomplexiteit, het projectdoel en het karakter van het project, waarbij de 
meerwaarde en de transactiekosten voor het toepassen van integratie initiatieven 
moeten worden afgewogen. Het stellen van vroege publieke projectkaders kan helpen 
bij het in de praktijk brengen van de initiatieven, waarbij planning strategieën op basis 
van netwerkmanagement richtinggevend kunnen werken. Daarnaast is het essentieel om 
voortdurende open interactie te bewerkstelligen waarin de maatschappij ook 
betrokken is, om innovatie en leerervaringen te stimuleren en om ideeën voor 
verandering vanuit de markt te koesteren. Dit kan zorgen voor een adaptieve 
benadering die complexiteit het hoofd kan bieden en duurzame ontwikkeling van 
weginfrastructuur kan realiseren.  
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A. List of interviewees 
 
Public parties in Dutch Road Infrastructure planning 
 Function Organisation Projects Date 
1 Alliance manager Rijkswaterstaat A2 Alliance Hooggelegen June 2010 
2 Planning stakeholder 
manager 
Rijkswaterstaat A2 Maastricht January 2010 
3 Technical manager Rijkswaterstaat A4 Steenbergen February 2008 
4 Contract manager Rijkswaterstaat A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal December 2009 
5 Legal advisor Rijkswaterstaat A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal November 2009 
6 Planning stakeholder 
manager 
Rijkswaterstaat A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal April 2011 
7 Procurement manager Rijkswaterstaat A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal April 2011 
8 Purchasing manager Rijkswaterstaat A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal January 2010 
9 Contract manager Rijkswaterstaat A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein January 2010 
10 Legal advisor Rijkswaterstaat A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein February 2010 
11 Manager back office Rijkswaterstaat A15 Maasvlakte–Vaanplein December 2009 
12 Planning stakeholder 
manager 
Rijkswaterstaat A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein January 2010 
13 Project director Rijkswaterstaat A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein January 2010 
14 Legal advisor Rijkswaterstaat Afsluitdijk Renewal November 2007 
15 Project director Rijkswaterstaat Afsluitdijk Renewal March 2011 
16 Project Manager Rijkswaterstaat Afsluitdijk Renewal February 2010 
17 Project manager Dutch Province Haak om Leeuwarden December 2010 
18 Project director Dutch Municipality IJmeerlijn April 2011 
19 Procurement manager Rijkswaterstaat N31 Zurich-Harlingen February 2008 
20 Project director Dutch Province N31 Zurich-Harlingen February 2008 
21 Project manager Dutch Province Rondweg N348 March 2011 
22 Contract manager Rijkswaterstaat Second Coentunnel January 2010 
23 Legal advisor Rijkswaterstaat Second Coentunnel January 2010 
24 Procurement manager Rijkswaterstaat Urgency approach, A12 
Utrecht-Veenendaal 
March 2010 
25 Senior policy advisor Dutch Municipality Not applicable November 2010 
26 Senior procurement 
advisor 
Dutch Municipality Not applicable January 2011 
27 Project manager 
sustainability 
Dutch Province Not applicable November 2010 
28 Process manager Dutch Province Not applicable January 2011 
29 Senior policy advisor Dutch Province Not applicable December 2010 
30 Asset manager Rijkswaterstaat Not applicable February 2011 
31 Program manager on 
Sustainability  
Rijkswaterstaat Not applicable October 2010 
32 Planning stakeholder 
manager 
Rijkswaterstaat Not applicable February 2011 
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Private Parties in Dutch road infrastructure planning  
 Function Organisation Projects Date 
33 Bid director large construction firm A2 Maastricht, A12 
Utrecht-Veenendaal, A15 
Maasvlakte-Vaanplein, 
Second  Coentunnel 
March 2011 
34 Director Tender Division  large construction firm A2 Maastricht, A12 
Utrecht-Veenendaal 
January 2010 
35 Project director  large construction 
consortium 
A2 Maastricht, A15 
Utrecht-Veenendaal, 
Second  Coentunnel 
January 2010 
36 Director Tender Division large construction firm A2 Maastricht, Second 
Coentunnel 
March 2011 
37 Senior project advisor large construction firm A2 Maastricht January 2010 
38 Senior project manager large construction firm A2 Maastricht February 2010 
39 Senior project advisor small engineering firm Second Maasvlakte March 2008 
40 Director Tender Division large construction firm A4 Steenbergen, A15 
Maasvlakte Vaanplein 
May 2011 
41 Transport and Traffic 
advisor 
large engineering 
firm 
A12 Utrecht-Veneendaal January 2010 
42 Director infrastructure 
development 
large construction firm A15, Second Coentunnel, 
A2 Maastricht 
February 2010 
43 Commercial and risk 
manager 
large dredging firm Afsluitdijk Renewal September 2008 
44 Director business unit large construction & 
engineering firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal September 2008 
45 Director business unit large construction & 
engineering firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal January 2009 
46 Program director 
‘contracts’ 
large engineering 
firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal September 2008 
47 Project manager area 
development 
large construction & 
engineering firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal September 2008 
48 Project manager area 
development 
large construction & 
engineering firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal January 2009 
49 Project manager 
infrastructure 
large engineering 
firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal September 2008 
50 Project manager 
infrastructure 
large engineering 
firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal January 2009 
51 Project manager water 
management 
large engineering 
firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal September 2008 
52 Regional director large construction & 
engineering firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal September 2008 
53 Regional director large construction & 
engineering firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal January 2009 
54 Strategic advisor large engineering 
firm 
Afsluitdijk Renewal September 2008 
55 Senior project advisor small engineering firm Interweaving projects December 2009 
54 Operations supervisor large construction firm Second Coentunnel February 2010 
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Interviewees from other organisations   
 Function Organisation Date 
55 Associate Professor  Construction Engineering and 
Management (USA) 
January 2011 
56 Professor Construction and procurement law, the 
Netherlands 
March 2010 
57 Project manager area 
development 
Dienst Landelijk Gebied December 2010 
58 Planning stakeholder 
manager 
Dienst Landelijk Gebied January 2011 
59 Program director Federal highways administration (USA) January 2011 
60 Senior infrastructure planning 
and policy advisor 
Large consultancy firm (USA) February 2011 
61 Project manager Port of Rotterdam  November 2010 
62 Project manager Port of Rotterdam November 2010 
63 Project manager ProRail November 2010 
64 Procurement manager ProRail December 2010 
65 Senior policy advisor ProRail November 2010 
66 Senior policy advisor  TenneT December 2010 
67 Project manager TenneT January 2011 
68 Visiting professional  Transportation research board (USA) January 2011 
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B. Interview guidelines 
 
B.1 Interview guide early (precompetitive) market involvement (see Chapter 2) 
Algemeen (General questions) 
Wat verstaat u onder vroege marktbetrokkenheid? 
(What is your understanding of the concept of early market involvement?) 
 
Wat zijn uw ervaringen met vroege marktbetrokkenheid?  
(What are your experiences with early market involvement?) 
 
Wat is uw beeld van /oordeel over “vroege marktbetrokkenheid”?  
(What is your opinion on early market involvement?) 
 
Overheidsinitiatieven (Government initiatives) 
Marktconsultaties, marktverkenningen, prijsvragen (Market consultations, market 
reconnaissances, design contests)  
 
Hoe staat u ten opzichte van overheidsinitiatieven voor vroege marktbetrokkenheid? (= in dit 
onderzoek betrokkenheid voor aanbesteding/voltooiing planvorming) 
(What is your opinion on government initiatives for early market involvement? (= in this research 
involvement before procurement/ completion of project plan development)) 
- Hoe zijn deze opgenomen in de bedrijfscultuur? 
(How are these initiatives incorporated in the organizational culture of public and private 
organizations?) 
 
Wat zijn voor u essentiële condities die bepalen of marktpartijen meedoen aan 
overheidsinitiatieven tot vroege marktbetrokkenheid?  
(What are essential conditions that determine if market parties participate in government 
initiatives for early market involvement?) 
 
Wat zijn de voordelen overheidsinitiatieven tot vroege marktbetrokkenheid? 
(What are the advantages of government initiatives of early marketinvolvement?) 
- Als marktpartij? 
(As a private party?) 
- Als overheid? (maatschappij) 
(As government? (society)) 
 
Tegen welke problemen loopt u op bij overheidsinitiatieven tot vroege marktbetrokkenheid?  
(Which problems occur in government initiatives for early market involvement?) 
- Consultaties 
(Market consultations) 
 
- Verkenningen 
(Market reconnaissances) 
 
- Prijsvragen 
(Early design contests) 
Wat zijn de issues/problemen die u tegenkomt en welke afwegingen maakt u in de volgende 
fasen/onderdelen van de overheidsinitiatieven tot vroege marktbetrokkenheid? 
(What are the issues/problems that occur and what decisions do you make in the following 
stages/parts of the government initiatives for early market involvement?) 
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- Bekendmaking/ communicatie 
(Announcement/ communication) 
- Partner zoeken/ organisatie optuigen 
(Searching private partners/ setting up 
an organisation) 
- Product/ input aanleveren 
(Deliver product/ input) 
- Beoordeling product/ input) 
(Judge product/ input) 
- Vervolg/ aanbesteding/ publieke 
uitwerking 
(Continuation in procurement / in public 
plan development) 
 
 
Welke verbeteringen kan u aanbevelen?  
(Which improvements do you recommend to the initiatives?) 
- Consultaties 
  (Market consultations) 
 
- - Verkenningen 
  (Market reconnaissances) 
 
- - Prijsvragen 
  (Early design contests) 
 
Eigen Initiatieven (Market initiatives: unsolicited proposals) 
Hoe staat u ten opzichte van eigen initiatieven?  
(What is your opinion on unsolicited proposals?) 
- Hoe zijn deze opgenomen in de bedrijfscultuur? 
  (How are these incorporated in the organizational culture?) 
 
Wat zijn in uw ogen essentiële condities om eigen initiatieven tot een succes te maken? 
(What are essential conditions to make unsolicited proposals a succes?) 
 
Wat zijn de voordelen van eigen initiatieven voor vroege marktbetrokkenheid? 
(What are the advantages of unsolicited proposals?) 
- Als marktpartij? 
  (As a private party?) 
- Als overheid? (maatschappij) 
  (As government? (society)) 
 
Wat zijn de issues/ problemen die u tegenkomt en welke afwegingen maakt u in de volgende 
fasen/onderdelen van eigen initiatieven?  
(What are the issues/ problems that occur and what decisions do you make in the following 
stages/parts of the government initiatives for early market involvement?) 
- Bekendmaking/ communicatie 
(Announcement/ communication) 
- Partner zoeken/ organisatie optuigen 
(Searching private partners/ setting up 
an organisation) 
- Product/ input aanleveren 
(Deliver product/ input) 
- Beoordeling product/ input) 
(Judge product/ input) 
- Vervolg/ aanbesteding/ publieke 
uitwerking 
(Continuation in procurement / in public 
plan development) 
 
 
Welke verbeteringen kan u aanbevelen?  
(Which improvements can you recommend?) 
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B.2 Interview guide early contractor involvement (see Chapter 3) 
 
Open interviews were conducted in which the following points and questions were raised: 
 
- Doel en verwachtingen bij vervlechting 
(Goals and expectations of early contractor involvement) 
 
- Welk type van vervlechting is gekozen? En waarom? 
(Which type of early contractor involvement has been chosen? And why?) 
- Parallellisatie of vervlechting? 
(Parallellisation or interweaving?) 
 
- Wat zijn de resultaten van de toegepaste vorm van vervlechting? 
(What are the results of the applied type of early contractor involvement?) 
 
- Wat zijn de sterktes, zwaktes, kansen en bedreigingen van de toegepaste vorm van 
vervlechting? 
(What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threaths of the applied type of 
early contractor involvement?) 
 
- Wat zijn de lessen die getrokken kunnen worden uit de toepassing van vervlechting? 
(Which lessons can be learned from applying early contractor involvement in practice?) 
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B.3 Interview guide competitive dialogue (CD) procurement procedure (see Chapter 4) 
  
Persoonlijk (Personal information) 
Functie  
(Job description and personal background) 
 
Wat is uw ervaring met de CD? Bij welke projecten?  
(What is your personal expertise with performing competitive dialogues? In which projects?) 
 
Motivatie & meerwaarde (Motivation & added value) 
Wat zijn de redenen voor het voeren van een CD in dit project?  
(What are the reasons for chosing the CD procedure in this project?) 
- Harde factoren: Technisch/juridisch/financieel  
(Hard factors: Technical/legal/financial) 
- Zachte factoren: Proces  
(Soft factors: Process and interaction) 
 
Welke meerwaarde heeft de CD opgeleverd?  
(Which added value has the CD delivered?) 
- Voor het project?  
(To the project?) 
- Voor de organisatie (opdrachtgever)?  
(To the organisation?) 
 
Wat was het profiel waaraan de opdrachtnemer moest voldoen? 
(What was the profile of the desired private party?) 
-  Hoe worden gegadigde gestimuleerd in te schrijven? 
(How are private parties encouraged to submit an offer?) 
 
Actoren (Actors) 
Beschikte de opdrachtgever (OG) over voldoende kennis & kunde?  
(Did the procuring authority have enough knowledge and expertise to perform the CD?) 
- Problemen bij de samenstelling van projectorganisatie/dialoogteam?  
(Were there any problems in setting up the project organisation/dialogue team?) 
- Problemen bij de beschikbaarheid van personeel en de werkbelasting? 
(Were there any problems in the availability of personnel or the workload? 
 
Beschikt de gegadigden over voldoende kennis en kunde? 
(Did the private parties have enough knowledge and expertise to perform the CD?) 
- Problemen met de capaciteit of met de werklast? 
(Were there any problems in the availability of personnel or the workload?) 
 
Sloten de kennis en kunde van de dialoogteamleden van OG en gegadigden op elkaar aan?  
(Did the knowledge and expertise of the members of the public dialogue teams correspond with 
that of the members of the private dialogue teams?) 
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- Verliepen de gesprekken vertrouwelijk en transparant? 
(Were the dialogue meetings confidential? Were they transparent?) 
- Op welke vlak lagen de wijzigingsvoorstellen die voortkwamen uit de dialoog? 
(What was the character of the proposals for changes to the terms of reference that 
resulted from the dialogue meetings?) 
 
Opzet (Set-up) 
Hoe is de dialoog vormgegeven in fases?  
(How was the CD set-up in stages/rounds/phases?) 
- Wordt deze opzet als efficiënt ervaren?  
(Was this set-up efficient?_ 
- Wat zijn de ervaringen met algemene en specialistische overleggen?  
(What are the experiences with the general and specialist meetings?) 
- Wat zijn de ervaringen met algemene en individuele vragen? 
(What are the experiences with general and individual questions?) 
 
Hoe werd de concurrentie zichtbaar? 
(How did the influence of competition become visible in the CD?) 
- Waarop werd geconcurreerd? (technisch, financieel, proces) 
(On which aspects was the competition? (technical, financial, process)) 
- Hebben de gegadigden daarbij ideeën/opmerkingen achtergehouden? 
(Did the private parties withhold any ideas or remarks (until later stages)?)  
- Hoe wordt openheid aan de kant van de gegadigden gestimuleerd? 
(Did the procuring authority stimulate open interaction in the dialogue meetings? And 
how?) 
  
Hoe werd de relatie met de beoordelingscommissie/gunningsadviescommissie vormgegeven?  
(What was the relation of the dialogue teams with the jury?) 
- Waaruit bestaat het contact tussen dialoogteam en beoordelingscommissie? 
(Was there any contact between the dialogue team and the jury? What was discussed?) 
- Hoe worden ‘zachte’ factoren in de beoordeling meegenomen? 
 (How were ‘soft’ factors taken into account in the judging of the bids?) 
 
Hoe wordt de vergoeding voor deelname aan CD beoordeeld?  
(What is the opinion on the compensation for participation in the CD?) 
-  Door de opdrachtgever? Door de gegadigden? 
(Of the procuring authority? Of the private parties?) 
- Hoe verhoudt deze zich tot de transactiekosten en de kwaliteit van de biedingen? 
(What is the relation/ratio between the transaction cost and the quality of the bids?) 
- Zou dit kunnen verbeteren door met meer/minder gegadigden de CD te doorlopen? 
(Would this ratio improve if the CD was performed with more/less participants?) 
 
Hoe worden externe partijen (bv. lokale en regionale overheden) betrokken? 
(How are external actors (e.g. local and regional governments) involved?) 
- Is er sprake van contact en wanneer? (voor/tijdens dialoog, voor beoordeling)  
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(Is there any contact with these actors? When? (before/during the CD, before/during the 
judging)) 
- Waaruit bestaat dit contact? (Informeren, consulteren, actief meedenken)  
(What was the character of this contact? (informing the external actors, consulting these 
actors, actively seeking input from these actors)) 
- Leverde dit problemen op? (politieke druk, tijdsdruk, minder onderhandelingsruimte)  
(Where there any problems in the contact with  the external actors? (political pressure, 
time pressure, decreasing negotiation opportunities)) 
 
Algemeen (General questions) 
Wat zijn de succesfactoren bij het voeren van een CD?  
(What are the success factors in carrying out the CD?) 
-  Hard (financieel, technisch, juridisch) 
(Hard (financial, technical, legal)) 
-  Zacht (proces) 
(Soft (process)) 
 
Wat zijn de faalfactoren bij het voeren van een CD? 
(What are the factors that could lead to failure in the CD?) 
-  Hard (financieel, technisch, juridisch) 
(Hard (financial, technical, legal)) 
-  Zacht (proces) 
(Soft (process)) 
 
Moet de CD vaker of minder vaak worden toegepast?  
(Should the CD be applied more often or less often? Why?) 
- Wanneer wel/niet?  
(In which conditions should it (not) be applied?) 
- Hoe verhoudt de CD zich t.o.v. andere aanbestedingsvormen?  
(What is the relation of the CD with other procurement procedures?) 
- Hoe verhoudt de CD zich tot andere marktbenaderingsinstrumenten? (marktverkenning, 
marktconsultatie, prijsvraag)  
(What is the relation of the CD with other market involvement instruments? (market 
reconnaissance, market consultation, early design contest, market scan)) 
 
Slotvraag (Closing questions) 
Heeft u nog vragen die u graag gesteld zou willen zien?  
(Do you have any questions which you would like to be asked?) 
- Andere vragen of opmerkingen? 
(Remarks, comments and suggestions?) 
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B.4 Interview guide integrated DBFM contracts (see Chapter 5) 
 
Duurzaamheid in concepten, instrumenten en beoordeling (Sustainability in concepts, instruments 
and appraisal) 
 
Welke definitie van duurzaamheid wordt in het project gehanteerd?  
(How is sustainability defined in this project?) 
- Zijn er concrete concepten/instrumenten aan verbonden? (bv. C2C, DuboCalc, CO2-
prestatieladder) 
(Are there concepts/instruments attached to this definition? (e.g. C2C, DuboCalc, CO2-
performance ladder)) 
- Hoe wordt deze gemeten?  
(How is sustainability being measured?) 
o Hoe vindt de beoordeling door commissie plaats?  
(How does the jury assess the sustainability?) 
o Was deze ook betrokken bij de formulering van duurzaamheid? 
(Was the jury also involved in the definition of sustainability in this project?) 
 
Ambities, voorwaarden en prijs (Ambitions, preconditions and costs) 
Hoe worden de ambities/voorwaarden beoordeeld? (percentages, aftrek, etcetera) 
(How are the public ambitions/preconditions being judged? (percentages, deductions, etc.) 
- Was de commissie ook betrokken bij de formulering van de ambities/voorwaarden? 
(Was the jury also involved in the formulation of the public ambitions/preconditions?) 
 
Hoe verhoudt zich de (plafond)prijs tov de ambities/voorwaarden? 
(Wat is the relation between the (maximum) costs and the ambitions/preconditions?) 
- Hoe is dit naar marktpartijen gecommuniceerd en hoe is dit ontvangen door de markt? 
(How is this relation being communicated to the private parties and how was this received 
by these parties?) 
- Hoe verhoudt de straf op de bieding als ambities/voorwaarden niet waargemaakt 
worden zich tot de (plafond)prijs? 
(What is the deduction on the bids if ambitions/preconditions are not taken into account in 
relation to the (maximum) costs?) 
- Vindt er zo ‘verkapte’ gunning op prijs plaats? 
(Does this approach lead to a disguised awarding on prize?) 
 
Procesinvestering, biedingskosten en innovatie (Process investments, bidding costs and 
innovation) 
Hoe veel investering in het planproces (FTE / biedingskosten) aan publieke zijde? 
(What was the investment in the planning process (in FTE/bidding costs)?) 
- Bij de overhead/aanbestedende dienst? 
(Of the public parties?) 
- Bij de private partijen/ gegadigden? 
(Of the private parties?) 
- Is dit in overeenstemming met de publieke inschatting vooraf? 
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(Does this correspond to the estimations of the public parties made beforehand?) 
- Hoe verhouden de biedingskosten zich tot de hoogte van de tegemoetkoming? 
(What is the ratio between the bidding costs and the size of the compensation?) 
Heeft de aanpak met ambities geleid tot innovatie?  
(Did the approach with ambitions/preconditions lead to innovation?) 
- Procesinnovatie?  
(Process innovation?) 
- Productinnovatie? 
(Product innovation?) 
- Waardoor werd dit beperkt / gestimuleerd? 
(Which conditions stimulated/limited this innovation?) 
 
Contractvorm (Type of contract) 
Waarom is gekozen voor een DBFM contract?  
(Why did you choose the DBFM contract? 
- Waren er ook andere contractvormen mogelijk? (bv. D&C, DBM, alliantie) 
(Were other types of contracts  possible? (e.g. D&C, DBM, alliance)) 
- Waarom is het contract met de gekozen aanbestedingsprocedure aanbesteed? (bijv. 
met een concurrentiegerichte dialoog)  
(Why did you choose the procurement procedure? (e.g. the competitive dialogue)) 
 
Waarom is gekozen voor een F-component in het contract? 
(Why is there a Finance-component included in the contract?) 
- Wat is de invloed van de F-component op de dialoog? 
(What is the influence of including the finance component in procurement?) 
- Wat is de invloed van de F-component op de biedingen? 
(What is the influence of including the finance component on the bids?) 
- Wat is de invloed van de F-component op de uitvoer? 
(What is the influence of including the finance component on the construction?) 
 
Waarom is gekozen voor een M-component in het contract? 
(Why is there a Maintenance-component included in the contract?) 
- Wat is de invloed van de M-component op de dialoog? 
(What is the influence of including the maintenance component in procurement?) 
- Wat is de invloed van de M-component op de biedingen? 
(What is the influence of including the maintenance component on the bids?) 
- Wat is de invloed van de M-component op de uitvoer? 
(What is the influence of including the maintenance component on the construction?) 
 
 
Afbakening en externe betrokkenheid (Delineation and external involvement) 
Hoe worden externe partijen (bv. lokale en regionale overheden) betrokken gedurende het 
contract? 
(How are external actors (e.g. local and regional governments) involved throughout the contract?) 
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- Is er sprake van contact en wanneer? (voor/tijdens dialoog, voor beoordeling, tijdens 
aanleg, tijdens onderhoud)  
(Is there any contact with these actors? When? (before/during procurement, 
before/during the judging, during construction, during maintenance)) 
- Waaruit bestaat dit contact? (Informeren, consulteren, actief meedenken)  
(What was the character of this contact? (informing the external actors, consulting these 
actors, actively seeking input from these actors)) 
- Leverde dit problemen op? (bijv. politieke druk, tijdsdruk, minder onderhandelings- en 
werkruimte)  
(Where there any problems in the contact with  the external actors? (e.g. political 
pressure, time pressure, decreasing opportunities for negotiation and 
construction/maintenance)) 
 
Hoe is de relatie tussen contract/project en asset management / netwerkmanagement 
vormgegeven? 
(What is the relation between the contract or project and the asset management or network?) 
- Op welke basis is de M-component afgebakend? 
(How is the maintenance component delineated in relation to the infrastructure network?) 
 
Evaluatie (Evaluation) 
Wat is uw oordeel over de toepassing van DBFM contracten in dit project? 
(What is your general opinion on the application of a DBFM contract in this project?) 
- Wat is uw oordeel over de marktbetrokkenheid in dit project? (Vroeger/ later, anders 
betrekken markt) 
(What is your opinion on the involvement of market parties in this project? (earlier/later, 
other way of involvement market parties) 
- Wat is uw oordeel over de afbakening van het contract? (Bredere of smallere scope, 
meer/minder betrekken lokale/externe partijen) 
(What is your opinion on the delineation of the contract? (Broader or smaller scope, 
more/less involvement of local/external actors) 
 
Wat zijn de sterke/zwakke punten van de toepassing van DBFM in dit project? 
(What are the strengths and weaknesses of the application of a DBFM contract in this project?) 
- Wat zijn mogelijke verbeteringen voor toekomstige projecten? 
(What are improvements that can be made for future projects?) 
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C. Composition of focus groups 
 
Focus group 1 
 
   
Role Organization Public/private Expertise 
Public planning expert 
Rijkswaterstaat: 
knowledge and 
advisory division 
Public Planning, evaluation 
Project management 
expert 
Rijkswaterstaat: 
implementation division 
Public / 
private 
Project management, 
Market structures 
Technical expert Rijkswaterstaat: implementation division Public 
Pre-competitive market 
involvement 
Policy expert Rijkswaterstaat: policy staff Public Policy 
Contracting expert Construction company Private Tender management 
Legal expert 
Rijkswaterstaat: 
knowledge and 
advisory division 
Public PPP: Contracting and contracts  
 
Focus group 2 
    
Role Organization Public/private Expertise 
Financial expert Construction company Private PPP investments  
Contracting expert Construction company Private Tender management 
Public planning expert Engineering consultancy Private Planning, evaluation 
Project management 
expert Project consultancy Public/Private 
Planning, project 
management 
Contracting expert 
Rijkswaterstaat: 
implementation 
division 
Public Contracting 
Contract management 
expert 
Rijkswaterstaat: 
implementation 
division 
Public Project contract management 
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D. Focus group discussion guideline 
 
Propositions for focus group discussions (see Chapter 6) 
 
Proposition 1 
De meerwaarde van marktbetrokkenheid voor de planning van weginfrastructuur weegt op 
tegen de verhoogde procedurele risico’s en transactiekosten. 
(The added value of market involvement for road infrastructure planning weighs up against the 
increased procedural risks and transaction costs). 
 
Proposition 2 
Na goede vroege marktbetrokkenheid in verkenning en planvorming is de complexiteit 
geadresseerd en kan er ‘traditioneel’ worden aanbesteed (= zonder intensieve publiek-
private interactie). 
(After pre-competitive market involvement in the plan and policymaking stages, the project 
complexity has been addressed and projects can be procured traditionally (= without extensive 
public-private interaction).  
 
Proposition 3 
Geïntegreerde contracten (zoals DBFM contracten) zijn op dit moment te rigide om aan te 
sluiten bij de complexiteit van projecten met een concurrentiegerichte dialoog (= met 
intensieve publiek-private interactie).  
(Integrated lifecycle contracts (such as Design-Build-Finance-Maintain contracts) are currently too 
rigid to allow for the complexity of projects procured through a competitive dialogue (= with 
extensive public-private interaction)). 
 
Proposition 4 
De lange duur en het gedetailleerde karakter van DBFM contracten belemmeren adequaat 
asset management in een dynamische omgeving en planvorming voor nieuwe infrastructuur. 
(The long period and detailed character of DBFM contracts limit the opportunities for asset 
management in a dynamic environment and limit plan-making for new or additional 
infrastructure). 
 
Proposition 5 
Competitie (markt) en coördinatie (overheid) zorgen voor dominantie van juridische factoren in 
het planproces en maken coöperatie op technisch-inhoudelijk aspecten onmogelijk. 
(Competition (by market parties) and coordination (by government) create a dominance of legal 
factors in the planning process and make cooperation on technical-qualitative aspects impossible). 
 
Proposition 6 
Levenscyclusintegratie door marktbetrokkenheid verhoogt de complexiteit van de reeds 
complexe infrastructuurplanning.  
(Lifecycle integration through market involvement increases the complexity of already complex 
infrastructure planning processes) 
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E. Overview of market involvement throughout the planning process 
 
 
 
Description of models, instruments and contracts in the figure above: 
 
Market involvement assessment instruments 
- Market scan: a structured in-house government analysis, performed in the explorative stage 
of the planning process, to determine whether early market involvement could provide 
added value by looking for potential value for money (in monetary terms or in terms of 
time or quality); identifying market parties and the approach to market involvement.  
- Public-private comparator: an instrument applied in the plan development stage to indicate 
added value of public-private partnerships over more traditional construction contracts. 
- Public sector comparator: a quantitative instrument that compares the costs of private 
delivery with that of public delivery. The PSC functions as a last benchmark before the 
contract is awarded. 
 
Early market involvement models (see Chapter 2) 
- Market reconnaissance: an model to let private parties generate concepts for a problem 
predefined by government. Private parties are rewarded based on cost compensation. 
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- Early design contest: an model to let private parties generate concepts for a problem 
predefined by government. The winning private party receives a price (i.e. sum of money). 
- Market consultation: a model to let private parties review a process, approach and/or 
solution as proposed by government. Participation is voluntary and not rewarded. 
- Unsolicited proposal: a model in which a private party approaches government unrequested 
with ideas, propositions or developed plans for a problem not predefined by government. 
 
Early contractor involvement models (see Chapter 3) 
- Interweaving: the parallel execution of public planning procedures and procurement 
procedures in which there are opportunities for interaction between the two procedures. 
- Parallellisation Plus: the parallel execution of public planning procedures and procurement 
procedures in which there are some opportunities for interaction between the two 
procedures, but these opportunities are limited and strictly defined. 
- Parallellisation: the parallel execution of public planning procedures and procurement 
procedures in which there are no opportunities for interaction between the two procedures. 
 
Procurement procedures (see Chapter 4) 
- Open procedure: a procurement procedure without prequalification and negotiation of the 
contract terms (see art. 1 paragraph 11 (a) and art. 28 of EU directive 2004/18/EC). 
- Restricted procedure: a procurement procedure with pre-qualification of at least 5 
competitors and without negotiation of contract terms (see art. 1 paragraph 11 (b), art. 28 
and 44 paragraph 3 of EU directive 2004/18/EC); 
- Negotiated procedure: a procurement procedure with pre-qualification and with negotiation 
of contract terms of contract with competitors before awarding (see art. 1 paragraph 11 
(d) and art. 30 and 31 of EU directive 2004/18/EC); 
- Competitive dialogue procedure: a procedure with pre-qualification, and with dialogue with 
competitors before bidding, specifically introduced for complex projects (see art. 1 
paragraph 11 (c) and art. 29 EU 2004/18/EC): 
-  
Contract types (see Chapter 5) 
- RAW (similar to Design-Bid-Build): contract in which government works out a desired solution 
in detail: a specification of a detailed technical design with underlying preliminary calcu-
lation of materials needed and construction time. The lowest private bid wins the contract. 
- Performance contracting: maintenance contract including performance criteria and rewards.  
- E&C (Engineering and Construct): similar to a RAW contract, but contractors are also made 
responsible for working out technical design specifications. E&C contracts provide more 
opportunities for contractors to bring in their expertise in the design of a project. 
- D &C (Design and Construct): similar to an E&C contract, but contractors are made 
responsible for the complete technical design. D&C contracts provide even more 
opportunities for contractors to bring in their expertise in the design of a project. 
- DBFM (Design-Build-Finance Maintain): A D&C contract which also includes financing and 
maintaining infrastructure. DBFM contracts provide opportunities to contractors to optimize 
activities in design, construction and maintenance and the private financing.  
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Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift: 
Market Involvement throughout the Planning Lifecycle 
Public and private experiences with evolving approaches integrating  
the road infrastructure planning process 
 
Sander Lenferink 
 
1. Planning wordt traditioneel niet ervaren als een aaneengesloten proces, laat 
staan als een cyclus; in de praktijk wordt er al te vaak geprobeerd afzonderlijke 
fases directief te voltooien. (Hoofdstuk 1van dit proefschrift) 
2. De uitspraak “creativity is not the finding of a thing, but the making something out 
of it after it is found” (James Russell Lowell) gaat ook op voor vroege 
marktbetrokkenheid, dat gedefinieerd kan worden als het creatief combineren 
van bestaande innovaties. (Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift) 
3. De meerwaarde van intensievere marktbetrokkenheid is dat de overheid 
gedwongen wordt om het eens te zijn met zichzelf. (Hoofdstuk 3 van dit 
proefschrift) 
4. Voor leken lijkt de concurrentiegerichte dialoog een contradictio in terminis; in de 
praktijk blijkt dit voor de professionals ook zo te zijn. (Hoofdstuk 4 van dit 
proefschrift) 
5. Door met een leesbril op de details te willen beheersen, raakt een bijziende 
overheid het vergezicht over het geheel kwijt. (Hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift) 
6. Projectoptimalisatie in geïntegreerde contracten leidt tot netwerkdegradatie: het 
geheel minder is dan de som der delen. (Hoofdstuk 6 van dit proefschrift) 
7. Marktbetrokkenheid in de plancyclus is meer dan contracten en aanbesteden: 
innovaties en slimme combinaties zijn nodig voor een volledige 
levenscyclusbenadering. (Hoofdstuk 7 van dit proefschrift) 
8. Het succes van marktbetrokkenheid is een kwestie van “finding Ps in relationships”: 
P-P-P-P.P. (publiek-publiek-privaat-private partnerships). 
9. Het interessante van het doorlopen van een cyclus is niet dat je altijd terugkeert 
naar dezelfde plaats, maar dat de ervaring je doet veranderen. 
10. Het proces dat leidt tot een proefschrift valt moeitlijk uit te drukken in 
transactiekosten, omdat er veel meer transactieopbrengsten tegenover staan. 
11. “Alles stroomt en niets is blijvend” (Heraclites); binnen Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) staat 
alleen het aantal letters van de afkorting vast: AVV en DWW, DVS, WVL. 
12. Het onderhouden van een eerlijk speelveld met gelijke kansen is vaak net zo’n 
uitdaging als het vinden ervan in Geesteren, Finsterwolde, Zenderen of Heelsum. 
 
